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Self-disorders have long been considered as a central nucleus of the schizophrenic 
experience. It has been suggested that such self-disturbances might be associated 
with abnormal multisensory integration and abnormal bodily self-awareness. The 
primary goal of this thesis was to explore the behavioural and neurophysiological 
markers of self-disturbances in schizophrenia and in high schizotypy (i.e. a sub-clinical 
trait linked to schizophrenia). Specifically, we aimed at (i) investigating the temporal 
acuity in individuals with low and high schizotypy (ii) measuring aspects of the neural 
responses to multisensory integration in low and high schizotypes (iii) exploring how 
body representation abnormalities in both schizophrenic patients and high schizotypes 
affect basic processes of self-perception. In line with previous research showing a 
reduced multisensory acuity in schizophrenia, results from Chapter Three revealed a 
significant relationship between the temporal window within which two stimuli are 
integrated (i.e. TWI), and schizotypal personality traits; namely, higher schizotypal 
traits are associated with wider TWIs. In Chapter Four, we provided evidence of a 
selective relationship between the TWI for visuo-tactile stimuli and the individual beta 
frequency (IBF), i.e, slower IBFs accounts for larger TWIs, and between the TWI and 
schizotypy, i.e. wider TWIs are linked to higher schizotypal traits. In Chapter Five, we 
have demonstrated that patients with schizophrenia possess more malleable body 
representations and that these abnormalities are linked to early markers of 
vulnerability to the disorder (i.e. basic symptoms). Finally, findings from Chapter Six 
revealed that the abnormalities in bodily self-awareness observed in schizophrenia 
might extend to schizotypy, suggesting that such abnormalities could represent a trait 
marker for schizophrenia proneness. All in all, our results suggest that the 
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abnormalities in multisensory integration and bodily awareness observed in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders might produce a distortion in the structure of self-
experience and contribute to the emergence of the disorder. 
 
Chapter One 
1. An introduction to schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
The driving motivation of this thesis has been to examine the processes by which 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders arise. Grounding on a vast amount of research that 
has conceptualised schizophrenia spectrum disorders as “disorders of the self”, I 
aimed to connect the newest neuroscientific evidence with both early and 
contemporary theories in phenomenological psychiatry. In particular, I have focused 
on the contribution of multisensory processes in the construction and maintenance of 
bodily self-awareness, a component of the self that appears compromised since the 
very early stages of the disorder (i.e., disembodiment of the self). As such, the studies 
presented in this thesis have investigated how abnormalities in multisensory temporal 
integration (Chapter One), the underlying patterns of neuro-oscillatory activity in the 
brain (Chapter Two), body ownership (Chapter Three) and body representation 
(Chapter Four) may underlie a more profound dis-attunement between the self and 
the body, which ultimately could be predictive of schizophrenia onset. 
A disordered sense of self has long been considered as a core feature of 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Kraepelin, 1913; Bleuler, 1911; Jaspers, 1913; 
Minkowski, 1927; Sass & Parnas 2003; Gallese & Ferri, 2013; Nelson et al., 2012; Hur 
et al., 2014). The unconscious, tacit quality of self-awareness rests upon the 
sensations deriving from the perceptive processes of one’s own body interacting with 
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the world. Interestingly, a vast amount of empirical and phenomenological evidence 
has shown that schizophrenia onset is characterised by the emergence of changes 
concerning anomalies of corporeality and self-awareness. Indeed, clinical phenomena 
such as disembodiment of the self and impairments in self-other discrimination appear 
to be quite common before the first psychotic episode and are maintained after the 
patient is diagnosed with schizophrenia (Møller & Husby, 2000; Parnas, 2000; 2003; 
Raballo et al., 2011). These symptoms can manifest with a sub-delusional detachment 
from reality, reduced recognition of the body, disintegration of multisensory inputs, 
diminished self-experience or feeling of being disconnected from oneself and one’s 
action (de Haan & Fuchs, 2010; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Nelson, 2012). Recent research 
has demonstrated that self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum are temporally 
stable and are highly predictive for the emergence of the disorder in high-risk 
populations (Nordgaard et al., 2017; Parnas et al., 2011).  
However, in the past decades, diagnostic criteria have vastly neglected these aspects 
of the disorder. As a result, research on schizophrenia and its neural correlates have 
overlooked the relevance of this subjective dimension in place of an over-reliance on 
the so-called “operationalized” conglomerate of psychotic symptoms and signs and, 
more generally, on the cognitive impairments of the disorder (Parnas, 2011). Currently, 
a more comprehensive account of schizophrenia spectrum disorders and their shared 
and core features is needed. Such an account would reunite knowledge regarding the 
phenomenology of the schizophrenia spectrum (i.e. the subjective experience of 
patients) with more recent discoveries on its specific neurological and behavioural 
features. Most importantly, more attention needs to be given to the early premorbid 
and prodromal stages of the illness as an access to a moment in which the dissolution 
of normal functioning is being formed. This would contribute to evaluating and 
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describing the mechanisms that become altered in the general structure of the 
schizophrenic experience that are responsible for the emergence of the disorder. 
Ultimately, this would contribute toward indicating future directions for potential 
causative treatment. Several contemporary authors now agree on stressing the 
importance of the corporeal dimension of the self (Stangellini, 2009) and of 
multisensory integration (Postmes et al., 2014) as fundamental expressions of the 
structure of subjectivity. Both of these aspects are enclosed in the concept of minimal 
self. 
1.1 Minimal Self and Bodily Self 
At the most fundamental, phenomenological level, the notion of the “self” refers to the 
sense of possessing a first-person perspective and of being an individual with defined 
physical boundaries between oneself and the environment (Blanke & Metzinger, 
2009). According to Gallagher (2000), the concept of the “self” comprises several 
aspects of conscious experiences from low-level bodily, to high-level cognitive or 
narrative aspects. On this basis, Gallagher identified three levels of selfhood. First, the 
pre-reflective selfhood, also referred to as the minimal self, refers to a fundamental 
sense of existing with a direct and immediate ‘mineness’ of experience (Gallagher, 
2000; Sass & Parnas, 2003, 2007). The minimal self could be described as the most 
basic level of self as it is constituted by a “consciousness of oneself as an immediate 
subject of experience” and as “the pre-reflective point of origin for action, experience 
and thought” (Gallagher, 2000, p.15). Thus, this nuclear aspect of the self is localised 
at the level of the body (i.e. the embodied self), and it carries potential for action (i.e. 
praktognosia) (Gallese, 2003; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2010, 2011). Second, the reflective 
self assumes a more explicit awareness of the self as a subject of experience and 
action extended in time and in constant relationship with the outer world; at this level, 
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the self acquires the character of invariance. Finally, the social or narrative self 
involves autobiographical information or an explicit idea about one’s individual identity. 
The second and third levels of selfhood depend and are built upon the “minimal self” 
(Nelson et al., 2012). While the minimal self is a self-devoid of temporal extension (it 
is the 'I' who is experiencing here and now), the reflective self and the narrative-self 
involve a sense of continuity across time.  
Interestingly, many of the early studies on schizophrenia proposed that disturbances 
in most basic forms of selfhood are constitutive of the schizophrenia spectrum 
conditions (i.e.“schizoidia” and “latent schizophrenia”) (Bleuler, 1911; 1911; Kraepelin 
1919). Recently, this view has been reinforced and expanded by empirical studies 
providing evidence for abnormal sense of minimal self in schizophrenia (e.g., Ferri et 
al., 2012; Maeda et al., 2012; Sass, 2001; Sass & Parnas, 2003). In particular, 
research has suggested that disturbances in the minimal self may cause and maintain 
“surface-level” symptoms often observed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Maj, 
2012). Indeed, although the more elaborate components of the self, such as the 
“reflective self” and the “narrative self” are also affected in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, it seems that the core symptomatology relates to the very basic experience 
of being a self - i.e. the implicit sense of coherence, unity and immersion in the world- 
thus, the “minimal self” (Sass & Parnas, 2003; Maj, 2012).  
 
The concept of the minimal self has been widely discussed in cognitive neuroscience 
(Metzinger & Gallese, 2003), developmental psychology (Rochat, 2004), 
phenomenological psychiatry (Nelson et al., 2019; Parnas et al., 2012) and philosophy 
(Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). However, the finer details of the minimal 
self have yet to be fully empirically demonstrated. For instance, it is not clear what kind 
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of experiences would contribute toward shaping this implicit sense of being oneself or 
what the brain’s role is in mediating the interaction between the minimal self and the 
stimuli from the outside world. Research on this topic has emphasized the role of the 
human body for cognition (Varela, 1994; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011) and has stressed 
the necessity of the embodiment of the self (Cremolacce et al., 2007). According to 
Metzinger (2003, 2004, 2005), minimal selfhood develops as a result of pre-reflective 
self-modelling. This account assumes that the brain is a representational system which 
interprets the environment to construct and simulate a model of the world that is 
phenomenologically centered onto the self (Metzinger & Gallese 2003). This model 
would reduce the ambiguity that comes from the external world. For this system model 
to be successful, the self needs to be constructed in the bodily context (Metzinger, 
2005). Indeed, the body is the context through which we feel, think, perceive and take 
action upon the world (Legrand, 2006; Friston, 2010; Farmer & Tsakiris, 2012). Thus, 
the minimal self is strictly connected to embodiment, as it represents a tacit “in the 
background” sense of one’s first-person presence and action in the environment.  
With this in mind, when we talk about the minimal self, we need to stress its 
fundamental bodily aspect. The body is a minimal “threshold” component of selfhood, 
which does not need an explicit conceptualisation to affect the agent’s cognition (de 
Haan & Fuchs 2010). The body represents the one and only interface with the world 
and is characterised by its potential for movement and action (Gallese & Ferri, 2013). 
Moreover, the body integrates multisensory information, acts as the source of 
internally generated inputs and is essential for interacting with the environment 
(Friston et al., 2010).  This relationship can be clearly observed in everyday 
interactions with our environment. Take, for example, the act of picking up an object: 
the information about the object arises from multiple senses, i.e., by looking at the 
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object (visual) and touching/grasping (tactile) it at the same time, i.e., we need to guide 
our body/hand to reach the object. These various processes provide us with 
information about both the world and our own bodies. This implicit self-awareness is 
constituted by the continuous integration and organization of sensory and motor 
signals, which are corporeal and mapped by various and specific brain circuits. In other 
words, the minimal self emerges from the dynamic interrelationship between brain, 
body and environment and heavily relies upon combining information across the 
senses. 
Bodily self-awareness is maintained through an interaction of multisensory 
experiences and a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes. As such, 
multisensory integration and body representation share a common currency, which is 
to perceive and effectively interact with the environment and to provide an online 
representation of the body in the world (Damasio, 1999). Evidence has suggested that 
our sense of embodiment is highly influenced by the processes involved in 
multisensory integration (Hohwy, 2010; Tsakiris, 2010). Indeed, as we perceive our 
environment and ourselves with all our sensory systems, multisensory inputs need to 
be combined to produce the basis of bodily self-consciousness (Haggard et al., 2003, 
Tsakiris, 2010). Unsurprisingly, disturbances in multisensory integration and in the 
bodily-self have been detected in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (de Gelder et al., 
2003; Stevenson et al., 2016; Ferri et al., 2018; Uhlhaas et al., 2008), resulting in the 
weakening of the basic sense of self - i.e. disembodiment of the self – often observed 
in patients (Fuchs, 2005).  
The following sections aim to provide the reader with an overview of the past and 
current theoretical and empirical literature that has shaped the current definition of 




1.2 . Schizophrenia as a disorder of the self 
Nosographic classification and phenomenological accounts of the disorder 
For a long time, studies on schizophrenia have been dominated by cognitivism. 
Indeed, much of the research has focused on the study of the disruption of high-level 
cognitive structures, such as language, working memory, theory of mind (for a review, 
see Brüne, 2005). In the clinical field, two and three-dimensional descriptions of 
schizophrenia have been dominating the field since the late 1980s, particularly with 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III (DSM III) 
and its newer edition (DSM-5) (2013). However, such an approach has neglected a 
vast corpus of knowledge that has been left by the fields of earlier approaches to 
psychopathology and phenomenological psychiatry. Early authors in these fields 
emphasised the role of the self and its pre-reflective relationship with the external 
world (Kraepelin, 1896; Bleuler, 1911; Minkowski, 1927). The specificity of the disorder 
was thought of as anchored to its “fundamental” clinical core, which was constitutive 
of the spectrum conditions (e.g. “schizotypes”, “latent schizophrenia”). The 
symptomatology observed in “schizophrenics” was considered as a “state” or 
“accessory” phenomena and the diagnostic identification of schizophrenia was linked 
to a Gestalt recognition of these single characteristics, their qualities, developmental 
and temporal aspects. As such, the specific signs and symptoms were seen as an 
expression of a fundamental structural change of the patient’s subjectivity (Parnas, 
2011).  
The German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) developed a classification 
system for mental illness, which has been influential for many years. By focusing on 
the search for homogenous groups of patients with a common aetiology and 
18 
 
symptoms, he proposed a distinction between chronic and progressing “dementia 
praecox” which was thought to be caused by organic changes in the brain, and the 
remitting “manic depressive disorder”. Kraeplin (1912) recognised that the emergence 
of schizophrenia - which he called dementia praecox - was characterised by 
fundamental changes in the self which manifested in the individual as a loss of the 
inner unity of consciousness and of will: “the chaos in the mind is like an orchestra 
without a conductor” (Kraeplin, 1912). Despite providing important insights into some 
of the fundamental characteristics of the illness, Kraepelin's view was profoundly 
influenced by nineteenth-century positivism: the idea of psychotic madness as a 
chronic and irreversible disease (Kraeplin, 1913). 
This paradigm was broken by Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) which, in 1908, translated 
the notion of dementia praecox into that of schizophrenia (from the Greek split mind) 
to indicate the patient’s splitting of psychic functioning as a prominent symptom 
(Bleuler as in Cutting and Shepherd, 1987). Bleuler observed that the disorder always 
involved a profound suffering/affliction of the self (Spaltung), which manifested with 
incoherence of association and affect. These symptoms, which he called “basic 
symptoms”, were considered as specific to the core of the schizophrenic spectrum. 
On the other hand, non-specific state phenomena indexing a psychotic phenomenon 
- i.e. hallucinations, delusions, catatonic features - which he classified as “accessory 
symptoms” - were relegated to a subordinate status and considered less relevant for 
the diagnosis (since they could be present or absent). According to Bleuler, the 
fundamental or basic symptoms were mainly associated with anomalies of self-
experiences and concerned progressive changes in the affective, expressional, 
behavioural domains. The inability to be normatively attuned with the world, what 
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Bleuler called schizophrenic autism, constituted the basic clinical essence of 
schizophrenia. 
This dimension became even more explicit in the writings of Eugène Minkowski (1885-
1972), who developed and expanded the Bleulerian intuition of autism. According to 
Minkowski, autism is not one of the symptoms of schizophrenia, but it is rather a 
peculiar mode of existence which affects intentionality (e.g., loss of meaning), the self 
and the dimension of intersubjectivity. Thus, he believed that schizophrenic autism 
represented a global structuring of a way of being which lay at a more basic 
experiential and existential alteration of the schizophrenic spectrum. This mode of 
existence was characterised by an incapability to attune to the “common sense” and 
through a progressive “lack of vital contact with reality” or what Minkowski called 
“trouble générateur”, viewed as an incapacity to “resonate with the world” and to 
establish meaningful bonds with other individuals (Urfer, 2001). Such alteration would 
then transpire into single characteristic symptoms, shaping them and keeping them 
interconnected through time. Thus, Minkowski believed that a true understanding of 
the disorder could only be achieved by adopting a background theory of the nature of 
mental life, a position that he shared with Karl Jaspers. This background theory, as we 
will see, is represented by phenomenology.  
Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) is generally acknowledged as the first major psychiatrist to 
bring scientific foundations to psychopathology. Moreover, he can be considered as 
the initiator of the phenomenological movement in psychiatry, and his contribution to 
the psychopathology of schizophrenia continues to be extremely relevant. Jaspers 
was interested in first-person experience and in what he called the “patient’s attitude 
toward his illness” - or the active role that the individual has in understanding and 
responding to their individual experiences of illness - an idea that was later adopted 
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by person-centred psychopathology (Stanghellini et al., 2013). His conceptualisation 
of ‘personalization’ (i.e. the I-quality of self-awareness) corresponds to what is now 
referred to as ‘subjective experience’: “self-awareness is present in every psychic 
event…every psychic manifestation, whether perception, bodily sensation, memory, 
idea, thought or feeling carries this particular aspect of ‘being mine’, of having an ‘I’ 
quality, of ‘personally belonging’ of it being one’s own doing. We have termed this 
‘personalization’” (Jaspers, 1913: 121). In other words, the subjective experience of 
feelings, thoughts, memories and perceptions, including the perception of the body, 
possess these the quality of being mine.  
In his General Psychopathology (1913), Jaspers observed how the alterations in self-
experience observed in schizophrenia seemed to challenge Descartes’ well-known 
notion of the cogito, that the nature of thought automatically provided evidence that 
the self is always in possession of its own experiences. Jaspers hypothesised that at 
the basis of the onset of schizophrenia lies a fundamental alteration of experience, 
which he named “delusional mood” or “delusional atmosphere”. These changes in 
experience were characterised by the alteration of four experiential modalities: the 
awareness of my own existence and action; the awareness of unity; the awareness of 
identity (temporal-diachronic identity), and the awareness of being distinct from the 
outer world (me/not me demarcation) (Gallese & Ferri., 2013). The schizophrenic 
would react to these confusing experiences with what Jaspers called “perplexity”, a 
state in which the patient’s level of activity progressively deteriorates, and he/she 
gradually becomes detached from external reality. Then, through a process of self-
interpretation, the schizophrenic would try to “work through” these experiences and 
“laboriously develops a delusional system out of his delusional experiences” (Jaspers, 
1913, p.416). The different outcomes of acute schizophrenia would derive from the 
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individual’s “position taking” in response to these aberrations, as a top-down effort to 
make sense of the subjective changes, which occurs during the initial pre-delusional 
phases of schizophrenia (Stanghellini et al., 2013). 
Moreover, Jaspers described more specific schizophrenic experiences which are very 
bodily-orientated, such as “abnormal body or organ sensation” (Jaspers, 1913, 447). 
On this basis, Kurt Schneider (1887-1967) described the loss of “ego-boundaries” and 
the feeling of being under the influence of an external agent, as characteristics of self-
disorders in the schizophrenic experience. As he noted: “Certain disturbances of self-
experience show the greatest degree of schizophrenic specificity. Here we refer to 
those disturbances of first-personal-givenness (Ich-heit) or mineness (Meinhaftigkeit) 
which consist of one’s own acts and states not being experienced as one’s own” 
(Schneider, 1950, p58).   Schneider’s primary focus was to teach clinicians how to 
reliably diagnose schizophrenia and, in contrast with Kraepelin, Bleuler and 
Minkowski, he defined hallucinations and delusions as the “first-rank symptoms” of 
schizophrenia. The Schneiderian viewpoint is integrated into the series of current 
major operational diagnostic systems: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) and the International Statistical Classification of Diseases (ICD). 
In the early nosographic classification of schizophrenia, as the International 
Classification for Diseases (ICD-8 and -9, 1893-1922), the role of disturbances of 
“personalities” and loss of “self-direction” was stressed. Here, it has to be noted that 
the term “personality” has to be interpreted in line within the customs of nineteenth-
century psychiatry, which corresponds to what today we call “self” and “subjectivity”. 
With the publication of the Third Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-III, 1980), this emphasis on the self was almost completely 
removed, in place of a more behaviouristic approach which highlighted the measurable 
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and observable characteristics of the disorder. In the DSM-IV and in the ICD-10, the 
notion of the self is not mentioned at all among the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia. 
Indeed, much attention has been given to the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic 
symptoms, while less emphasis on the unifying factors that are shared by the patients. 
Remaining at the level of nosographic-descriptive diagnosis, the various clinical 
manifestations of schizophrenia have been distinguished and categorized in the DSM-
IV TR into five types of schizophrenia: the disorganised type; the paranoid type; the 
catatonic type; the undifferentiated type; the residual type. In the latest edition of the 
DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), schizophrenia disorders are 
classified as “schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders”, favouring a 
partially dimensional approach. The five subtypes of the DSM-IV have been 
abandoned again in DSM-V because of their "limited diagnostic stability, poor reliability 
and poor scientific validity" (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Instead, 
symptomatology has been subdivided into three main clusters: positive symptoms, 
negative symptoms and disorganised symptoms. Positive symptoms include 
hallucinations, abnormal perceptual experiences, delusions, false beliefs and 
disorganised behaviour. Delusions often fall into different categories: paranoid 
delusions, delusions of reference or control and delusions of grandeur. Negative 
symptoms refer to apathy, anhedonia, social avoidance and reduced affect. The 
disorganised symptoms usually include confused or abnormal speech, behaviour and 
emotion (APA, 2013).  
Despite giving an accurate and reliable definition of the schizophrenic 
symptomatology, the DSM-V fails to describe what connects and underlies the various 
symptoms (Maj, 2012). Indeed, despite schizophrenia having been intensively studied 
for over a hundred years, an account that includes a satisfactory aetiological 
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explanation is still lacking (Parnas, 2012). Current research needs to indicate core, 
basic features which may underlie the whole diversity of symptoms. Such features are 
likely to be rooted in the most basic abnormalities of consciousness - an alteration of 
the “minimal self” or ipseity - that underlie and also precede the largely heterogeneous 
signs and symptoms observed in the schizophrenic spectrum.  
According to Sass and Parnas, the core of the disorder is represented by the fact that 
the bodily self loses its automaticity and transparency (Parnas & Sass, 2010). To 
explain this, they refer to two fundamental and complementary components: 
diminished affection and hyperreflexivity. Both the notions of hyperreflexivity and 
diminished self-affection are important aspects of the intentional activity of awareness. 
Diminished self-affection refers to a reduced sense of existing as a vital and self-
coinciding source of awareness and action, meaning that the sense of immersion in 
the world has lost their relevance and their vitality. These feelings are often a 
consequence of a more general and pervasive struggle in grasping otherwise familiar 
and taken-for-granted significations present in the world. In this context, the body loses 
its role as an intermediary for meaningful interaction with the world. This loss of self-
presence occurs not only on the individual but also on the intersubjective level, 
typically resulting in a withdrawal from the social world.  This aspect is particularly 
predominant in the stages preceding the onset of schizophrenia, in which the patient’s 
sense of agency and ownership is diminished to the point that their lived experience 
becomes highly passive, automated and alienated. 
The concept of hyperreflexivity refers to the fact that something, which was normally 
tacit, becomes focal and explicit and, as a consequence, can become an object of 
concern. In other words, aspects of the self, which are usually tacit or implicit, are 
objectivised and experienced as external objects of consciousness. For instance, 
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some patients report becoming deeply aware of the act of breathing or of different 
sensations while walking (Nelson & Sass., 2017). Thus, in hyperreflexivity, there is a 
loss of the transparency of self-consciousness. Indeed, patients with schizophrenia 
perceive implicit properties of their experience as explicit and clear, as if they were 
external objects or events. This tendency is predominantly non-volitional but rather 
“operative” and occurs automatically. From an experiential point of view, 
hyperreflexivity can manifest as intensified experience, such as prominence of 
proximal over distal aspects of stimuli (see, e.g., Sass, 1994, re “phantom 
concreteness”), or as a focal awareness of kinesthetic bodily sensations (Sass & 
Parnas, 2003). Some level of introspective and metacognitive types of hyperreflexivity 
are visible at the very onset of the disorder, particularly in the domain of bodily 
experiences (Alvarez et al., 2016; Parnas & Handest, 2003). The body is often 
experienced as an object lived in the third person, with the patient often reporting 
feeling like they do not own their own body anymore or like they can observe their 
action as a witness (Parnas & Handest, 2003). In this respect, hyperreflexivity may 
progressively lead to a loss of the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, 
which characterises minimal selfhood. As the disorder progresses, the body is not 
anymore experienced as “taken for granted” or tacitly given in the first-person 
perspective, but it rather loses its “transparent quality, its tacit experience-based 
function, turning into an object of observation, of thinking, of concern, and thus ends 
up being the “thematic” of an impediment or a problem” (Irrazàval, 2005).  
At the present time, experimental psychology and neuroscience could offer a crucial 
contribution toward the investigation of subjective experience in schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders. However, the various theories and intuitions from the past have 
only been marginally investigated with the newest empirical methods. This represents 
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a lacuna in the current research of psychopathology. In particular, fields like embodied 
cognition, phenomenologically oriented neuroscience and phenomenological 
psychiatry have made it possible to investigate concepts such as selfhood and 
intersubjectivity with neuroscientific methods and to describe them to a sub-personal 
level. Indeed, recent literature in this field has put an emphasis on self-disorders as an 
important focus that may allow the early detection and prevention of psychosis. 
Ultimately, this could also shed important lights on the neural processes involved in 
the emergence and preservation of self-disorders. 
1.3 Schizophrenia related disorders 
The development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders is complex and multifaceted. 
In general, prior to the diagnosis of schizophrenia, at-risk individuals progressively 
experience subtle changes in self-experience, behavioural and cognitive impairments 
(Klosterkötter et al., 2001). Thus, disorders of self-experience are being rediscovered 
as a crucial factor in the early detection of traits characterizing the schizophrenia 
spectrum conditions (Nelson et al., 2012; Henrisken & Nordgaard, 2016). As reported 
by most patients, self-disorders, such as long-time persisting feelings of identity void 
and self-transformation, seem to emerge in childhood or early adolescence and 
characterise an intrinsic feature of one’s mode of experiencing the world and the self 
(Koren et al., 2013). These symptoms are not experienced as isolated ruptures of 
everyday life, but rather belong to the entire ontological framework of the patient’s 
existence and characterise most aspects of their lived experience (Sass & Parnas, 
2003).  
In the premorbid phase, worsening of self-disturbances is often predictive of the 
development of schizophrenic psychosis and persist after remission of a frank first 
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episode (Nelson et al., 2012; Parnas et al., 2011). In particular, disturbances in 
multimodal processing undermine the ability to experience the world in a holistic 
fashion, as well as impacting the unity of one’s own body. Consequently, this produces 
a progressive decline of basic selfhood and of the sense of existing in a coherent 
world. The present subchapter aims to introduce schizophrenia-related disorders, with 
a particular focus on research that has attempted to identify the phenotypical and 
neural markers of the illness. 
1.3.1. Basic symptoms and self-disorders 
One of the first attempt to classify the very early expressions of schizophrenic 
symptoms come from the clinical work of Huber et al. (1979; 1983), later expanded by 
Gross (Gross et al., 1982) and Klosterkotter (Klosterkotter et al., 1990). Huber noted 
that many schizophrenics maintained a certain level of awareness of their own 
symptoms and could recall when and how the first symptoms first appeared; thus, he 
coined the term “basic symptoms”. During the 1980s, Gross et al. (1982) started to 
examine longitudinal data and detected several types of subtle symptoms that were 
often present in schizophrenic patients prior to, or very early in, the illness. Most of 
these symptoms reflect anomalies in self-experience (e.g., depersonalization and 
distorted bodily experiences) and appear to be predictive of the schizophrenia onset. 
The researchers created the Bonn Assessment of Basic Symptoms-BSABS scale, a 
comprehensive, semi-structured interview that evaluates various anomalies of 
experience (affective, volitional, cognitive, perceptual and bodily) and that is routinely 
used for the assessment of schizophrenia proneness (Gross, 1987).  
The BSABS scale has been vastly used in clinical and empirical research and has 
been found to have satisfactory reliability (Vollmer-Larsen et al., 2007). The basic 
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symptoms identified by the BSABS scale have subsequently been included in different 
assessment scales utilised to detect individuals at risk of developing a psychotic 
disorder, such as the Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States 
[CAARMS] (Yung et al., 2005), the Scale of Prodromal Symptoms [SOPS] (Miller et 
al., 2003), and the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument for adults [SPI-A], (Schultze-
Lutter, 2009). Following a similar approach, Parnas, Møller and Zahavi, (2005), 
created a semi-structured interview to examine the precursory phenomena most at 
risk for turning into schizophrenia: the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience 
(EASE) (Parnas et al., 2005). The EASE has been developed on the basis of self-
descriptions provided by individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
and has a strong descriptive, diagnostic and differential diagnostic value. Studies 
using the EASE have confirmed that self-disorders are predominant and differentiate 
schizophrenia from other psychotic syndromes, such as psychotic bipolar illness or 
non-schizotypal personality disorders (Parnas et al., 1998; Parnas et al., 2003; Møller 
and Husby, 2000; Raballo et al., 2011).  
The centrality of self-disturbances as risk factors for the development of schizophrenia 
was evidenced by an important longitudinal study: the Copenhagen Prodromal Study 
(Parnas et al., 2011). At baseline, first admission patients were assessed with semi‐
structured interview comprising overall psychosocial and family history, and with the 
Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS): fifty-seven had a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, forty-three had a diagnosis of schizotypal disorder (which 
is considered one of the phenotypic expressions of liability for schizophrenia), and the 
remaining fifty-five patients suffered from other, non-schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders. The diagnoses were in line with the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10) research criteria (WHO 1992). Five years later, participants were 
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reassessed, and all the baseline interview components were repeated. Importantly, 
the reassessment was blind to the information gathered during the initial part of the 
study. At follow-up, the rate of conversion to schizophrenia spectrum diagnosis was 
37%, whereas the conversion rate from schizotypal disorder to schizophrenia was 
25%. Interestingly, results revealed that alterations of the basic experience of the self 
- as indicated with high baseline scores on perplexity and hyperreflexivity (see section 
1.2.1) - predicted a subsequent evolution of schizophrenia. Thus, the authors 
concluded that certain trait‐like anomalous subjective experiences, particularly 
hyperreflexivity and perplexity, are important prognostic indicators for identifying 
individuals with vulnerability traits of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder (Parnas et al., 
2011). 
Importanly, research has observed abnormal bodily self-experiences at the time of the 
first psychotic episode, which is the first time a person experiences a full-blown 
psychotic episode, following which a diagnosis of schizophrenia is often made. 
Research agrees that this stage represents a critical period for treating schizophrenia. 
A study from Stanghellini et al. (2012) selected patients with first-episode 
schizophrenia from a sample of 393 psychotic patients. The researchers observed that 
abnormal bodily experiences were present in 30 out of 39 (76.9%) of the patients with 
first-episode schizophrenia. By means of a phenomenologically based qualitative 
method of inquiry, the authors identified two main properties that could be taken as 
cores of abnormal bodily experiences in the schizophrenic spectrum: dynamisation of 
bodily boundaries and construction, and morbid objectification/devitalisation. 
Dynamisation refers to violation of bodily boundaries (i.e., feeling that the body is being 
violated by external entities or forces); disintegration of bodily construction (i.e., loss 
of coherence or disaggregation of bodily structure, e.g. bodily parts are felt like moving 
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away from usual position), externalization (i.e., projection of personal bodily 
boundaries into the outer space), and transformation of bodily appearance (i.e. body-
dysmorphic-like experiences). Morbid objectification refers to the phenomenon in 
which parts of one’s body that are usually tacitly present become “explicitly 
experienced” (e.g., hyperreflexivity). This feature is often experienced alongside 
feelings of devitalisation and of devitalization of body parts (e.g., body parts are felt as 
devoid of life and experienced as things) (e.g. diminished self-presence).  Most 
importantly, the researchers found that patients devote significant attention to these 
experiences affecting their body and report great distress and feelings of anguish as 
a consequence. Also, the authors observed that much effort is produced to make 
sense of these disturbances, possibly contributing to delusional thinking (Stanghellini 
et al., 2012).  
The concepts related to basic symptomatology and self-experiences have been highly 
influenced by the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology, particularly by Karl 
Jaspers’ descriptive phenomenological method for understanding mental disorders. 
One of the merits of this approach has been to observe schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders from several points of view and at different stages of development of the 
pathology, with particular focus on the experiences that characterise the development 
of psychosis. However, the fact that most of the studies adopting this approach have 
implemented semi-structured interviews, which must be conducted in a clinical setting, 
represents something of a problem for data collection in the healthy population. Given 
the fact that abnormal experiences appear to start several years (e.g. since childhood) 
before the emergence of first frank symptoms, investigating the emergence of subtle 
changes in experience among healthy individuals could shed important light on the 
trajectory of schizophrenic spectrum disorders. To this purpose, we need to refer to a 
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construct able to describe a set of experiences - expressed at a subclinical level - that 
can be found in the general population without being necessarily associated with a 
mental disorder. This set of experiences below the clinical threshold has been 
conceptualised as schizotypy.  
1.3.2. Schizotypy  
Schizotypal pathology refers to a latent psychological organization that underlies a 
liability for schizophrenia. For instance, the DSM-5 recognised that schizophrenic-like 
psychopathology could represent an alternative manifestation of schizophrenia liability 
by placing schizotypal pathology within the schizophrenic spectrum (Lenzenweger, 
2018). It is likely that schizotypal pathology is determined by schizophrenia-related 
genetic and polygenic influences, which co-habit and are impacted by the environment 
(e.g. stressors and epigenetic inputs). Thus, schizotypal traits can be exhibited 
phenotypically in various ways, ranging from clinically diagnosable schizophrenia 
through pathological personality manifestation - such as schizotypal personality 
disorder - to more subtle, subclinical schizophrenic-like phenomenology. The term 
“schizotype” was coined by Meehl and Rado (1962) as an abbreviation of 
“schizophrenic phenotype”. The authors observed that one of the main disturbances 
in schizotypes was represented by the tendency to form a distorted awareness of 
bodily self, a deficiency in the “action self” and a dysfunction of “spatial-kinesthetic-
vestibular system” (Meehl, 1990).   
The development of the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (Raine, 1991), further 
contributed to the development of the definition of schizotypy. Schizotypy has been 
conceptualised as series of cognitive and behavioural variations of schizophrenic traits 
which are less severe but similar in nature (Kraepelin 1919; Lenzenweger 1995, 2006, 
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2010; Stotz-Ingenlath 2000) and which indicates a “latent personality construct rather 
than a description of overt behaviours” (Lenzenweger, 1996). Schizotypy can range 
from low to high; thus, elevated levels of schizotypy might represent a vulnerability to 
psychosis (Kwapil et al., 2015). The schizotypy construct is crucial to investigate the 
psychosis continuum, representing a useful framework for understanding variation in 
behaviours and in the development, trajectory and potential risk factors for the 
emergence of schizophrenia. In particular, it offers the possibility to bypass all the 
issues given by the confounding factors associated with schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders (e.g. medications and hospitalisations) (Gambini et al., 1992; Kwapil & 
Barrantes-Vidal, 2015). Importantly, the construct of schizotypy offers the possibility 
to implement studies with multiple participants, that can be conducted outside of 
clinical settings. These types of studies have the benefit of being able to investigate 
subtle alterations in experience across the lifespans of the healthy population. 
Ultimately, this would contribute toward identifying a psychopathological continuum 
that stretches from sub-psychotic and sub-clinical mental states to frank psychotic 
experiences. This approach has already been proven successful, with much evidence 
supporting the hypothesis of a continuum between schizotypy and schizophrenia.  
For instance, in line with the hypothesis of polygenic inheritance of schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders (for a review see Ingraham & Kety, 2000), adoption studies have 
observed a greater incidence of schizotypal traits in relatives of schizophrenic patients, 
regardless of environmental conditions (Kendler & Gruenberg, 1984). Additionally, a 
growing body of research has suggested that the abnormalities observed in both 
schizophrenia and schizotypy may be at least partly a result of cascading effects from 
multisensory anomalies, linking multisensory disintegration with disturbances of the 
self (Schilder, 1993; Postmes et al., 2014).  Researchers have observed that both 
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schizophrenic patients and high schizotypes often experience multimodal stimuli that 
are further apart in time and in space as co-occurring (Foucher et al., 2007; Haß et al., 
2017; Ferri et al., 2019). Also, individuals with schizophrenia and schizotypy show 
altered responses to somatosensory stimuli, which seem to weaken their capacity to 
discriminate between the environment and the body (Ferri et al., 2016; Lenzenweger 
et al., 2000; Chang et al., 2005; Benson et al., 2019; Michael & Park, 2016). 
Correspondingly, both conditions have shown a more malleable form of body 
representation (Thakkar et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2014; Michael & Park, 2016). 
Commonalities among schizophrenia and schizotypy have been observed at the 
neural level too. For instance, several studies have found abnormal patterns of neural 
alterations and functional dysconnectivity in both conditions (Nikulin et al., 2012; 
Roiser et al., 2013; Ferri et al., 2017; Siever et al., 2002). For instance, Uhlhaas et al. 
(2010), found a reduction of beta and gamma oscillations and their synchronization, 
indicating a deficit in the temporal coordination of distributed neural activity. In line with 
these findings, Koychev et al. (2011) found that individuals with high schizotypy exhibit 
reduced phase-locking factor – a measure of network synchronization - in the beta 
and gamma bands in fronto-central and central occipital regions, and reduced beta 
power in the same fronto-occipital network. Given the role of synchronised neural 
oscillations in facilitating the transfer of information across sensory modalities (for a 
review see Keil & Senkowski, 2018), the aforementioned abnormalities in 
synchronised oscillatory activity may exacerbate the multisensory abnormalities 
already observed in both conditions.  
Both multisensory integration and body representation are essential for maintaining a 
stable sense of self; disturbances to these components may contribute to the loss of 
coherent perception of one’s body and the external world, exacerbating the self-
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disturbances observed in both schizotypy and schizophrenia (Schilder, 1993; Postmes 
et al., 2014). Researchers suggest that self-disturbances are often characterised by 
depersonalisation and ‘loosening of association’ between thoughts, feelings and 
action (Sass & Parnas, 2003), something that has also been observed in dissociative 
disorders. 
1.3.3. Schizophrenia and Dissociative Disorders 
Dissociative disorders include a range of disorders which are characterised by a 
disintegration of the functions of consciousness, identity, body representation, 
memory, and perception of the environment (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; 
Butler et al., 1996; Renard et al., 2017). Dissociative disorders include 
depersonalization/derealization disorder, dissociative amnesia, and dissociative 
identity disorder. Both depersonalization and derealization refer to ongoing 
experiences of extraneousness, unreality and detachment from the self, the body and 
the external world (e.g., the sensation of observing oneself from outside). However, 
while in depersonalization these experiences are immersed in an intense emotional-
affective climate, such as that phenomena of detachment can lead to ego boundary 
disturbances, derealization is instead mainly characterised by apathy towards, and 
reduction of, the emotional-affective involvement with interpersonal relationships, and 
between the body and the external world (for a review, see Salami, Andreu-Perez & 
Gillmesteir, 2020). Dissociative identity disorder refers to identity fragmentation and 
feelings of being possessed. Dissociative amnesia indicates the inability to recall 
significant personal information, usually of traumatic nature. An individual diagnosed 
with dissociative disorder might suffer from one or more of these subtypes (Spiegel et 
al., 2013).  
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Despite having been classified as distinct conditions from schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, both dissociative disorders and schizophrenia spectrum disorders share 
some fundamental aspects of abnormal self-experiences that are worth further 
discussion. Indeed, common symptoms include feelings of being detached from 
oneself, mental absorption and fragmentation of one’s own identity. Both in 
dissociative disorders and in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, phenomena of 
detachment are often described as a sort of "daydream" in which the body loses its 
sense of unity and can be perceived as modified and distorted (Spiegel et al., 2013; 
Sass & Parnas, 2003). Unsurprisingly, overlap with schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
and dissociative disorders have been observed in research (Moise et al., 1996; Ross 
and Keyes, 2004). For instance, dissociative disorders are often found in first-episode 
psychotic (FEP) individuals and are often associated with childhood trauma (Sun et 
al., 2019), suggesting that experiences of trauma or intense stress may exacerbate 
abnormal responses in already vulnerable individuals. Additional evidence on this 
association comes from clinical data reporting dissociative symptomatology in 
schizotypal personality disorder and in early stages of schizophrenia (Watson, 2001). 
For instance, subclinical dissociation is often observed in individuals with high 
schizotypy, a personality trait that has been linked to schizophrenia proneness 
(Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2008; Pope & Kwapil 2000; Watson, 2001). Whether 
dissociative symptomatology could represent a risk factor in the development of 
schizophrenia, is still being debated.  
Although the line of demarcation between these dissociative experiences and the 
emergence of schizophrenia is blurred and unclear, the main point of connection can 
be identified within symptomatology concerning detachment and depersonalisation, 
aspects that are both deeply related with changes in the quality of embodied pre-
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reflective experiences. Indeed, a major constitutive factor of both clinical pictures is 
characterized by the progressive loss of the first-person perspective, which threatens 
the basic experience of bodily awareness and bodily boundaries. As such, both 
conditions imply a loss of the implicit gestalt structure of the body - or of “transparency 
of experience” (i.e. hyperreflexivity) (Sass & Parnas, 2000) - even though in 
dissociative syndromes this loss is usually transient and the agent maintains a certain 
level of awareness of this change.  
The detection of enhanced incidences of hyperreflexivity and dissociative 
symptomatology among at-risk individuals posits interesting questions regarding the 
role of bodily disturbances as an important component of self-disturbances. This is 
because hyper-reflective forms of consciousness accentuate the perception of the 
body as an object of explicit cognition, rather than as a subject of pre-reflective 
experience (Krueger, 2018). Similarly, in dissociative disorders, individuals may feel 
like third-person onlookers, rather than first-person subjects of their own experiences. 
Clinical reports have observed that the progression to schizophrenia illnesses is 
characterised by an objectification of the body and of introspective experience, with 
progressive feelings of alienation between the self and the stream of consciousness, 
as well as forms of decentralization, disembodiment and a disturbed feeling of agency 
(Szczotka & Majchrowicz, 2018; Sass & Parnas, 2003). For instance, patients in the 
prodromal phase may start to devote full attention to their body and movements, which 
eventually begin to feel alien, and, as a consequence, begin to develop delusional 
explanations to rationalize their state. Future research could investigate the role of 
dissociative symptomatology in schizophrenia spectrum disorders in order to provide 
important insights into the pathogenesis of the illness. 
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From the research mentioned in this section, it emerges that that impairments in 
multimodal integration, body representation, and disturbances in brain processing, 
may induce incoherent self-experiences, including diminished sense of self (i.e., 
derealization), depersonalization, and a weakened self-other gradient (i.e., the 
boundaries between internal and external sensory inputs becomes distorted) (Thakkar 
et al., 2011; Postmes et al., 2014). The following chapter aims to introduce the 
components that seem altered in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, namely, 
multisensory integration, body ownership and body representation, all aspects that are 
directly relevant to the studies conducted in this thesis. Subsequently, the chapter 
















2. An introduction to multisensory integration and body representation 
Recognizing the concept of the minimal self as a phenomenon strongly rooted in the 
body and dependent on multisensory integration implies that it can be experimentally 
manipulated. This chapter aims to introduce different but interrelated concepts that 
have been utilised in my studies: multisensory integration, body ownership and body 
representation. Namely, I will explain how these different concepts have been utilised 
in research and how they can be linked to the concepts introduced in Chapter One. 
Particularly, I will focus on the research that has investigated these aspects in 
schizophrenia and schizotypy. The four studies that are part of this project ground on 
the research presented in this chapter. More specifically, in the studies investigating 
multisensory integration (Chapters Three and Four respectively), we have 
experimentally induced multisensory conflicts to investigate how individuals with high 
and low schizotypy process signals coming from their direct environment. Thereafter, 
we have attempted to utilize multisensory stimuli to manipulate the sense of body 
ownership in individuals with schizophrenia, and we have linked this process to basic 
symptomatology and to body representation (Chapter Five). Finally, the last study has 
attempted to isolate a more specific component of body part representation - i.e., the 
body structural representation – to investigate whether individuals with high 
schizotypy, similarly to individuals with schizophrenia, exhibit a more malleable 







2.1 Multisensory Integration  
Multisensory integration is fundamental for several aspects of normal self-experience, 
such as the recognition of one’s own body, actions and awareness (Gallagher, 2000; 
Tsakiris et al., 2007; Bermúdez, 2011). Sensory information coming from different 
modalities (e.g., vision and touch) needs to be integrated across time and space into 
a coherent percept of our dynamic environment and of our body. As such, a disrupted 
multisensory integration could cause feelings of detachment from one’s environment 
and from one’s self (Jauregui-Renaud et al., 2008); experientially, this would manifest 
with perceptual incoherence. Extensive evidence has found alterations in time 
perception (Elvevåg et al., 2003) and temporal processing in people with 
schizophrenia (Davalos et al., 2002). Moreover, research has found that individuals 
with schizophrenia exhibit abnormalities in both unisensory and multisensory temporal 
perception indicated by a reduced capacity in judging the simultaneity between purely 
visual, purely auditory and combined visual-auditory stimulus pairs (Foucher et al., 
2007, Martin et al., 2013). In addition, structural and functional changes in the superior 
temporal cortex, a brain region deeply involved in multisensory processing, has been 
detected in schizophrenia and in individuals identified as being at risk for the disorder. 
Such abnormalities have been detected as reduction in grey matter volume (Gur, 
1999; Honea et al.,2005; Wright et al.,2000), and abnormal activity in the superior 
temporal gyrus during performance of different cognitive tasks (Gur et al., 2007). Also, 
hypoactivity in the ventral premotor cortex has been observed in patients with First 
Episode Psychosis (Ferri et al., 2012; Ebisch et al., 2013). Research shows that this 
region is involved in integrating multisensory signals with motor representations of 
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different parts of the body (Fogassi et al.,1996; Graziano et al.,1994; Rizzolatti et al., 
2002). 
In line with the hypothesis of schizophrenia as a continuum, impaired sensory 
integration has been observed in schizotypy (Stevenson et al., 2017; Ferri et al., 2018) 
and at the time of patients’ first psychotic episode (Williams et al., 2010), corroborating 
the hypothesis that disturbances in multisensory integration represent a hallmark 
neurological “soft sign” of schizophrenia spectrum disorders  (Heinrichs & Buchanan, 
1988).  These disturbances could contribute to the development of aberrant self-
experiences, including depersonalisation and “loosening of associations” between 
thoughts, feelings and actions (Postmes et al., 2014). These experiences lie within the 
framework of “disorders of the self” as conceptualised by Sass and Parnas (2003), as 
mentioned in Chapter One. As such, in order to understand schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders, we need to investigate the more general components of multisensory 
integration. 
Multisensory integration refers to the ability to consolidate the information arising from 
different sensory modalities into a single multisensory perception (Stein & Meredith, 
1993: Rohde, van Dam, Ernst, 2016; van Dam et al., 2014). The integration of the 
senses is fundamental in creating a coherent representation of the world and for our 
ability to discriminate between self and non-self (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1998; 
Gawęda et al., 2013). Perception, as already observed by Gibson (1968), is, in 
essence, multisensory.  This multimodal aspect of perception has enormous survival 
value and is fundamental for shaping our bodily self-consciousness (i.e., the feeling 
that our body belongs to us) (van Dam et al., 2014). Consequently, multisensory 
integration contributes to shaping the self from its more fundamental, pre-reflective 
level (the minimal self). Minimal selfhood is believed to be formed through the 
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combination of multisensory information of interoceptive and exteroceptive origins, 
and it is related to processing of bodily signals in multisensory cortical systems 
(Ehrsson, 2012; Gallagher, 2000). For example, the experience of owning one’s own 
body (i.e. body ownership) can be altered by manipulating the timing of visual and 
tactile/proprioceptive (i.e. exteroceptive) body-related information. At the same time, 
individual differences in sensitivity to internal bodily signals (i.e., interoception) could 
affect the experience of body ownership as well. 
Research in multisensory integration has identified a series of principles to explain 
which combination of cross-modal inputs would be most likely to cause enhanced 
responses (Meredith & Stein, 1986). These principles are subsumed under the 
concept of the “unity assumption”, i.e. the assumption, or belief, that whenever two or 
more unisensory cues are highly consistent in one or more dimension, observers are 
more likely to perceive them as perceptually bound (Welch & Warren, 1980;  Spence, 
2017; Chen & Vroomen, 2013).  The bindings of different stimuli depend on stimulus-
driven factors (low-level factors), such as the spatial and temporal co-occurrence of 
the stimuli (Calvert et al., 2004), on cognitive factors (high-level factors), such as 
semantic congruency (Chen & Spence, 2010) and on prior knowledge (van Dam et 
al., 2014; van Dam & Ernst, 2015). 
The crossmodal integration of multiple sensory signals into unified multisensory 
percepts has been demonstrated in studies utilising both simple stimuli (e.g. sound or 
tactile stimuli) as well as more complex stimuli (e.g. speech). For instance, research 
has shown that sound can guide attention toward a visual target. Frens et al. (1995) 
showed that participants had faster saccades to a visual target when an irrelevant 
auditory cue was spatially and temporally aligned with the target. A study from Perrot 
et al. (1990), observed an improvement in visual search times when an auditory click 
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was presented at the same location as the visual target. Interestingly, such benefits 
are also found when the auditory and visual signals come from different locations. Van 
der Burg et al. (2008) demonstrated that a nonspatial auditory event (i.e. a pip) could 
guide attention toward the location of a synchronized visual event (a colour-changing 
object) that, without such an auditory signal, is very hard to find. Thus, the authors 
concluded that the temporal information of the auditory signal was integrated with the 
visual signal, creating a salient emergent feature that automatically draws spatial 
attention (van der Burg et al., 2008). In a similar fashion, receiving irrelevant tactile 
signals can speed-up the detection of faint tones presented simultaneously - as 
opposed to when presented non-simultaneously - and increase auditory intensity 
ratings (Gillmeister & Eimer, 2007). Also, several studies investigated the role of 
combining sensory information in speech comprehension. For instance, a study from 
Sumby & Pollack (1954) showed that speech comprehension is facilitated when 
participants can make use of both auditory and visual information in combination.   
One aspect that has been widely investigated in multisensory integration research is 
related to the temporal coincidence within which different stimuli are presented. 
Subsided under the “unity assumption”, the “temporal principle” refers to the fact that 
temporally aligned stimuli facilitate multisensory enhancement (see Stein, 2012 for 
review). Thus, sensory information is more likely to be bound together when signals 
from the separate senses are presented in close temporal proximity (Wallace et al., 
1998; Wallace et al., 2004). An important characteristic of this phenomenon seems to 
be linked to the individual temporal resolution in multisensory perception, namely the 
temporal window of integration (Stevenson et al., 2014). This window refers to the time 
frame within which the brain is more likely to bind together temporally asynchronous 
sensory information and perceive them as coming from the same multimodal event 
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(Wallace et al., 2004; Wallace & Stevenson, 2014). The width of the temporal window 
of integration appears to be robust across healthy individuals even though it can 
slightly change depending on the tasks and stimuli used (Stevenson & Wallace, 2013); 
that is, larger windows are observed for complex stimuli (e.g. speech) than for simple 
stimuli (e.g. a light flash, a brief sound, a brief tactile stimulation) (Stevenson et al., 
2013). Unsurprisingly, an atypical temporal window of integration – e.g., too narrow or 
too large – have been observed in various psychological disorders (Zhou et al.,2018; 
Wallace & Stevenson, 2016) and in schizophrenia (Haß et al., 2017).  
A task that is particularly appropriate to assess the individual’s temporal window of 
integration is the Double Flash Illusion (Shams et al., 2000). In a typical Double Flash 
Illusion, when participants are presented with a visual stimulus (a single flashing disc) 
and tactile or auditory stimuli (a quick double-tap on their finger or a quick double beep) 
they can be induced into perceiving a second illusionary flash, even if there is only 
ever one flash (Shams et al., 2000). In this type of illusion, one sensory domain (e.g., 
auditory or tactile) has an influence on another, in this case, vision. In order to 
characterise the temporal profile of the audio-visual version of the Double Flash 
Illusion – and thus identify to what point the illusion starts to decay - Shams et al., 
(2002) varied the width of the interstimulus interval (ISI) between the beeps. A longer 
ISI means that the second beep is no longer sufficiently overlapping with the flash, 
and therefore is not integrated. The authors found that the illusion tends to decline 
when the average time between the beeps exceeds 100 ms. Thus, when the two 
beeps are spaced apart by less than 100 ms, on average participants tend to report 
seeing two flashes, suggesting the illusory effect is taking place. Conversely, when 
beeps are spaced apart by more than 100 ms, the illusory effect begins to degrade, 
and the participants will tend to report seeing only one flash (Shams et al., 2002). Haß 
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and colleagues (2017) adopted this version of the illusion to investigate the temporal 
sensitivity of individuals with schizophrenia compared to healthy individuals. The 
researchers found an extended temporal window of integration in schizophrenic 
patients compared to healthy participants (Haß et al., 2017). In Chapter Three, we 
aimed at expanding these findings to schizotypy. Namely, we employed the audio-
visual Double Flash Illusion to investigate the individual temporal window of integration 
of audio-visual stimuli of individuals with high and low schizotypy (Ferri et al., 2017, 
Chapter Three).  Results show that individuals with high schizotypy exhibit larger 
windows of integration of audio-visual stimuli and a higher proneness to the illusion 
(Chapter Three). Moreover, in Chapter Four, we linked the individual temporal profile 
of the tactile-Double Flash Illusion to beta activity in the visual cortex (Fotia et al., 
2021). The next section aims to introduce past and present research that has linked 
neural oscillatory activity with multimodal processing. In particular, I will focus on the 
studies that have been used as supporting literature for Chapter Four. 
 
2.2. Neural correlates of multisensory integration 
For a long time, it was assumed that different regions of the brain were independent 
from each other, and that each primary sensory area received information from a 
specific sensory modality. That is, the integration of the senses was thought to happen 
after the sensory signals were processed in unisensory cortical regions (Benevento, 
1977). Indeed, the majority of the early investigations on sensory processing 
mechanisms have focused on the activity in sensory cortices in respect to their primary 
sensory inputs (e.g., modulation of activity in the visual cortex in response to visual 
stimuli). However, a number of investigations identified several systems within the 
brain that respond to more than one type of sensory information (so-called 
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“convergence sites”) such as the superior colliculus (Stein & Meredith 1993), the 
amygdala (Nishijo et al., 1998), the striatum (Nagy et al., 2006), the fronto-temporal 
regions (Giard & Peronnet, 1999), the parieto-occipital regions (Molholm et al., 2002), 
the ventral premotor cortices, intraparietal cortices and cerebellum (Ehrsson et al., 
2005). Converging evidence coming from brain imaging studies have observed cross-
modal influences even in the low level, primary sensory cortical areas that were 
traditionally thought to be functionally independent and sensory specific, such as the 
primary auditory cortex and the primary visual cortex (Bell et al., 2001). This has 
provided further support for the hypothesis that neuronal activity in a given cortical 
sensory region is modulated not only by its primary sensory inputs but also by the 
stimulation of other sensory systems (Foxe & Schroeder, 2005).  
One mechanism that allows multisensory integration across distributed cortical 
networks and across sensory modalities is the transient synchronization of neural 
oscillations (Senkowski et al., 2008; Mercier et al., 2013; Fries, 2015). Neural 
oscillations are prominent features of brain functioning. One of their roles is to 
synchronise neuronal populations at different neural sites (e.g. auditory and visual 
cortex) and to coordinate distributed neuronal activity and information transfer from 
one site to the other ( Keil & Senkowski, 2018). This is in line with Hebb’s postulate of 
neural assemblies (1949). Hebb postulated that learning could be explained according 
to three hypotheses, each of which has received experimental confirmation in current 
research. The first hypothesis, commonly referred to as Hebb’s rule, postulates that 
cortical neurons strengthen their connections after they have been repeatedly 
activated simultaneously. The second hypothesis states that the strengthening of 
synapses across the cortex involves not only neighbouring neurons, but also neurons 
in distant cortical areas. The third hypothesis postulates that when a group of neurons 
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is simultaneously and frequently activated, this activation will impact the functional 
organization of the brain. Thus, strongly connected neurons in different areas will tend 
to fire together as a functional unit and to form functional, synchronised patterns. 
Hebbian cell assemblies are not necessarily located within small cortical areas but 
may be dispersed over distant cortical areas. Evidence from neuroanatomical and 
neuroimaging studies have lent support for the Hebbian principle, indicating cortico-
cortical pathways between different areas in the cortex (Barredo et al., 2016; Roland 
et al., 2014; Fiori et al., 2018).  
The precise dynamics by which this synchronization happens are still being 
investigated. One hypothesis is that multisensory processing is contingent on the 
functional connections between areas of the brain that are involved (e.g. visuo-tactile, 
audio-visual). As stated within the Communication Through Coherence framework 
(Fries, 2005; 2015), selective interaction among neural networks is realised by 
coherence (i.e. synchronization) between firing rate oscillation in remote but 
functionally interconnected areas. In particular, this synchronization is due to the 
alignment of post-synaptic neural activity to pre-synaptic input, producing temporal 
windows for communication between the involved areas. One way to investigate this 
hypothesis is to focus on neuronal activity during cross-modal stimulation (Iurilli et al., 
2012; Kayser et al., 2008). A non-invasive method utilised to investigate neuro-
oscillatory activity is electroencephalography (EEG). 
The EEG measures the extracellular current flow generated by the sum of the 
synchronised activity of large groups of neurons that are spatially aligned. This activity 
is enabled by the transmission of electrical signals, which are passed from pre-
synaptic to post-synaptic cells producing a change in the membrane potential of the 
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post-synaptic terminal. The EEG allows to detect and to visualize multiple (excitatory 
or inhibitory) postsynaptic potentials of relatively large groups of neurons firing 
synchronously. These postsynaptic potentials produce a complex waveform, which 
can be segmented into different frequency bandwidths, with distinct amplitudes and 
phases. These bandwidths are commonly referred to as neuro-oscillations or brain 
waves. Research has shown that these oscillations play an active role in neural 
communication (Fries, 2005; Engel & Fries, 2010). A number of findings suggest that 
neural oscillations at low (theta, alpha) and high (beta, gamma) frequency play a 
fundamental role in sharing temporary information across large-scale networks that 
characterise the neural correlates of specific aspects of sensory integration (Singer, 
1999; Varela et al., 2001). Indeed, several studies have linked neural oscillations in 
distinct frequency bands to different mechanisms of multisensory processing, 
suggesting that multisensory binding is processed differently according to the domains 
involved (e.g. audio-visual versus visuo-tactile) (Uhlhaas & Singer, 2012; Cecere, 
Reese & Romei, 2015; Cooke et al., 2019). This has recently been confirmed by Cooke 
et al. (2019) who investigated the neural processing involved in audio-visual and the 
visuo-tactile Double Flash Illusion. The researchers found that the two types of cross-
modal illusion were characterised by aspects in different oscillatory processes 
associated with the inducing domain (i.e. alpha oscillations for the auditory driven 
illusion and beta oscillations for the tactile induced illusion). In order to introduce this 
research, we first need to briefly introduce alpha and beta frequencies and the role 
they play in different perceptual and mental processes. This will also serve to introduce 
the research presented in Chapter Four. 
Brainwave frequencies are produced by synchronised electrical pulses arising from 
groups of neurons communicating with each other. These frequencies can be divided 
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into distinct wavebands: Alpha (7 – 12 Hertz Hz), Beta (12 – 30 Hz), Theta (4 – 7 Hz), 
Delta (0.5 – 4 Hz) and Gamma (25 – 100 Hz) frequencies. Expanding on the function 
of each individual frequency band is out of the scope of this thesis. However, to our 
purpose, it is important to focus on the role of alpha and beta bands. Alpha oscillation 
appears to be the predominant rhythm in the resting human brain (Britton et al., 2016). 
Increase in alpha power is usually associated with reductions in cognitive activity 
(Lundqvist et al., 2013). Furthermore, alpha activity has been associated with 
neurocognitive functions that are central to the engagement of visual information 
(Piantoni et al., 2017; Ronconi et al., 2018) and auditory information (Mercier et al., 
2013). Beta oscillations are present over a large range of frequencies (12-30 Hz) and 
are commonly segmented into low, medium or high beta. Beta oscillations are often 
associated with the formation of largely distributed functional networks in the context 
of multisensory processing, sensory-motor coordination, and the maintenance of 
posture during normal brain functioning. Indeed, previous studies have linked tactile 
and somatosensory processing with beta oscillations (Foffani et al., 2005) as well as 
with motor and motor related tactile stimuli (Engel and Fries, 2010; for a review see 
Kilavik et al., 2013). Research has observed that low amplitude beta are linked with 
several types of cognitive and emotional processes, such as active concentration and 
anxious thinking (Baumeister et al., 2008). Notably, beta frequencies are involved in 
inhibitory cortical transmission mediated by gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA). 
Research has observed a connection between oscillatory beta activity and 
pharmacologically modulated GABA concentration in the sensorimotor cortex, 
demonstrating that drugs that decrease cortical GABA tend to result in heightening 
cortical beta activity (Drinkenburg et al., 2004). 
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An investigation conducted by Cecere, Rees, and Romei (2015) found a link between 
individual’s alpha band responses in the visual cortex and the temporal window of 
integration for audio-visual inputs (the Double Flash Illusion). More specifically, they 
found that slower alpha waves (i.e. slower alpha peak frequency) were associated with 
larger temporal windows of integration. Conversely, faster alpha waves were 
associated with shorter temporal windows of integration. Subsequently, Cecere, 
Reese and Romei, (2015) expanded this research by demonstrating that changing the 
alpha peak frequency could directly influence the individual’s temporal windows for the 
audio-visual Double Flash Illusion. The researchers directly manipulated the speed of 
the individual alpha wave using transcranial Alternating Current Stimulation (tACS). 
When the individual alpha peak frequency was reduced, the temporal window 
widened, conversely when the alpha frequency was increased, the window shortened. 
As a result, changing the occipital alpha wave time in the visual cortex resulted in a 
change in the perception of the illusion.  
A possible interpretation for this effect is that the auditory-induced Double Flash 
Illusion is driven by local oscillatory activity in the visual cortex which is associated 
with alpha activity (Dugue et al., 2011; Frey et al., 2014; van Dijk et al., 2008) and 
which set the temporal profile for the Double Flash Illusion. If this is to be the case, 
one would expect the same local effect of alpha activity for the visuo-tactile Double 
Flash Illusion. However, this is not what has been found in a subsequent research by 
Cooke et al. (2019). The authors replicated the relationship between the audio-visual 
Double Flash Illusion and the alpha frequency observed by Cecere et al. (2015). 
However, the researchers found that the tactile temporal window for the tactile Double 
Flash Illusion’s (i.e., one flash and two taps) was correlated with beta frequency in the 
visual cortex. More specifically, the authors found that a slower beta wave is 
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associated with a longer temporal window of integration, whereas a faster beta wave 
is associated with a shorter temporal window of integration. This suggests that the 
cross-modal effect in the Double Flash Illusion is not driven by local visual processes 
(related to alpha wave frequencies), but rather, it is driven by properties of functional 
connections between remote areas of the brain.  In the auditory induced DFI, the 
connection between auditory and visual cortices would be linked with the oscillatory 
processes related to auditory processing (alpha waves); on the other hand, the tactile 
induced DFI is linked to beta waves, which is the frequency at which tactile stimuli are 
processed. Thus, the visuo-tactile Double Flash Illusion, rather than being dependent 
on local network rules (i.e., local occipital oscillatory resonance activity), is determined 
by long-range communication networks (i.e., functional connections between 
somatosensory and visual cortices) that influence visual cortical processing. More 
specifically, the temporal window for the tactile induces illusion would be mediated by 
beta oscillations as somatosensory processing (pre-synaptic), which is typically linked 
with beta activity, phase-align beta oscillations in the visual cortex (post-synaptic), 
defining the temporal resolution of interregional synchronization. A similar pattern has 
been observed for the auditory-to-visual network by the aforementioned study from 
Cecere et al. (2015), who found an association with the auditory-induced illusion and 
alpha activity (which has been linked to auditory processing) in the visual cortex. 
These observations have been interpreted within the “Communication Through 
Coherence” framework (Fries, 2005; 2015) as a way of communication between the 
senses for optimal multisensory binding (Cooke et al., 2019).  
How does the above link to observations of neural activity in patients with 
schizophrenia and schizotypal disorders? Given the functional involvement of 
oscillatory networks in cognitive and perceptual processes, it is plausible that the 
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disturbances observed in the spectrum might be associated with a core disturbance in 
the generation of coherent neural oscillatory activity. This is what has emerged in 
current literature (Uhlhass, 2010). Electroencephalography (EEG) and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies have examined rhythmic activity during both 
spontaneous and task-related activity in schizophrenic patients or in healthy 
individuals with schizotypal traits. Results suggest abnormal power, amplitude and 
synchrony of oscillatory activity in both schizophrenia and schizotypy, especially in the 
beta and gamma bands (Liddle et al., 2016; Tillman et al.; Uhlhaas & Grent-Jong, 
2018; Grutzner et al., 2013; Koychev et al., 2011; Spender et al., 2003; Symond et al., 
2005; Uhlhaas et al., 2008). Moreover, research has found slower oscillatory activity 
in the alpha band in both schizophrenia (Clements et al., 1994: Omori et al., 1995) and 
schizotypy (Fuggetta et al., 2014). Researchers have hypothesised that the tendency 
towards slower oscillatory activity within a given frequency band is symptomatic of a 
general loss of neural code efficiency (see Ferri et al., 2018; Cecere et al., 2015). 
Moreover, as observed by Cecere et al. (2015) and Cooke et al. (2019), slower 
oscillatory activity appears to be associated with longer period of integration of 
information across the senses. In agreement with previous investigations which 
demonstrated that the abnormalities in schizotypy are similar to, but less pronounced 
than, those in schizophrenia (Nelson et al., 2013), both a longer window of sensory 
integration (Haß et al., 2017; Ferri et al., 2018) and slower oscillatory activity 
(Stevenson et al., 2017; Fotia et al., 2021) have been observed in both schizophrenia 
and schizotypy. These findings support the hypothesis that these alterations be 
present at the preclinical stages of schizophrenia spectrum disorder.  
With this in mind, Chapter Four investigated the relationship between temporal 
sensitivity in the tactile-induced Double Flash Illusion, neural oscillations and 
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schizotypy. Here, we were able to replicate the findings from Cooke et al. (2019), which 
demonstrated slower beta waves (i.e., reduced frequency) was associated with longer 
temporal window of integration, whereas faster beta waves were associated with 
shorter temporal windows of integration accounting for the illusion. Additionally, we 
found that reduction in individual beta frequency was associated with high schizotypal 
traits, as well as a longer temporal binding window within which they perceived the 
illusion. Individuals with lower schizotypal traits showed faster beta waves and shorter 
temporal binding windows for the illusion. Moreover, we found that the relationship 
between individual beta frequency and schizotypal personality traits was fully 
mediated by the temporal binding window. Taken together, these results suggest that 
a wider temporal window of integration between different sensory modalities, as have 
been observed in schizophrenia (Stevenson et al., 2017), likely also characterize 
schizophrenic-like subclinical conditions (Haß et al., 2017). Both these aspects may 
at least partially originate from abnormalities of the oscillatory frequency patterns 
associated with multisensory integration processes. Such interpretation would be in 
line both with reports of abnormal oscillatory activity and abnormalities in network 
synchronisation as measured by the “phase-locking factor” from Koychev et al. (2011), 
in turn leading to a deficient modulation of the sensory processing in schizotypy as 
observed in Chapter Four. Our results may represent a step forward in the 
identification of neurophysiological biomarkers of schizophrenia across different 
sensory domains and brain networks. 
The multisensory abnormalities that have been observed in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders are likely also connected to a deeper aberrancy in the structure of the self. 
In the phenomenological context, the self and the external world are not separable, as 
an individual’s sense of self is shaped through interactions with the world of objects. 
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This immersion and projection into the multisensory external world is mediated by the 
body, which is the most fundamental component to cohabit and co-determine the 
experiential structure from which a Gestalt emerge (Parnas, 2003). In the next section, 
we will focus on the representation of our body in the brain by introducing the concept 
of body ownership.  
 
 
2.3. Body Ownership 
The body plays a crucial role in shaping our fundamental sense of self. Representing 
our body at the brain level is extremely important for several tasks; for instance, it 
allows us to perceive our limbs in space and this, in turn, allows us to program our 
movement in the external space. Phenomenologically oriented neuroscientists 
suggest that the experience of the body must be assumed as the first and fundamental 
manifestation of the phenomenal or minimal self (Cremolacce et al., 2007; Metzinger, 
2003). Research in developmental psychology has shown that at the age of 2-3 
months - thus, long before mirror self-recognition has developed, which usually occurs 
at around 18 months – infants develop the capability to interpret invariant information 
about their own body as a separate entity in the environment (Rochat, 1998). This 
represents a fundamental step to develop a sense of one’s body as a distinct entity, 
differentiated from the external world. Without a representation of one's own body, it 
is not possible to perceive and experience properties of ownership and agency. Body 
ownership, also referred to as ‘mineness’ (Gallagher, 2000), refers to the status of 
one's body as an invariant structure for receiving sensory stimuli that are unique to 
oneself (Tsakiris et al., 2007) and has been linked with neural activity of specific brain 
areas, such as the premotor areas, the occipitotemporal cortex, the primary/secondary 
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somatosensory areas, and the anterior insula (Petkova et al., 2011; Ehrsson et al., 
2004). Body ownership is essential to distinguish us from others (Myers & Sowden, 
2008), and to develop higher-order cognitive processes (Gallese et al., 2004).  
These experiences of embodiment posit an interesting question: where does body 
ownership come from? What grounds the experience of my body as my own? The 
sense of body ownership is likely to be acquired by dynamic multisensorial integration 
processes and their interactions with internal models of the body. Indeed, a long 
tradition in psychology and cognitive neuroscience have suggested that body 
ownership depends on multisensory integration (Bonnier, 1905; Holmes & Head, 
1911; Longo & Haggard, 2012). Gibson (1979) argued that self-perception of one’s 
body is generated by different forms of sensory stimulation, such as “amodal 
invariants” (e.g., synchrony, rhythm and intensity patterns) and their overlap: 
“Information about the self accompanies information about the environment, and the 
two are inseparable. Egoreception accompanies exteroception, like the other side of 
a coin. Perception has two poles, the subjective and objective, and information is 
available to specify both. One perceives the environment and coperceives oneself” 
(Gibson, 1979, p. 126). The experience of body ownership is clearly adaptive from an 
evolutionary perspective, and this is most likely linked to the problem of localising and 
identifying oneself in the sensory environment, particularly because our bodies 
constantly change. These fundamental components of body ownership (i.e., self-
identification and self-location) are related to the processing of bodily signals in 
multisensory cortical systems (Blanke et al., 2015; Ehrsson et al., 2004). Thus, body 
ownership is highly malleable and multisensory integration, lying at the root of body 
unity, is the mechanism through which the experience of ‘mineness’ is constantly 
aligned with the changing body. At the neural level, the brain regions involved in 
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multisensory integration, such as the ventral premotor cortex (Ferri et al., 2011), the 
intraparietal sulcus and the insula (Grivaz et al., 2017) also contribute to body 
ownership. Information from bodily signals, as well as visual, proprioceptive, tactile 
and auditory signals, reach converge zones in the cortical regions, where the binding 
of these body signals happens (Botvnick, 2004; Graziano & Botvinick, 2002).  
The sensation of owning our own’s body is also modulated by the intentional and 
agentic nature of voluntary action: the sense of agency (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
The enabling conditions for self-experience are likely to be grounded in the feeling of 
body ownership and agency, which both play important roles in shaping the bodily self. 
For instance, in voluntary action, the sense of ownership and the sense of agency 
often coincide. Conversely, in the case of involuntary actions, it is almost always 
possible to distinguish between ownership and agency. Take, for instance, a doctor 
that, during a medical examination, moves the arm of the patient. In this case, the 
subject is aware that the moved arm belongs to him (sense of ownership), but on the 
other hand, he does not feel he was the one who caused the movement (sense of 
agency) (Gallagher, 2000). This suggests that agency and ownership produce 
complementary – but dissociable – components of embodiment (Gallagher, 2000;  
Tsakiris et al., 2006). For instance, research has evidenced that the active body 
(related to the sense of agency) is experienced as more coherent and unified than the 
passive body (Tsakiris et al., 2005, Gallagher, 2005). Indeed, in action, multiple body 
parts are controlled as an integrated whole. Neuroimaging studies show an orderly, 
segregated representation of body parts in the primary somatosensory cortex (SI), 
whereas the representations of different body parts strongly overlap in the primary 
motor cortex (M1) (Hlustik et al., 2001). For the purpose of this thesis, we will focus 
more specifically on body awareness as proprioceptive awareness, that is, the 
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conscious experience of the location of a specific body-part (i.e. an arm or a hand) in 
space. 
A vast corpus of literature on body ownership is based on the Rubber Hand Illusion 
paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This paradigm has been utilised to showcase 
that the perception of one’s own body in space critically depends on multisensory 
integration. The illusion offers an example of how an extra-biological object (i.e. a 
rubber hand) can be incorporated into the neural body map. Several studies have 
demonstrated that changes in body ownership occur during the Rubber Hand Illusion, 
both using the classical paradigm (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Armel & Ramachandran, 
2003; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2007) or modifications of the classical 
paradigm (Ehrsson et al., 2007, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Petkova & Ehrsoon, 2008). 
In the typical Rubber Hand Illusion, a participant is asked to put their hand (palm-
down) on a table, while an experimenter places a screen to hide the participant’s hand.  
Then, a rubber hand is placed on the table in a location that replaces the real, hidden 
hand. The experimenter strokes the rubber hand and the hidden hand in synchrony 
with two paintbrushes, moving the brushes at the same time on corresponding parts 
(e.g. corresponding fingers) of the hidden hand and of the rubber hand.  This creates 
a multisensory visuo-tactile temporal congruency of multisensory cues from that limb. 
In accordance with the temporal congruency principle of multisensory integration 
(Holmes & Spence, 2004; Stein and Stanford, 2008), the participant begins to feel that 
the rubber hand is their own actual hand. The rubber hand illusion creates the sense 
that the false hand is connected to the body; the effect occurs because the participant 
watches the rubber hand being touched synchronously with their real hand. The 
illusion does not occur when the rubber hand is stroked asynchronously with respect 
to the subject’s own hand.   
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The rubber hand illusion also depends on the spatial congruence of the sensory 
information involved. In accordance with the spatial principle of multisensory 
integration - namely, that spatial coincidence facilitates the integration of information 
coming from different sensory modalities (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Stein & Stanford, 
2008) - a study from Lloyd et al., (2007) found that the illusion is limited by the distance 
between the rubber hand and the participant’s real hand. Indeed, when the distance 
between the two hands is widened, the strength of the illusion decreases in a nonlinear 
way: it remained quite stable for smaller distances, and it started to consistently decay 
for distances beyond 27.5 cm.  The decay reflects the extent of peripersonal space as 
estimated in electrophysiological (Fogassi et al., 1996) and neuropsychological 
(Ladavas et al., 1998) studies. Also, in order to elicit the illusion, the rubber hand must 
be as similar as possible to the subject's real hand (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Interestingly, participants who experienced the Rubber Hand Illusion more strongly 
also perceived their hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar as opposed 
to participants who did not experience the illusion (Longo et al., 2009). These effects 
are not limited to the hand. For instance, in the full-body illusion, watching the body of 
an avatar being stroked, while receiving the same tactile stimulation on one’s own 
body at the same time, induces participants to self-identify with the avatar (Petkova & 
Ehrsson, 2008). Moreover, the full-body illusion can induce the participants to 
misperceive the location of their own body and perceive themselves as closer to the 
avatar’s position (Ionta et al., 2011). What this ultimately suggests is that the unity 
between body and self can be temporarily suspended. 
The changes in subjective experience elicited by the rubber hand illusion have been 
investigated with different methods. For instance, one widely used method consists of 
submitting the participant to questionnaires in the form of analogue or Likert scales, 
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which usually include two or three statements about the important perceptual effect of 
the illusion (e.g. “I felt as if the rubber hand was my hand,” “It seemed as if I were 
feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the rubber hand being 
touched”), and five to seven statements designed to control for task compliance and 
suggestibility (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). More recent literature has been debating 
whether these questionnaires are reliable measures of embodiment, particularly on 
whether the introspective account of ownership, as indicated in the questionnaires, 
reflects the sense of ownership or the judgement of ownership (de Vignemont, 2010). 
A recent investigation found that the phrasing of the questions can influence 
participants’ judgment. For instance, statements based on ‘feeling’ (whether the 
participant feels that the rubber hand belongs to them), resulted in higher agreement 
compared to statements based on ‘believing’ (e.g., whether the participant believes 
that the rubber hand belongs to them) (Tamè et al., 2018). Another indicator which 
has often been used as a measure of ownership is the perceived change in the location 
of the participant’s own hand towards the rubber hand (i.e., proprioceptive drift) (see 
Tsakiris, 2007 for a review). Further research demonstrated that if the rubber hand is 
threatened (e.g., with a hammer), unconscious fear response mechanisms are 
activated, and the subject reacts as though the hammer is about to be hit their real 
hand. Also, the participant’s blood pressure and heart rate, as well as the adrenaline 
levels, rise when they experience the illusion, or when the rubber hand is threatened 
(e.g. with a hammer, or sometimes even with a knife, in Virtual Reality (VR) studies) 
(Gonzalez-Franco et al., 2013).  
The extent to which these various measures reflect the same or different underlying 
processes involved in the illusion, is still under debate (Longo et al., 2008; Gallagher 
et al., 2021; Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016).  In particular, despite the fact the 
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proprioceptive drift often correlates with body ownership in the Rubber Hand Illusion, 
this is not consistent across different studies, and the relationship between these two 
measures still remains unclear. Rohde et al. (2011), found that subjective ratings of 
embodiment were higher following synchronous vs asynchronous tactile stimulation, 
whereas proprioceptive drift was reduced only by continuous asynchronous 
stimulation. On the other hand, when tactile stimulation was frequently interrupted, the 
authors observed similar drifts both in the synchronous and in the asynchronous 
conditions. Also, Abdulkarim & Ehrsson (2016), found that proprioceptive drift was 
affected when the participants moved their hand towards or far from the rubber hand, 
whereas movement did not affect the subjective questionnaire ratings. On these 
bases, it has been suggested that proprioceptive drift reflects self-localization, while 
subjective reports indicate ownership over the rubber hand (Longo et al., 2008; Serino 
et al., 2013). Thus, the proprioceptive drift is likely to result from a process of 
multisensory spatial recalibration, during which the position sense is dynamically 
updated to correspond better with the location of the rubber hand in the external space. 
However, despite the fact that the two components of ownership and localization can 
be dissociated, they are generally strongly linked in most experiences. Indeed, even if 
the sense of owning one’s body might not be reducible to the perceived location of 
one’s body, the two components of ownership and location most likely work together 
to differentiate self from other (Jeannerod, 2007). 
Further insights on the relationship between the experience of the location of one’s 
own hand relative to the rubber hand (i.e. proprioceptive drift), and the sense of 
ownership over the hand (as assessed with subjective reports) come from a study from 
Longo et al. (2008). The authors found that the two components are dissociable but 
form a coherent cluster of experience, suggesting that the sense of body ownership is 
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not a single dimension, but a composite of several different subjective components, 
organised with a characteristic structure. By applying principal component analysis, 
the authors found four major components related to the RHI: embodiment of the rubber 
(i.e. the feeling that the rubber hand belonged to the participant), loss of own hand (i.e. 
feeling that one’s hand is out of one’s control), movement (i.e. perceived motion of 
one’s own hand and of the rubber hand), and affect (i.e. pleasant feelings related to 
the illusion). Furthermore, the authors found an additional fifth component in the 
asynchronous condition: deafference (i.e., the sensation of pins-and-needles and 
numbness in one’s hand). A secondary analysis of the embodiment of the rubber hand 
component further revealed three subcomponents: ownership (i.e., the sense that the 
rubber hand was part of one’s own body), location (i.e. the sense that one’s own hand 
was in the same location as the rubber hand), and agency (i.e. the sense of control 
over the rubber hand). In particular, the authors found that both the location and 
ownership component were significant independent predictor of proprioceptive 
displacement, whereas the agency subcomponent was not. What this suggests is that 
proprioceptive displacement is a by-product of embodiment which relates to body 
ownership, but not to agency. The authors concluded suggesting at least two types of 
influences structuring embodiment: those associated with immediate sensations from 
the body (bottom-up) and those associated with stored representations of the body 
(top-down).  
Thus, the Rubber Hand Illusion effect suggests that feelings of ownership result from 
both bottom-up processes (i.e. involving the multisensory integration of visual, tactile 
and proprioceptive information) and top-down processes (i.e. involving an internal 
representation of the body) (Tsakiris, 2010). Indeed, it has been noted that the spatial 
and temporal congruence, (e.g. between tactile and visual information) is necessary, 
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but not sufficient, to experience the rubber hand illusion. On top of that, a pre-existing 
representation of the body is essential to understand several aspects of the illusion 
(Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010).  For instance, susceptibility to the illusion 
can be abolished by a mismatch in hand orientation (Pavani et al., 2000; Ehrsson et 
al., 2005), or by using a fake wooden hand instead of a rubber hand (Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005). Costantini and Haggard (2007) demonstrated that the illusion 
operates in a hand-centered reference frame, which is constantly updated with 
changes in body posture. The authors suggest that perception of current sensory 
stimulation on the body depends not only on feedforward integration of current inputs 
but also on pre-existing body representations which possess their own frame of 
reference and are distinct from external spatial representation. Therefore, it is likely 
that a prior structural-spatial body representation has a key role in elaborating 
multimodal stimuli and creating the experience of what is “mine”. This aspect of body 
representation will be furtherly expanded in section 2.4. On a neural level, the rubber 
hand illusion has been linked to activity in multisensory areas in frontal and parietal 
association cortices such as the ventral premotor cortex and the intraparietal cortex 
(Ehrsson et al., 2004), suggesting that these areas contribute to self-attribution of body 
parts by integrating visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals (Gentile et al., 2013). 
Unsurprisingly, research has observed that individuals with schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders are more susceptible to the Rubber Hand Illusion and exhibit a more rapid 
onset of the illusion (Peled et al., 2000; Peled et al., 2003; Thakkar et al., 2011; for a 
review see Klaver & Dijkerman, 2016), suggesting abnormal multisensory integration 
related to bodily self-experience. One interpretation is that altered proprioception 
outweighs visual information coming from the rubber hand (Chang & Lenzenweger, 
2005). However, research which found reduced influence of visual information on 
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proprioceptive and auditory signals in schizophrenia is inconsistent with this 
hypothesis (Williams et al., 2010; de Gelder et al., 2003). Alternatively, researchers 
have hypothesised that the higher proneness to the illusion may be caused by more 
flexible body representations among patients with schizophrenia. This would be 
consistent with anecdotal observations which found that some patients experience the 
illusion even before receiving tactile stimulation (Peled et al., 2000; Haggard et al., 
2011). Previous work has found that body representation anomalies are pre-existing -
or even predisposing – features in at-risk individuals (Chapman et al., 1978; 
Lenzenweger, 2010; Thakkar et al., 2011). This is also supported by evidence that 
found significant alterations in long-latency somatosensory evoked potential during the 
Rubber Hand Illusion in schizophrenic patients (Peled et al., 2003). Moreover, it has 
been shown that higher proneness to the Rubber Hand Illusion was detectable among 
healthy individuals who exhibited psychotic-like symptoms (Germine et al., 2013). With 
this in mind, Chapter Five aimed to investigate whether disturbances in a specific type 
of body representation (i.e. the body structural representation, see section 2.4.), were 
associated with higher proneness to the Rubber Hand Illusion and with basic 
symptomatology that is usually taken as phenomenological markers of schizophrenia 
risk (i.e. the basic symptoms, see section 1.3.1). Our results suggest that patients with 
schizophrenia possess more malleable body representations. Consequently, patients 
might be more likely to adopt faulty models of their own body’s spatial mapping and 
location and be more susceptible to external influences (e.g. an external visual rubber 
hand).  Moreover, our results indicate that such aberrancies are correlated with 
symptoms that are considered as the first experienced phenomena of the ongoing 
morbid process. To test whether similar body representation disturbances are 
traceable in high schizotypy, Chapter Six examined the internal body representation 
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system in individuals with high and low schizotypal personality traits. To this purpose, 
we utilised two tasks that target body representation directly, in the absence of 
multisensory cues. The next section aims to introduce different types of body 
representation and examine the different ways that have been employed to investigate 
them. 
 
2.4. Body Representations 
When we talk about body representations, we refer to the neurological and cognitive 
structures of the body that underlie self-representation (Waters & Badcock, 2010). 
Possessing a set of representations of one’s body has consequences for both feelings 
of agency and bodily ownership, as it provides a natural reference point for 
understanding one’s own body and its possibility to interact with the external world 
(Damasio, 1999). Thus, we are able to perceive our body as a coherent, holistic “me”, 
and not merely as a disorganised collection of inputs (Tsakiris et al., 2006). This 
coherent experience of “me” arises from the simultaneous activation of multiple body 
representations, which are derived from multimodal sensory input, motor monitoring 
and planning sources. According to phenomenological research, the body in 
schizophrenia is often experienced as an object external to one’s self and unrelated 
to events in the external world (Northoff & Stanghellini, 2016). In addition, abnormal 
processing of body parts and perceptual gestalts in schizophrenia spectrum disorders 
have been extensively documented in research (Uhlhaas & Mishara, 2007; Chan et 
al., 2010).  These disturbances consist in the weakening of the kinetic dimension (e.g. 
limited sense of agency) (Van Haren et al., 2019), the kinaesthetic dimension (e.g. 
abnormal sensorimotor representation) (Ardizzi, 2020), and the aesthetic dimension 
(e.g. misperception of body’s appearance) (Priebe & Rohricht, 2001; Ferri et al., 2012). 
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An unstable and disorganized system of body representations can include perceiving 
changes in proportions, size and weight of different body parts (Nelson et al., 2010) 
and loosening of body boundaries (Parnas et al., 2003; Noel et al., 2016; Di Cosmo et 
al., 2018). From a phenomenological perspective, these changes are characterised by 
a transformation in the subjective experience of the body. For instance, a patient might 
feel like they no longer inhabit their body, but rather experience it as an object (e.g., 
hyperreflexivity).  
In phenomenology, body representations have been interpreted through the 
framework of intentionality, i.e., when “I” take the world as an intentional object from 
the position of the body. Thus, “I” am a lived body of intentions, projects and activity, 
but “I” am also capable of viewing my body as an objective body. This distinction 
echoes the phenomenological division between the body-as-object of experience or 
“Körper”, and the body-as-subject of experience or “Leib”. Whereas the “Körper” is the 
physical body that the agent can observe and that can be in turn observed by the 
others, the “Leib” is the body that the agent can pre-reflectively experience as a subject 
and consists in sensorimotor representation that guides actions (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945). To date, there is little consensus on how many body representations exist and 
on how they should be functionally defined (Holmes & Spence, 2004). Several 
prominent theories have attempted to provide a clear conceptual distinction between 
two of the most pertinent types of body representation: the body schema and the body 
image. However, there has been confusion surrounding these definitions because of 
the conflation between these two concepts (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Gallagher & 
Zahavi 2012). Justifying the definition employed here is the fact that this definition 
emphasises the important distinction between the ‘body as an object’ (i.e., the body 
image) and the ‘body as a subject’ (i.e., the body schema), a distinction that is 
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important for understanding the schizophrenic pathology, and, more specifically, the 
schizophrenic prodrome. 
 
2.4.1. Body Image and Body Schema 
Body image refers to the conscious representation of our body in space in reference 
to an external observer and is made up of sensory, conceptual and affective processes 
(Paillard, 1999; Gallagher, 2000). The body image consists of a system of perceptions, 
dispositions and beliefs regarding one’s physical body and allows for the identification 
and recognition of one’s body (in the objective space). Moreover, the body image often 
involves an abstract or partial representation of the body, as “conscious awareness 
attends to one part or area of the body at a time”. The body schema is a network of 
integrated bodily capacities, a system of proprioceptive and sensorimotor processes 
that produce and regulate motor behaviour in absence of perceptual awareness 
(Gallagher, 1995). As pointed out by Gallagher (1995), the body schema may be best 
characterised as a subconscious system that plays an active role in monitoring and 
governing posture and movement. The body schema registers the postural changes 
of the body through multisensory information and produces appropriate motor control. 
In contrast to the abstract nature of the body image, body schema functions in a holistic 
way: “…a slight change in posture involves a global adjustment across a large number 
of muscle systems” (Gallagher, 1995, p. 229). Thus, we could claim that body image 
is perceptual in nature and body schema is enactive in nature, although they still have 
to work in conjunction - similarly to how perception and action work in conjunction - to 
shape and maintain the sense of agency and ownership. In the context of multimodal 
integration, the body image interprets the multisensory processes related to body 
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perception, and the body schema interprets the multisensory processes that facilitate 
our motor responses.   
Neuroscientific and neuropsychological findings have provided strong support for the 
existence of these two types of body representation: a sensorimotor representation of 
the body that guides actions (i.e., body schema), and a more perceptual 
representation – or explicit attitude - towards the body (i.e., body image). In 
neuroscientific literature, it has been suggested that the primary somatosensory cortex 
and the supramarginal gyrus are involved in mediating non-action-oriented body 
representations (i.e., body image). In contrast, body representations that support 
actions appear to be mediated by the primary motor cortex and the right extrastriate 
body (Di Vita et al., 2016). In neuropsychological literature, an important contribution 
regarding the classification of body representational systems emerges from the 
concept of double dissociation. In brief, a double dissociation is observed when a 
group of patients is impaired on a task “A”, which assesses one aspect of body 
representation, but not on a task “B”, which assesses another aspect of body 
representation (de Vignemont, 2009).  If A and B are both body-related tasks, then 
one could argue that there must be two distinct processing systems of bodily 
information, which can be functionally dissociated by brain lesions. Several studies 
showcased the existence of a double dissociation between neurological patients who 
exhibit impairments in perceptual detection - but maintain intact sensorimotor 
guidance towards a stimulated location (i.e., ‘numbsense’) - and vice versa. Thus, 
some patients exhibit a specific deficit in the perceptual representation of the target 
(body image), whereas the sensorimotor representation remains intact (body 
schema). For instance, a patient might be able to verbally identify the location of a 
tactile stimulus but show impairments when asked to point toward the stimulus 
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(Paillard, 1999; Halligan et al., 1995), indicating an impairment in body schema, with 
a preserved body image. On the other hand, some other patients may exhibit residual 
tactile processing for action without perceptual awareness (Paillard et al., 1983).  
Interestingly, research which has found a neurological dissociation between 
autopagnosia (i.e., mislocalization of body parts and bodily sensations) and body-
specific aphasia (i.e. loss of lexical knowledge of body parts) have hypothesised the 
existence of two additional subcomponents of the body image: the body structural 
representation and the body semantics (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Sirigu et al., 
1991; de Vignemont., 2009). The body semantics corresponds to a conceptual and 
linguistic body representation, including body part names and functions. The body 
structural representation, or “visuospatial body map” consists of a structural 
description of the relationships between body parts, including the relative positions of 
different body parts relative to one another in a spatial configuration (De Vignemont, 
2010). For the purpose of the present thesis, I shall focus on the body structural 
representation.  
The body structural representation is considered to be a topological map of the body 
which functions as a stored representation of the relationship between body parts in 
relation to each other within a whole-body structure (Rusconi et al., 2009; Longo, 
2016). Evidence for the existence of body structural representation comes from the 
study of autotopagnosia, a condition in which knowledge of the structural body 
becomes deeply impaired. Autotopagnosia is normally associated with a lesion of the 
left parietal lobe. Patients with autotopagnosia are unable to point to parts of their body 
on verbal command, nor to judge the spatial relations between body parts (although 
their somatosensory processing remains mainly intact) (Sirigu et al., 1991). 
Nonetheless, they are able to describe the function of their different body parts and to 
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utilise the body parts that they cannot localize, for instance, to perform self-initiated 
goal-directed tasks. (Sirigu et al., 1991), suggesting that body structural representation 
and body schema can be dissociated. A study from Buxbaum and Coslett (2011) 
described a patient who is unable to point to body parts but can perform visually guided 
grasping movements. Moreover, the patient could point to objects attached at different 
locations to the body (see also Sirigu et al. 1991). The authors interpreted these 
impairments as a disrupted body structural representation. Further evidence comes 
from a neurological condition caused by lesions in the left posterior parietal brain area: 
finger agnosia (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962). Patients with finger agnosia cannot 
identify their fingers, although they maintain relatively good abilities in terms of 
sensation and action. A study by Anema et al. (2008) examined different types of finger 
representations in patients with finger agnosia following a lesion in the angular gyrus 
(a region of the brain located in the inferior parietal lobule), and with no language or 
motor deficits. Patients were asked to localize a tactile stimulus delivered to the hand. 
Most notably, patients were assessed in three different conditions: naming the finger, 
pointing toward the finger on a schematic drawing, and pointing directly to the touched 
finger without the aid of visual feedback. The last condition is considered to involve 
the body schema, as it involves a sensorimotor representation of the fingers that are 
not consciously accessible and is used for guiding motor action (Paillard, 1999; 9, 
Rossetti et al., 2001). The other two tasks are believed to involve the body image – 
and more specifically the body structural representation - because the tactile 
information about the targeted finger has to be transferred to an abstract hand 
representation (Paillard, 1999; Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Anema et al., 2008). 
Patients performed normally only in the third condition (i.e., pointing directly to the 
touched finger with no visual feedback), whereas they were not able to accomplish the 
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two other tasks (i.e., respectively naming the finger and pointing toward the finger on 
a hand’s drawing), suggesting an impairment in the body structural representation 
(body image), but not in the body schema. 
Moreover, neuroimaging studies have identified brain areas which are active during 
tasks related to body structural representation. In line with clinical literature on 
autotopagnosia and finger agnosia, evidence coming from fMRI studies linked body 
structural representation with the left superior parietal cortex, the left posterior 
intraparietal sulcus and the primary somatosensory cortex; the latter hosts the 
somatotopic map of the hand and fingers (SI) (Maldjian et al., 1999). Interestingly, 
alteration of the SI has been found in schizophrenia (Geyer et al., 1999). For instance, 
a study from Reite et al. (2003) found an anomalous asymmetry of touch-activated 
sources in the primary somatosensory cortex of patients and anterior and inferior 
displacement of such activity in their left-hemisphere. Furthermore, Minzenberg et al. 
(2009), found that individuals with schizophrenia exhibit hyperactivation of the left 
inferior posterior parietal cortex and a bilateral hypoactivation of the posterior parietal 
cortex. Also, abnormalities in the volume of the inferior parietal cortex (left angular 
gyrus) have been found as well (Buchanan et al., 2004; Nierenberg et al., 2005).  
Recently, a study from Graham-Smith (2016) found a reduced acuity in body structural 
representations in schizophrenic patients. The researcher adopted a task widely used 
to investigate body structural representation in neurological patients (Kinsbourne & 
Warrington, 1962) and in healthy participants (Rusconi et al., 2009; Rusconi et al., 
2014): the In Between Task. The task requires participants to evaluate the relationship 
between the spatial structure of the fingers, i.e., participants are asked to identify how 
many fingers are in between the stimulated fingers. This task is particularly well suited 
to investigate the fine-grained detail of generalised visuospatial acuity (i.e., distances 
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between fingers). The authors found that patients with schizophrenia performed 
significantly worse at the task, suggesting a reduced acuity in body structural 
representation. This reduced acuity may be caused by a weakened internal model of 
the bodily self, which in schizophrenics appears more blurred and malleable (Thakkar 
et al., 2011).  
A similar task utilised to investigate the perceived structural representation of the hand 
is the finger localisation task. The finger localisation task is similar to the In Between 
Task in that it is appropriate for investigating fine-grained body mapping. In the most 
common version of the task, participants are asked to identify and differentiate 
between stimulated fingers, first with hands in view and then with hands hidden. The 
Finger Localization Task has often been used to diagnose patients with finger agnosia, 
the aforementioned disorder which affects the ability to identify stimulated fingers 
(Reed, 1967; Benton, 1955; Miller & Hynd, 2004), following posterior parietal lesions 
(Miller & Hynd 2004). In Chapter Six, we adopted both the In Between Task and the 
Finger Localization Task to investigate body structural representation in individuals 
with high and low schizotypal traits, in the absence of multisensory stimulation. Results 
from Chapter Six found that a deficient body structural representation in individuals 
with high schizotypy and high dissociative traits (i.e., fragmentation of own identity), 
suggesting that abnormal body structural representation may represent a potential 
early marker of schizophrenia.  
What this suggests is that schizophrenia spectrum disorders are rooted in a lack of 
anchoring to one own’s body.  With this in mind, we can hypothesise that the 
disturbances in the minimal self that are observed in schizophrenia could be – at least 
partially - caused and maintained by more basic disturbances of body representation, 
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such as in the body image. Whether this aberrancy in body image representation is a 
consequence of an abnormal body schema is still unclear. However, the efficiency of 
the body schema is deeply interconnected with the successful interpretation of the 
different body image components. Therefore, it is more likely that both these types of 
body representations are affected in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, suggesting a 
more profound dis-attunement with the lived body, which would detrimentally affect 
















Higher proneness to multisensory illusions is driven by reduced temporal 
sensitivity in people with high schizotypal traits 
3.1. Abstract 
A coherent sense of self, typically altered in schizophrenia, is accompanied by an 
ability to meaningfully integrate sensory information. According to the idea of 
schizophrenia as a continuum, the higher proneness to multisensory illusions 
observed in schizophrenia may extend to schizotypy. In the present study, this 
hypothesis was directly tested by means of the Double Flash Illusion in participants 
with low and high schizotypal traits. Results confirmed that individuals with high 
schizotypal traits exhibit enhanced proneness to the illusion when compared with 
individuals with low schizotypal traits. Importantly, such higher proneness was fully 
explained by a significantly reduced temporal sensitivity in the integration of sensory 
information. Thus, we conclude that reduced temporal sensitivity accounts for 
enhanced proneness to illusions in people at higher risk of developing schizophrenia 




The development of the ability to use cues from multiple senses in concert is 
intertwined with the emergence of a sense of self (Bremner et al., 2012; Rochat, 2011; 
van Dam et al., 2014). Consistently, impairments in multisensory temporal processing 
that extend beyond those observed in unisensory domains have been observed in 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Stevenson et al., 2017). Such impairments are 
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thought to contribute to abnormal self-experiences (Postmes et al., 2014) and 
abnormal perception of the outer environment (Tseng et al., 2015). Within this 
theoretical framework, it has been hypothesised that symptoms such as hallucination 
and delusion might emerge in this atmosphere, when, over the course of many months 
or even years, the patients attempt to restore perceptual coherence (Postmes et al., 
2014). 
Multisensory integration abnormalities in schizophrenia spectrum disorders have often 
been investigated using audio-visual illusion tasks, such as the streaming-bounce 
illusion (Zvyagintsev et al., 2017), the McGurk illusion (Martin et al., 2013) and the 
double-flash illusion (DFI) (Haß et al., 2017). All these illusions are determined by the 
brain’s effort to integrate information from different sensory modalities into unified, 
coherent precepts. Given the characteristics of the stimuli presented, such percepts 
(the illusory outcome) are often incoherent with the actual sensory input. Notably, 
these sensory illusions reflect specific temporal constraints between the senses. Such 
constraints provide a contextual framework for interpreting ambiguous (e.g., the 
precise co-occurrence of certain audio-visual events in the streaming-bouncing 
illusion) or otherwise incoherent stimuli (e.g. the inconsistent correspondence between 
lip movements associated with a compatible but mismatched sound in the McGurk 
illusion; or the number and temporal disparity between low-level audio-visual events 
in the DFI). Thus, such illusions have been commonly utilised to assess whether 
multimodal processing is intact, or not, in non-clinical and clinical conditions. 
 
Research that utilised the aforementioned, and other types of illusions, have 
consistently suggested that higher susceptibility to audiovisual illusions in 
schizophrenia is linked to reduced temporal sensitivity. Such reduced temporal 
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sensitivity is indexed by an enlarged temporal window within which the illusion is 
maximally perceived, namely the Temporal Window of Illusion (TWI; Cecere, Rees, & 
Romei, 2015). TWI, therefore, represents an inverse index for temporal sensitivity (i.e. 
enlarged TWI = reduced temporal sensitivity). More specifically, the temporal window 
within which stimuli coming from different sensory modalities tend to be integrated, 
rather than segregated, appears enlarged in schizophrenia (Stevenson et al., 2017) 
and in individuals with high schizotypal traits (Ferri et al., 2017). Whether individuals 
with high schizotypal traits experience greater susceptibility to multisensory illusions 
is currently unknown. If this would be the case, whether this phenomenon may be fully 
accounted for by a more general temporal sensitivity mechanism during sensory 
processing, remains another relevant open question to be addressed. 
 
According to a dimensional approach to schizophrenia, schizotypy represents a 
continuum throughout the general population ranging from psychologically healthy 
individuals (low schizotypy) to schizophrenia-prone individuals (high schizotypy) 
(Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015, Nelson et al., 2013).  Notably, schizophrenia-
proneness does not necessarily imply schizophrenia-risk, and most schizotypes are 
not expected to develop schizophrenia. Nonetheless, considerable overlaps between 
schizotypy and schizophrenia have been found both in terms of etiological factors - at 
the genetic, biological, and psychosocial levels (Barrantes-Vidal et al., 2015) – and 
both concerning a wide range of perceptual, cognitive, and motor impairments 
(Ettinger et al., 2015). Most importantly, investigating multisensory processing in 
individuals with high schizotypy offers the advantage to bypass all the confounding 
variables of a complex disorder such as schizophrenia (i.e., pharmacological 
treatment, the severity of symptoms, compensatory strategies, distress and 
74 
 
comorbidity). Furthermore, using the same experimental paradigms in schizotypy and 
schizophrenia may contribute to, first, further detailing the idea of a “continuum” 
between the two conditions (Ettinger et al., 2015); second, to identifying early risk 
markers. 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the susceptibility to auditory-induced visual 
illusions in individuals with high and low schizotypy by means of the DFI, which has 
been already proven to be informative in people with schizophrenia (Haß et al., 2017). 
We specifically chose to test very brief audio-visual stimuli as they have the 
appropriate temporal resolution for assessing the fine-grained temporal profile of 
crossmodal interactions (e.g. Murray et al., 2016, Romei et al., 2012, Romei et al., 
2007) and its alterations (Bao et al., 2017, Haß et al., 2017, Noel et al., 2017, 
Stevenson et al., 2017, Stevenson et al., 2014). Specifically, we hypothesize that by 
comparing the proneness to the DFI between low- and high-schizotypal groups, a 
higher percentage of perceived illusion in the high-schizotypal group is expected. 
Importantly, in line with Ferri et al. (2017), we expect that the enhanced percentage of 
illusory precepts in the high-schizotypal group will be accounted for by an enlarged 










3.3. Materials and Methods 
3.3.1. Participants 
One hundred ninety-six adult volunteers, recruited via mailing lists at the University of Essex, 
were screened with respect to schizotypal traits using the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991). The questionnaire was administered electronically via 
Qualtrics, a web-based data collection system. The SPQ is a 74-item forced choice 
(Yes/No) questionnaire based on clinical features of schizotypal personality disorder 
described by the DSM-III-R and DSM- IV-TR (APA, 1987; APA, 2000). All items 
answered “yes” are scored as one: therefore, the total maximum score is 74. Factor 
analysis has revealed that three main factors best represent schizotypal personality: 
the cognitive-perceptual (i.e., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences, paranoid 
ideation and ideas of reference), the interpersonal (i.e., excessive social anxiety, 
constricted affect, no close friends), and disorganized factors (i.e. eccentric behaviour, 
eccentric speech) (Raine et al., 1994). These three factors structure is comparable to 
the three analogous factors reported for schizophrenic symptomatology (i.e., positive, 
negative, disorganised symptoms) (Fossati et al., 2003). 
 
The distribution of scores was divided into quintiles, with the first quintile representing 
the participants rated as low schizotypes (score range 5–16, n = 32), and the fifth 
quintile representing the participants rated as high schizotypes (score range 36–68, 
n = 32). As a result, a total of sixty-four participants falling within the first and fifth 
quintile were selected to perform the DFI task (Cecere et al., 2015, Shams et al., 2000, 
Shams et al., 2002). The study was approved by the University of Essex Ethics 
Committee. All participants read and signed a consent form prior to their participation. 
All the participants included in the “low schizotypes” and the “high schizotypes” groups 
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had normal or corrected vision, and normal hearing. They did not report any history of 
substance abuse or other (neuro)psychiatric disorders. Age and gender were matched 













Performance of three participants in the first quintile and four participants in the fifth 
quintile did not fit the sigmoid function (see data analysis below), mostly due to 
unreliable report of the illusion (as a function of the time interval between the two 
sounds) and were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, a total of fifty-seven 
participants (29 in the low- and 28 in the high-schizotypal group) were included in the 
current analyses. The participants gave written consent before taking part in the 
experiment, and all were naïve to the actual purpose of the study. 
3.3.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as Cecere, Reese and Romei, (2015). On each 
trial, the visual stimulus consisted of a solid white circle subtending 2 degrees of visual 
angle, presented in a dimly lit room at 57 cm viewing distance on a 17′ CRT display 
(ViewSonic Graphics Series G90FB, refresh rate 85 Hz) for the duration of one refresh 
frame (∼12 ms). Auditory stimuli were stereo, sinusoidal pure tones (frequency: 
3.5 kHz; sampling rate: 44.1 kHz) of the duration of 7 ms presented by a pair of stereo 
PC speakers placed either side of the monitor. This arrangement allowed coincident 
spatial perception of visual and auditory stimuli as they were perceived spatially 
aligned with the location of the visual stimuli on the screen (Macaluso, George, Dolan, 
Spence, and Driver, 2004). Stimulus presentation and behavioural response recording 
were controlled by a PC running E-Prime software (version: 2; Psychology Software 









The procedure was adapted from Cecere et al. (2015). All trials started with a small 
fixation cross continuously displayed at the centre of the screen. After a random time-
lag of 500–1500 ms, a single visual flash of a diameter of 2 cm, and an auditory 
stimulus pair were presented. Each visual stimulus flashed for 12 ms, and each 
auditory stimulus had a frequency of 3500 Hz and a duration of 7 ms. While the flash 
was always displayed simultaneously with the first auditory stimulus, the second 
auditory stimulus was played at 15 different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) from 
the first auditory stimulus onset ranging from 36 to 204 ms (with each interval 
corresponding to an increment of one refresh frame: 12 ms) (see Fig. 3.1).  According 
to Apthorp et al. (2013), although a frame is generally reported as 12 ms for an 85 Hz 
refresh rate, the actual duration of the flash is estimated to be much shorter, due to 
the phosphor decay rate of the cathode ray tube monitor (Elze, 2010). Therefore, the 
present investigation will refer to SOAs rather than inter-stimulus intervals, as the onset 






Fig. 3.1. Schematics of the experimental paradigm. For each trial, participants were instructed 
to fix a white fixation point in the middle of a grey screen lasting for a period randomly ranging 
between 500 and 1500 ms. Subsequently, they were presented with one (and always one) 
visual flash lasting for one refresh rate (12 ms) accompanied by two (and always two) brief 
(7 ms) auditory stimuli. The onset of the first beep was always temporally coincident with the 
onset of the visual flash, whereas the onset of the second beep could be presented at 15 
different delays, with onset ranging between 36 and 204 ms in 12 ms steps from the first 
auditory stimulus onset. Participants were explicitly asked to report whether they perceived 











The presentation of the auditory pair together with the single flash was aimed at 
inducing the perception of a second visual illusory flash while there was only ever one 
flash. In particular, the shorter the SOA, the stronger the illusion was expected to be 
(Cecere et al., 2015, Shams et al., 2002). This range of SOAs and its sampling interval 
has been shown to be optimal to determine the time frame within which the DFI illusion 
is maximally perceived while also extending beyond this time frame (Cecere et al., 
2015). Therefore, it might likely provide a sufficiently sensitive time window within 
which any difference in TWI between low and high schizotypy could be investigated. 
Participants were instructed to pay attention to visual stimuli only and to ignore the 
sounds. Moreover, as correct responses were favoured over speeded responses, 
participants were instructed to verbally report after each trial whether they perceived 
one or two flashes. The experimenter inputted the participant’s verbal response by 
pressing the corresponding button on a keyboard, which in turn started the subsequent 
trial. The experimental block consisted of 150 trials, with each of the 15 SOAs being 
randomly presented for ten times. 
3.4. Data Analysis 
3.4.1. Proneness to the DFI  
Recent findings have shown that patients with schizophrenia have a higher proneness 
to the DFI (Haß et al., 2017). According to the continuum hypothesis, we tested 
whether a similar observation can be made for participants with high-schizotypal traits. 
To this aim, the percentage of “two” responses across all SOAs out of 150 (Overall 
proneness to the illusion [OPI]) were counted for each individual independently of their 
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SOAs. This percentage was compared across the low- and high schizotypy groups, 
testing the specific hypothesis that participants in the high schizotypy group are 
expected to show higher proneness to the illusion. A one-tailed independent sample t-
test was used to examine the difference between the total amount of perceived illusion 
in the low and high schizotypy groups. Finally, a linear regression analysis was 
performed to investigate the contribution of each factor of the SPQ (i.e., perceptual-
cognitive, interpersonal and disorganized factors) to the variance in the proneness to 
DFI. We expected the cognitive-perceptual factor, also referred to as positive 
schizotypy (Ettinger et al., 2014), more than the other factors, to significantly account 
for higher proneness to DFI in people with high schizotypy. This hypothesis was based 
on prior evidence that both positive schizotypy (e.g. Benson and Park, 2019; Bressan 
& Kramer, 2013; Van Doorn et al., 2018) and positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. 
Peled et al., 2000) are commonly associated to proneness to perceptual illusions. 
3.4.2. Temporal window of illusion (TWI)  
In order to calculate for each individual and group the TWI, i.e. the temporal window 
within which participants maximally perceive the DFI, and thus the point from which 
the illusion starts to degrade, the number of trials in which the illusion was perceived 
(total percentage of “two” responses out of 10) was plotted for each SOA separately 
for individuals in the low- and high schizotypy groups. A psychometric sigmoid function 
y = a+b/(1+exp(-(x-c)/d)); a = lower asymptote for high values of x; b = amplitude of 
the psychometric curve (a+b forms the upper asymptote for low values of x); c = 
inflection point; d = slope] was fitted to the individual observations. Note, that 
parameter d determines also the direction of the function and, generally, can be either 
positive (upward sigmoid) or negative (downward sigmoid). The parameters estimation 
was done using the curve fitting option in Matlab. The fitting procedure assigns random 
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values on the interval (0,1) as starting points for the parameters (a,b,c,d), that by 
default are unbounded. Normally, a starting point of 100 for the parameter c (i.e. the 
inflection point) was given, as 100 is near the average TWI for two simple stimuli 
(Cecere et al., 2015; Cooke et al., 2019). The sigmoid function is then fitted to the data, 
giving us a downward function (i.e. with a negative d and a positive b, or viceversa). 
The estimated SOA (in ms) corresponding to the inflection point (centre) of the fitted 
sigmoid was considered as the individual TWI within which the illusion was maximally 
experienced. According to our hypothesis, we expect the TWI to be enlarged in the 
high- relative to the low schizotypy group. Therefore, a one-tailed independent sample 
t-test was used to examine the difference between the mean inflection point and 
statistically compare the TWI of individuals with low- and high-schizotypal traits. 
Finally, linear regression analyses were performed to investigate the contribution of 
each factor of the SPQ (i.e. Perceptual-Cognitive, Interpersonal and Disorganized 
factors) to the variance in the TWI. We expected the Perceptual-Cognitive factor, also 
referred to as positive schizotypy (Ettinger et al., 2014), more than the other factors, 
to significantly account for larger TWI in people with high schizotypy. This hypothesis 
was based on prior evidence that positive schizotypy is associated with larger temporal 
binding window (Ferri et al., 2017). 
3.4.3. Relationship between proneness to DFI and the TWI 
An outstanding question to investigate is whether an enhanced proneness to the DFI 
can be determined by an extended TWI or whether, alternatively, might be the result 
of more general noise in sensory processing (Javitt, 2009, 2015). To test this 
hypothesis, we first ran a regression analysis between individual TWI and the 
individual overall proneness to DFI (OPI) using both parametric (Pearson) and non-
parametric (Spearman) correlations. Moreover, to test their robustness we computed 
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skipped parametric (Pearson) and nonparametric (Spearman) correlations (Wilcox, 
2004) using the Robust Correlation toolbox (Pernet, Wilcox, and Rousselet, 2012) and 
conducted null hypothesis statistical significance testing using the nonparametric 
percentile bootstrap test (2000 resamples; 95% confidence interval, corresponding to 
an alpha level of 0.05), which is more robust against heteroscedasticity compared with 
the traditional t-test (Pernet et al., 2012). Next, we tested whether any positive 
correlation between these measures can be simply explained by the relative number 
of trials falling within a temporal window, and therefore more sensitive to the perceived 
illusion. In other words, if participants with high schizotypy have an enlarged TWI 
relative to participants with low schizotypy, they will perceive the illusion in a 
comparatively higher number of trials encompassing a wider range of SOAs. To 
specifically test this hypothesis, we normalized the measure of proneness to the DFI 
to each individual TWI by calculating the percentage of perceived illusion falling in the 
3 SOAs preceding the inflection point. In this way, the absolute number of SOAs 
sensitive to the illusion was kept constant across participants, and any differential 
effect of proneness was now controlled for by any individual difference in TWI. A one-
tailed independent sample t-test was calculated now comparing this newly obtained 
weighted proneness to the illusion (WPI) for low and high schizotypy groups. Finally, 
parametric and nonparametric correlations were performed to test whether any 






Fig. 3.2. Relationship between temporal sensitivity and proneness to the illusion in low- and high schizotypy. (A) Average probability of perceiving the illusion 
plotted as a function of SOA for low- (grey dots and curve) and high-schizotypal groups (red dots and curve). The curves represent the sigmoid fit determining 
(B) the temporal window of illusion (TWI), i.e. the temporal window within which the illusion is maximally perceived, corresponding to the inflection point of the 
sigmoid. (C) The proneness to the illusion across all inter-beep delays (Overall Proneness to the Illusion [OPI]) is significantly higher in high-relative to low-
schizotypal individuals and (D) positively correlates with their TWI. (E) When individual differences in TWI are taken into account, and the proneness to the 
illusion is normalized for the individual TWI, no significant differences in weighted proneness to the illusion (WPI) and (F) no positive correlation between WPI 




3.5.1. Proneness to the DFI 
First, as expected, in line with the idea of a continuum with schizophrenia (see Haß et 
al., 2017), we found that participants with high schizotypy show a higher overall 
proneness to the illusion (34.71%) relative to participants with low schizotypy (25.24%) 
(one-tailed independent sample t-test t(55) = 2.06; p=0.02) (Fig. 3.2C). Interestingly, 
only two factors of the SPQ, the Interpersonal (8%) and the Perceptual-Cognitive 
(7.4%) factors, accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the proneness 
to DFI. 
3.5.2. Temporal window of illusion (TWI) 
Second, our results revealed for the first time that high schizotypy individuals show a 
significantly enlarged TWI (98.45ms) relative to low schizotypy individuals (77.14ms) 
(one-tailed independent sample t-test: t(55) = 2.78; p < 0.004; see Fig. 3.2A and B). 
Interestingly, only two factors of the SPQ, the Disorganized (9.6%) and the Perceptual-
Cognitive (7.1%) factors accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the 
TWI. 
3.5.3. Relationship between proneness to DFI and the TWI 
We reasoned that the difference in proneness might be mediated by the significant 
difference in TWI between the two groups. If this is the case, one might expect a trivial 
positive correlation between the proneness to the illusion and the TWI. However, by 
normalizing proneness to each individual TWI, the between-group difference in 
proneness to the illusion should disappear as well as their correlation. In order to test 
for the specific hypothesis that any effect of higher proneness to DFI may be more 
simply explained by a larger TWI in high schizotypy, the individual proneness to the 
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illusion was computed for each participant both across all SOAs (Overall proneness 
to the illusion, OPI) and as a function of each individual TWI (Weighted proneness to 
the illusion, WPI). With regards to the WPI, we computed for each individual the 
proneness to the illusion for the three SOAs delays preceding their individual infection 
point, i.e. the largest SOA defining the TWI, so as to first normalize the proneness to 
the illusion to each individual TWI and second, to compute this weighted measure on 
a comparable number of trials across participants. As expected, a first trivial finding 
was that individual TWI positively correlates with the overall proneness to the illusion 
(OPI) (Pearson r=.53; p < 0.0001; Spearman r=0.43; p < 0.001) and such relationship 
survived robust correlation (skipped Pearson r=0.451165; CI = [0.203726 0.653286]; 
skipped Spearman r=0.492489 CI = [0.234016 0.691173]) (2D). Crucially, when the 
data were normalized, low- and high schizotypy groups did not show any significant 
difference in the amount of proneness to the illusion (low schyzotypy: 51.14%; high 
schyzotypy 55.12%; t(55) = 0.61; p=0.54). Accordingly, when controlling for the TWI, 
no significant correlation was found between the proneness to the illusion and TWI 
(Pearson r=−0.03; p=0.81; Spearman r=−0.08; p=0.53). 
3.6. Discussion 
Grounding on previous research that demonstrated an enlarged audio-visual TWI in 
schizophrenia (Haß et al., 2017), the present study aimed to expand this finding to 
schizotypy. Therefore, the DFI was used to investigate audio-visual multisensory 
integration in schizotypy. In agreement with the hypothesis of a schizophrenia 
continuum (DeRosse et al., 2015; Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015; Nelson et al., 
2013), results revealed that high schizotypy individuals, similar to schizophrenic 
patients (Haß et al., 2017), show a significantly enlarged TWI, relative to low 
schizotypy individuals. Interestingly, this larger TWI was less dramatically enlarged 
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relative to comparable data collected in schizophrenic patients (see Haß et al., 2017), 
thus further supporting the hypothesis of a progressive continuum between high 
schizotypy and schizophrenia. Notably, when looking at the contribution of the SPQ 
factors accounting for both proneness and TWI of the DFI, we found only the 
Perceptual-Cognitive factor to clearly account for both phenomena. This suggests, in 
line with previous literature (Ferri et al., 2017), that alterations in perceptual and 
cognitive factors are those accounting for the reduced temporal sensitivity and the 
increased proneness to DFI in the high-schizotypy group in our experiment.  
Accordingly, as in schizophrenia (Haß et al., 2017), results revealed that individuals 
with high schizotypy exhibit greater proneness to the DFI, as compared to participants 
with low schizotypy. However, in the study of Haß et al. (2017), it was not clear whether 
such an enhanced proneness was the direct consequence of an extended TWI of 
schizophrenic patients or instead, independently of it, the result of an impoverished 
ability to segregate information, because of a more general noise in sensory 
processing (Javitt, 2009, 2015). Indeed, several studies would suggest that sensory 
noise may lead to modulation of the sensitivity to illusions, independently of timing 
issues (Javitt, 2009; Moro & Steeves, 2018; Perez et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in our 
study, the normalization of the individual proneness to illusion to each individual TWI 
allowed us to disambiguate between these two possibilities, at least in our high 
schizotypy group. After normalization, the between-group difference in proneness to 
the illusion disappeared, as well as its correlation with individual TWI.  
Therefore, based on these findings, we can discard the alternative hypothesis that our 
results reflect a general problem in sensory processing per se (Javitt, 2009, 2015) that 
is independent of the individual TWI. Instead, our novel findings point to the idea that 
a reduced temporal sensitivity as indexed by an enlarged TWI fully mediates the 
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proneness effects of the crossmodal induced illusion observed in the high- (vs low-) 
schizotypy group. It can still be argued that the effects we observe here may be the 
result of a temporal sensitivity issue in the visual system per se, rather than a 
multisensory binding problem. In this regard, Kostaki & Vatakis (2016) have shown 
that a decreased ability to distinguish two visual flashes in time enhances the amount 
of double-flash illusions. Therefore, difficulties in the timing of unisensory processing 
may lead to a general increase in the amount of illusions. Our current dataset does 
not allow us to assess this specific hypothesis. However, a difficulty in distinguishing 
events in time even in the unisensory modality would not be in contradiction with the 
general hypothesis of a wider window of temporal integration, nor with the literature in 
patients with schizophrenia, who have difficulties with both unisensory and 
multisensory processing (Foucher, et al., 2007; Giersch et al., 2009; Stevenson et al., 
2017). Indeed, the main issue we have identified here is a temporal sensitivity 
reduction in people with high schizotypy in the context of a crossmodal experimental 
design.  
All in all, our results suggest that the difference in the proneness to the illusion in low- 
and high schizotypy groups is likely driven by an enlarged temporal window of 
crossmodally-induced visual illusion, ultimately accounted for by an overall reduced 
temporal sensitivity in the high schizotypy group. Finally, evidence of abnormal 
temporal processing in both sub-clinical and clinical samples may shed light also on 
the nature of anomalous multisensory self-experiences (Postmes et al., 2014) that are 
predictive of schizophrenia onset (Nelson et al., 2012), such as diminished sense of 
body ownership and agency (Postmes et al., 2014). Indeed, both these basic aspects 
of self-experience depend upon the temporal proximity of multisensory events 
(Costantini et al., 2016; Moore & Fletcher, 2012). Consequently, interventional 
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strategies aimed at enhancing temporal resolution in sensory processing in schizotypy 






















The temporal sensitivity to the tactile induced Double Flash Illusion mediates 
the impact of the beta oscillations on schizotypal personality traits 
 
4.1. Abstract 
The coherent experience of the self and the world depends on the ability to integrate 
vs segregate sensory information. Optimal temporal integration between the senses 
is mediated by oscillatory properties of neural activity. Previous research showed 
reduced temporal sensitivity to multisensory events in schizotypy, a personality trait 
linked to schizophrenia. Here we used the tactile-induced Double-Flash-Illusion (tDFI) 
to investigate the tactile-to-visual temporal sensitivity in schizotypy, as indexed by the 
temporal window of illusion (TWI) and its neural underpinnings. We measured EEG 
oscillations within the beta band, recently shown to correlate with the tDFI. We found 
individuals with higher schizotypal traits to have wider TWI and slower beta waves 
accounting for the temporal window within which they perceive the illusion. Our results 
indicate reduced tactile-to-visual temporal sensitivity to mediate the effect of slowed 
oscillatory beta activity on schizotypal personality traits. We conclude that slowed 
oscillatory patterns might constitute an early marker for schizophrenia proneness. 
4.2. Introduction  
Identifying biomarkers for the early diagnosis of schizophrenia has become a crucial 
goal of current research. Schizophrenia is a highly debilitating disorder which affects 
about 0.5% of the worldwide global population (Sukanta et al., 2005). Schizophrenia 
often emerges in late adolescence or early adulthood, and its symptoms are non-
remitting. Interestingly, the emergence of the disorder is typically preceded by a 3-4-
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year prodromal phase in 75% of patients (Hafner et al., 2003; Sorensen et al., 2009). 
During this phase, subtle changes and sub-threshold psychotic symptoms usually 
emerge (Klosterkötter et al., 2001). As such, recent research has increasingly focused 
on identifying those individuals at a higher risk of developing schizophrenia and has 
strived to identify appropriate strategies for risk prediction and early intervention 
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2013, McGorry et al., 2009). Researchers have identified a series of 
cognitive and behavioural variations of schizophrenic traits which, while of reduced 
severity, share salient characteristics similar in form. These variations are thought to 
form a single personality trait: schizotypy (Lenzenweger 2018; Stotz-Ingenlath 2000). 
Schizotypy seemingly shares a factor-structure with schizophrenic symptoms; namely 
the positive, negative and disorganised subscale. It has been hypothesised that 
elevated levels of schizotypy represent a vulnerability to schizophrenia (Kwapil et al., 
2013). As such, it could be argued that schizotypy and schizophrenia are qualitatively 
close but quantitatively distant. Areas of overlap between schizotypy and 
schizophrenia have indeed been shown both at the behavioural and neural levels 
(Koychev et al., 2011; Ettinger, U. et al. 2015) in several domains. 
At the behavioural level, for example, both schizophrenia and schizotypy have been 
associated with altered responses to somatosensory stimuli (Lenzenweger et al., 
2000; Chang et al., 2005; Benson et al., 2019; Michael & Park, 2016). Proprioception 
and touch allow for the proper discrimination between the outer environment and the 
sense of one’s bodily boundaries. As such, a distorted haptic or proprioceptive sense 
could invalidate proper self-other boundary recognition. Related to this, Ferri et al. 
(2016) investigated the role of touch remapping in people with high and low schizotypy. 
They demonstrated altered remapping of environmental stimuli in the bodily space in 
the high- relative to the low schizotypy group. Dysfunctions in somatosensory 
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processing and its integration with other senses seemingly lead to a more malleable 
body representation and increased proneness to multisensory bodily illusions both in 
schizophrenia and schizotypy (Thakkar et al., 2011; Ferri et al., 2014; Michael & Park, 
2016). This heightened proneness to multisensory illusions might also be accounted 
for by another perceptual dysfunction seemingly shared by both schizophrenia and 
schizotypy, namely a dysfunction in the temporal profile of multisensory integration. 
Researchers have indeed observed that both schizophrenic patients (Foucher et al., 
2007; Stevenson et al., 2017; Haß et al., 2017) and high schizotypy individuals (Ferri 
et al., 2017; Ferri et al. 2018) often experience stimuli that are further apart in time and 
in space as co-occurring, possibly leading to higher proneness to multisensory 
perceptual illusions, something that has been observed in Chapter Three.  
At the neural level, neurophysiological evidence suggests that schizophrenia is 
associated with abnormalities in oscillatory activity and functional connectivity, 
especially in the beta- and gamma band frequencies and that these impairments are 
linked to both perceptual and cognitive deficits (Uhlhaas et al., 2008). Moreover, such 
observations, already described in schizophrenia, have been extended to schizotypy 
(Koychev et al., 2011). Interestingly, evidence is now emerging linking neural 
oscillations in distinct frequency bands to different mechanisms of multisensory 
processing (Senkowski et al.,2008; Ronconi et al., 2017). An investigation conducted 
by Cecere, Rees, and Romei (2015) using the audio-visual Double Flash Illusion task 
(aDFI) in healthy individuals, found a relationship between individual’s alpha band 
oscillations in the visual cortex and the Temporal Window of Illusion (TWI). In a typical 
aDFI, a participant is presented with a single flash as the visual stimulus paired with 
two auditory beeps presented in quick succession. The pairing of the two auditory 
stimuli often results in the perception of a second illusory flash, even if only one flash 
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is ever presented (Shams et al., 2000). In particular, Shams et al. (2002) adopted a 
version of the illusion, which uses a wide range of inter-beep intervals, well-suited to 
determine the size of the TWI (Shams et al., 2002; Cecere et al., 2015). Using 
electroencephalography (EEG) to measure brain activity, the researchers found a link 
between the TWI and the individual alpha frequency. More specifically, they found that 
slower alpha frequencies were associated with longer TWIs and vice versa. The 
authors interpreted these findings as a sampling mechanism gating sensory 
information into temporal units. These findings have been recently replicated (see 
Cooke et al., 2019; Keil & Senkowski, 2017). Moreover, Cooke et al. (2019) 
investigated the neural dynamics related to the tactile version of the DFI, that is the 
tactile-induced DFI (tDFI), where the two auditory stimuli are replaced by two tactile 
stimuli (as in Violentyev et al., 2005). The researchers found that the TWI induced by 
the tDFI does not relate to the individual alpha frequency but to the individual beta 
frequency instead. More specifically, they found that slower beta frequencies are 
associated with longer TWIs and vice versa.  
Taken together, these results suggest that prolonged periods of temporal integration 
between different sensory modalities, which have been observed in schizophrenia 
(Stevenson et al., 2017) and also characterize schizophrenic-like subclinical 
conditions (Haß et al., 2017), may at least partially originate from a slowing-down of 
those oscillatory frequency patterns associated with the temporal dynamics of 
multisensory integration processes. In other words, prolonged periods of temporal 
integration between different sensory modalities would mediate the impact of specific 
oscillatory pattern changes on individual levels of schizotypy. The overarching goal of 
our work is to test this model with the final aim of providing a neuro-behavioural early 
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marker for schizophrenia risk. This goal will be achieved through the validation of the 
following empirical points:  
(i) extending the findings of Ferri et al. (2018), who showed enlarged TWI in high 
schizotypes using the aDFI, to the somatosensory domain, hence using the tDFI;   
(ii) replicating the findings of Cooke et al. (2019), who showed that the individual TWI 
for the tDFI positively correlates with the individual beta frequency (IBF) in the occipital 
cortex;  
(iii) investigating the potential association between schizotypy and IBF.  
We expect people with high schizotypy to show an enlarged TWI for the tDFI, in turn 
predicted by a slower individual beta frequency. Most importantly, the association 
between the individual beta frequency and the individual scores in a self-report 
measure of schizotypy, should be mediated by the size of the TWI.  
 
4.3. Material and Methods 
4.3.1. Participants 
An a-priori sensitivity power analysis (G*Power) was performed to determine the 
sample size that would provide ≥80% power to find correlations between behavioural 
and EEG data corresponding to an effect size r = 0.50. The analysis returned a sample 
of 26 participants. This effect size estimate was chosen based on a recent study 
showing that both the speed of individual alpha oscillations predicts the temporal 
window of the auditory-induced illusion and that the speed of individual beta 
oscillations predicts the temporal window the tactile-induced double flash illusion with 
an effect size r > 0.50 (Cooke et al., 2019). Studies reporting correlations between 
auditory- or tactile- induced illusions and SPQ scores were not available. A total 
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sample of 55 participants (33 females, mean age 25) volunteered to take part in the 
study after having been screened with respect to their schizotypal traits using the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991). The questionnaire was 
administered through Qualtrics, a web-based data collection system. The study was 
approved by the University of Essex Ethics Committee. All participants read and 
signed a consent form prior to their participation. None of the participants reported any 
history of substance abuse or other neuropsychiatric disorders. Furthermore, they 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.   
 
4.3.2. Apparatus and procedure  
All visual stimuli were presented on a 17.5” cathode ray tube monitor via a Dell 
Optiplex 960 computer (Windows XP, resolution: 1280x1024) with a refresh rate of 
85Hz. The tactile stimulation was provided by a Heijo Research Electronics tactile 
stimulator taped onto the participant’s left index finger. The stimulator would produce 
a suprathreshold tap by pushing a plastic tip against the participant’s skin whenever a 
current was passed through the solenoid. White-noise (approximately 50db) was 
continuously played to participants through speakers during the tactile stimulation, to 
cover the mechanic noise produced by the tactile stimulator (Experimental stimuli were 
presented via E-prime (version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded at 500Hz from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes 
mounted on an elastic cap (Easycap, Herrsching, Germany) alongside the ground 
electrode (position: AFz) and the reference electrode (placed upon the right 
mastoid bone). The EEG signals were amplified using BrainVision Recorder 
(BrainProducts GmbH, Gilching, Germany). All the electrodes were set at an 
impedance of a maximum of 10k. In all trials, participants were presented with a 
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flashing disc of a diameter of 2 cm displayed against a grey background. The disc 
always flashed once for 12 ms and was located below a small fixation cross 
continuously present at the centre of the screen. During the task, the disc presentation 
was always paired with a double tactile stimulation (double tap) to the left finger. Each 
participant was told to fixate the central cross at all times and to verbally report the 
number of flashes they saw on the screen, regardless of what was felt under the finger. 
The experimenter responded according to the participants’ report (1 or 2 flashes) by 
pressing “1” or “2” (respectively) on the keyboard. Following the experimenter inputting 
the participant’s response, a varying time interval between 500 and 1500 ms passed 
before the following visuo-tactile stimulus pair was presented. The second tactile 
stimulus always followed the first visuo-tactile pair. The two tactile stimulations were 
delivered one after the other at varying Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (SOAs) ranging 
between 36 and 204 ms with increments of 12ms. Each block of trials had 15 different 
time intervals between taps (repeated ten times) with a total of 150 randomly ordered 
trials per task. This range of SOAs appears to be well-suited to define the time frame 
within which the illusion is perceived (Cecere et al., 2015; Cooke et al., 2019). 
 
4.3.3. Experimental Design  
Each participant was instructed to fixate the central cross and report the number of 
flashes they saw on the screen while ignoring the tactile stimulations (taps). 
Participants were seated 57 cm away from the computer screen with their visual angle 
aligned with the centre of the screen. Participants were asked to place their left index 
finger below the presentation of the flashing disc to maximise spatial co-occurrence of 
the visual and tactile stimuli processing. Each visual stimulus flashed for 12 
milliseconds and always occurred with a seven-milliseconds tap aligned with the onset 
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of the flash. The second tap was randomly presented in one of the 15 inter-tap 
intervals. The double taps were intended to produce an illusory effect and trick the 
participants into seeing two flashing discs while there was only ever one presented. In 
particular, the quicker the taps, the stronger the illusion was expected to be. The 
responses were indicated by participants saying `1`, if one flash was perceived, or `2` 
if two flashes were perceived. The experimenter then pressed the corresponding key 











Figure 4.1. Paradigm. A schematic of the experimental paradigm. In each trial, participants were told 
to fixate a central cross for a period randomly ranging between 500 and 1500 ms. Thereafter, they were 
presented with one visual white disc (flashing for 12 ms) accompanied by two brief tactile stimuli (7 ms 
each). The first tactile stimulus (tap) was aligned with the onset of the flash, whereas the second tap 
was randomly presented at 15 different delays (randomly ranging between 36 and 204 ms). Participants 
were required to verbally report whether they perceived one or two flashes. The verbal report was then 
entered by the experimenter via the “1” and “2” key on the keyboard which prompted the new trial to 
start after a variable inter-trial interval. During the tactile stimulation, white noise (approximately 50db) 
was played to participants through speakers to mask the noise produced by the tactile stimulator. During 









alpha band (7-13 Hz) 





4.4. Behavioural data analysis 
The temporal window within which the visual illusion was maximally perceived was 
calculated using the participants’ perceived illusory flashes across the different SOAs. 
The percentage of trials in which the tactile-induced Double Flash Illusion (tDFI) was 
perceived (total “two” responses out of 10) was plotted for each participant’s inter-tap 
interval to obtain the TWI induced by the tDFI (i.e. the point in time after which the 
illusion starts to degrade). A psychometric sigmoid function y = a+b/(1+exp(-(x-c)/d)); 
a = lower asymptote for high values of x; b = amplitude of the psychometric curve (a+b 
forms the upper asymptote for low values of x); c = inflection point; d = slope] was 
fitted to the individual observations. Note, that parameter d also determines the 
direction of the function and, generally, can be either positive (upward sigmoid) or 
negative (downward sigmoid). The parameters estimation was done using the curve 
fitting option in Matlab. The fitting procedure assigns random values on the interval 
(0,1) as starting points for the parameters (a,b,c,d), that by default are unbounded. 
Normally, a starting point of 100 for the parameter c (i.e. the inflection point) was given, 
as 100 is near the average TWI for two simple stimuli (Cecere et al., 2015; Cooke et 
al., 2019). The sigmoid function is then fitted to the data, giving us a downward function 
with a negative d and a positive b, or viceversa. The inflection point was of particular 
interest as it corresponds to the point of the fitted curve dividing those trials in which 
the participant maximally perceived the illusions from those trials within which the 
illusion tended not to be perceived, thus representing the most representative measure 
of the TWI for each participant.  
As the inter-individual variability in the susceptibility to the illusion is high (de Haas et 
al., 2012), it would usually be more convenient to pre-screen participants and include 
only those that reliably perceive the illusion (and especially so when the dependent 
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variable is the inflection point). However, as we were examining a personality trait, we 
decided to initially include all participants without taking into account their susceptibility 
to the illusion. Indeed, if we were to exclude participants merely based on their 
perception of the illusion, in principle, we might have missed important information on 
how the perception of the illusion is distributed as a function of the schizotypy score. 
After having analysed each participant’s fitting, we have based our exclusion criteria 
on fitting procedures (i.e., whenever data could not be fitted, participants were 
excluded), which led to the exclusion of 18 participants and R square values 
(whenever individual fitting R-scores values were lower than 0.6), which led to the 
exclusion of another 4 participants. Importantly, we explored whether participants 
whose performance could not be fitted (because of noisy data in reporting the illusion 
over time, or because they never – or always – experienced the illusion independently 
of SOAs) were clustered towards one extreme of the distribution of the SPQ score. 
However, our excluded participants’ SPQ scores were equally distributed on a 
continuum; thus, we are confident that their exclusion has not hindered our 
experimental observation. 
It must be noted that such a rejection rate is relatively high (corresponding to 40% of 
all the original participants) when compared to the one observed in previous reports 
(corresponding to 20% of all the original participants) (Cecere et al., 2015; Cooke et 
al., 2019). However, both in Cecere et al. (2015) and in Cooke et al. (2019), 
participants were pre-screened with a practice trial to ensure, as a prerequisite to 
taking part in the study, that they could reliably perceive the illusion. Those participants 
who could not perceive the illusion from the start were thus not included in the study, 
which resulted in a reduced rejection rate. When applying the same criteria to the 
current study, again, around 20% of the participants would have possibly been 
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excluded because of fitting issues, and the other 20% because of lack of illusion, thus 
consistent with previous reports by our group. Thus, in agreement with the sample 
size estimated by the power analysis, the total number of participants included in the 
study was n= 33 (18 females, mean age 25). 
 
4.5. EEG data analysis 
EEG scans were performed during all trials to investigate pre-stimulus oscillatory 
activity both in the alpha and beta bands (see Cooke et al., 2019). For each participant, 
64 channels EEG was recorded at a sampling rate of 500Hz. The EEG signal was re-
referenced offline to the average of all scalp electrodes. EEG data was subsequently 
segmented into 2000ms stimulus-free and artifact-free epochs time-locked to and 
preceding the visual stimulus onset. Given that a total of 150 stimulus trials were 
presented, this resulted in 150 epochs of pre-stimulus oscillatory activity. Each single 
epoch was inspected to determine the data and reject any artefacts created by 
involuntary movements (minor muscle contractions or eye blinks) or interference. A 
total of 41.45% (±3.88%) of the epochs were rejected due the presence of eye 
movements and muscle artifacts. This relatively high number of rejected epochs 
contaminated by eye movements and muscle artefacts may be due to residual artifact 
induced by the verbal response provided by the participants.  
The individual alpha and beta peak frequencies were calculated with spectral analysis 
based on Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) with no overlapping windows and nominal 
resolution of 0.1 at channel Oz for each 2-sec epoch and subsequently averaged. For 
each frequency peak calculation, signals were band-pass filtered within the frequency 
of interest using infinite Impulse Response (IIR) filter applied to separate individual 
wave bands in the visual cortex before undergoing FFT. This allowed filtering out 
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frequencies that may have contaminated the calculation of the frequency of interest. 
Thus, peak frequency was determined as the frequency having the largest spectral 
values in the ranges 7-13 for alpha and 12-25 for beta (as measured at channel Oz). 
Once the frequency peak was calculated for each individual, the same value of cycles 
per seconds (e.g. 20Hz) was transformed in the corresponding duration of one single 
cycle (e.g. 50ms).  In order to ensure that extracted peaks in alpha and beta oscillatory 
bands represent independent components in our EEG analysis, we performed a 
correlation analysis between alpha and beta frequency peaks which returned a 
nonsignificant correlation between individual alpha and beta peaks (r=-0.02, p>0.05). 
4.6. Statistical analyses 
4.6.1. Relationship between schizotypal personality trait (SPQ) and temporal window 
of illusion (TWI) 
To test for the possible association between the individual schizotypal traits and the 
individual TWI measured during the tDFI task, we ran Pearson’s correlation analyses 
between SPQ total scores and TWI, as well as between the SPQ subscales (i.e., 
perceptual-cognitive, interpersonal and disorganized) scores and TWI. Moreover, to 
test for their robustness, we computed skipped parametric (Pearson) correlations 
(Wilcox, 2004) using the Robust Correlation toolbox (Pernet et al., 2013) and 
conducted null hypothesis statistical significance testing using the nonparametric 
percentile bootstrap test (2000 resamples; 95% confidence interval, corresponding to 
an alpha level of 0.05), which is more robust against heteroscedasticity compared to 
the traditional t-test (Pernet et al., 2013). Finally, we corrected for multiple 




4.6.2. Relationship between temporal window of illusion (TWI) and individual 
frequency peaks (IBF, IAF). 
To confirm the beta frequency-specificity accounting for the TWI measured during the 
tDFI (Cooke et al., 2019) in our participant sample, we ran Pearson’s correlation 
analysis between IBF and individual TWI as well as between IAF and TWI. Moreover, 
as above, to test for their robustness we computed skipped parametric (Pearson) 
correlations (Wilcox, 2004) using the Robust Correlation toolbox (Pernet et al., 2013) 
and conducted null hypothesis statistical significance testing using the nonparametric 
percentile bootstrap test (2000 resamples; 95% confidence interval, corresponding to 
an alpha level of 0.05).  
 
4.6.3. Relationship between schizotypal personality trait (SPQ) and individual beta 
frequency peak (IBF). 
Given the existing evidence of abnormal neural oscillations in the schizophrenia 
spectrum since its early stages (Uhlhaas et al., 2008), we tested the association 
between IBF and SPQ total scores, as well as between IBF and the SPQ subscales 
(i.e. perceptual-cognitive, interpersonal and disorganized) scores, using Pearson’s 
correlations. As above, to test for the robustness of the correlation, we computed 
skipped parametric (Pearson) correlations (Wilcox, 2004) using the Robust Correlation 
toolbox (Pernet et al., 2013) and conducted null hypothesis statistical significance 
testing using the nonparametric percentile bootstrap test (2000 resamples; 95% 






4.6.4. Mediation analysis 
A mediation analysis (model 4 in the SPSS PROCESS macro80) was performed to 
probe any effects of IBF on individual schizotypal personality traits, mediated by its 
effects on TWI. All the analyses were carried out with standardized values for all the 
variables. Consistent with published guidelines (Memon et al., 2018), we report 95% 
confidence interval (CI) based on 5000 bootstrap iterations (bias-corrected) for all 
major effects. 
 
4.6.5. Median split analysis 
Since participants have been enrolled in the experiment independently of their SPQ 
scores, we have used a median split approach according to the individual SPQ score 
to test whether low and high SPQ scores show significant differences both in the TWI 
and beta peaks. 
 
4.7. Results  
4.7.1. The individual SPQ score accounts for the size of the TWI 
Recent work (Haß et al., 2017) has found a significantly enlarged temporal window 
within which schizophrenic patients (relative to a healthy control group) experience the 
auditory version of the DFI. This observation was extended to a schizotypal sample 
(Ferri et al., 2018). Here we tested whether the individual SPQ score could predict the 
size of the tactile-induced TWI. To this aim, a two-tailed correlation analysis between 
the individual SPQ scores and the individual TWI was conducted. We found a 
significant positive correlation between the size of TWI and the individual SPQ score 
(r = .56, p <.001, two-tailed), which also survived the robust skipped correlations 
method (r = 0.48, CI = [0.13, 0.76]) (See Figure 4.2.D), indicating that the wider the 
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TWI, the higher the SPQ score. In other words, individuals with higher schizotypal 
personality traits show wider TWIs. Moreover, in order to understand whether specific 
characteristics associated with the schizotypal traits do preferentially account for the 
size of the TWI, we investigated the relationship between the different SPQ subscales 
and the individual TWI. Results of these analyses showed that each of the three SPQ 
subscales significantly and positively correlate with the individual TWI, also surviving 
the skipped correlation method and the p-value correction for multiple correlations: 
cognitive-perceptual subscale (r=0.43, p=0.01, two-tailed; skipped r=0.44, CI = 
[.12 .69 ]), disorganised subscale (r=0.44, p=0.01, two-tailed; skipped r =0.44, CI= 
[.13 .68]), interpersonal subscale (r=0.50, p=0.01, two-tailed; skipped r=0.23, CI 
[.12 .55]). As there was no preferential contribution from any subscale, we used the 
total SPQ score in the subsequent analyses.  
 
4.7.2. Individual beta peak frequency accounts for the size of the TWI 
Recent research has shown a significant relationship between the size of TWI induced 
by the tDFI and the individual beta frequency (Cooke et al., 2019). We expected here 
to reproduce this relationship selectively for the beta but not alpha frequency. To this 
aim, individual oscillatory frequencies were converted from cycle units (Hz) into 
millisecond units (period=1000/frequency) so as to correlate TWI and oscillatory 
activity on the same measure scale (of time) and the same unit (ms). We found a 
significant positive correlation between the TWI and the duration of an individual beta 
frequency (r = 0.37, p = 0.015, one-tailed, based on an a priori hypothesis, see Cooke 
et al., 2019), which survived the skipped correlation method (r = 0.42, CI= [.16 .65]) 
(See Figure 4.2.C), replicating previous findings by Cooke et al. (2019). This result 
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indicates that participants with wider TWIs (i.e. more prone to perceive the illusion) 
also have a slower beta cycle. As expected, no significant correlation was found 
between the TWI and the peak alpha frequency (IAF; see Figure 4.2.B) (r=0.16, 
p=0.37 two-tailed).  
4.7.3. Individual beta peak frequency accounts for the individual SPQ score  
So far, we have observed that larger tactile-induced TWIs relate both to higher SPQ 
scores and slower IBF. However, before testing the mediation role of the tactile-
induced TWI for the impact of IBF on SPQ, another association needs to be tested, 
that is the one between IBF and individual SPQ scores. To this aim, a two-tailed 
Pearson’s correlation analysis between IBF and the SPQ total score was performed, 
which revealed a significant positive correlation (r=0.36; p=0.04, two-tailed), which 
survived the skipped correlation method (r=0.36, CI = [.06 .61]). Specifically, the 
results of this correlation indicate that people with slower beta oscillations also have a 
higher SPQ total score (See Figure 4.2.I). Again, as expected, no significant 





Figure 4.2. Correlation analyses. A. The 
sigmoid curve represents the best fit of the 
average probability of perceiving the 
illusion plotted as a function of inter-tap 
delays. The sigmoid fit determines the 
temporal window of illusion (TWI), i.e. the 
temporal window within which the illusion 
is maximally perceived, corresponding to 
the inflection point of the sigmoid. B. 
Correlation plot depicting the relationship 
between the TWI for the tactile DFI and the 
individual peak frequencies in alpha and 
C. beta oscillatory bands. D. Correlation 
plot between the individual SPQ’s score 
and the width of the TWI. E. Oscillatory 
activity at individual peak signal averaged 
across participants in the alpha and F. 
beta oscillatory bands. G. Range of SPQ 
scores. H. Correlation plots depicting the 
relationship between individual SPQ’s 
scores and individual peak frequencies in 
the alpha and I. beta oscillatory bands. 
Across the panels, significant correlations 
are reported on a green background 
together with r values and corresponding 
significant level p. Non-significant 





4.7.4. Mediation Analysis 
To better understand the relation between SPQ, TWI and IBF, we used a mediation 
model to examine a possible mediation role of the TWI for the effect of IBF on SPQ. 
We found a significant mediation effect (0.291, 95% CI: 0.0633 – 0.715), whereby 
relatively enlarged TWI mediated a positive association between IBF and SPQ (i.e., 
slower IBF in individuals with higher SPQ scores). Results of this analysis showed that 
there was no significant residual direct effect of IBF on SPQ (0.192, 95% CI: -0.322 – 
0.708) suggesting that the impact of IBF on SPQ are fully mediated by the TWI. 





Figure 4.3. Mediation model.  Standardized parameter estimates and standard errors are reported. No significant direct effect of IBF on SPQ 







4.7.5. Median split analysis 
These findings highlight the relevant role played by oscillatory activity in accounting 
for individual differences in multisensory interactions, which are in turn able to predict 
SPQ scores, and in principle able to differentiate people with low and high schizotypy 
scores. To test this directly, we applied a median split analysis to contrast people with 
low and high SPQ scores on their IBF and TWI measures.   
In line with our expectation, we found that the average TWI (103.6 ms) for the lower 
end of the median split (approximating the profile of a low schizotypy group) was 
significantly shorter than the average TWI (123.0 ms) for the upper end of the median 
split (approximating the profile of a high schizotypy group) (t(32) = 2.04; p = 0.03, d = 
-3.21). Finally, we measured whether the median split could also significantly 
differentiate groups according to their beta frequency. Indeed, we found that the IBF 
for the lower end SPQ score group was significantly faster (M = 57.8, SD = 9.5) than 
the IBF for the upper end SPQ score group (M = 65.5, SD = 9.1) (t (32) = 2.04; p = 
0.02, d = -0.86). Interestingly, when looking at frequency specificity, our control 
analysis did not show any significant difference for the IAF between the lower end (M 
= 101.5, SD = 11.4) and upper end (M = 102.4, SD = 14) of SPQ score group (t (32) 








In the current study, we aimed to describe the temporal profile and the oscillatory 
dynamics of the tactile-induced DFI in relation to schizotypal personality traits and their 
interplay. Chapter Three had previously shown a tight relationship between the 
auditory version of the DFI and the SPQ scores (Ferri et al., 2018), such that 
individuals with higher SPQ scores showed larger TWIs. Here, we were able to extend 
this observation to the tactile version of the DFI. Indeed, we found a positive correlation 
between the TWI, as measured with the tDFI, and the SPQ scores, thus confirming 
that the higher the SPQ score the larger the TWI.  
This first characterization of the temporal profile of the tDFI accounting for low- and 
high-schizotypal profiles was followed by an investigation of their potential neural 
underpinnings. Relevant to this initiative is the work from Cooke et al. (2019) which 
demonstrated a relationship between the TWI for the tDFI and the IBF; namely, larger 
TWIs were associated to slower IBFs and vice versa. In the present study, we 
replicated the findings from Cooke et al. (2019) and crucially assessed, for the first 
time, whether IBF could account for the different size of the TWI as a function of the 
individual SPQ score. Results confirmed the presence of a significant relationship 
between the size of the TWI and the SPQ score, which was also associated with the 
IBF values. Specifically, slower IBFs were associated with larger TWIs, characterizing 
participants with the high-schizotypal profile, while faster IBFs were associated with 
shorter TWIs, characterising participants with the low-schizotypal profile. Moreover, 
we confirmed that IBF significantly correlated with the SPQ scores such that the slower 
the IBF, the higher the SPQ score. These results are in line with the notion that slower 
oscillatory activity is associated with prolonged periods of integration of information 
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across the senses, as indicated by an enlarged TWI accounting for high schizotypal 
traits. 
The hypotheses tested specifically revolved around the neural underpinning of the temporal 
dynamics of the illusion. Previous research looking at the relationship between the 
Double Flash Illusion and oscillatory activity have generally observed a link between 
oscillatory brain activity prior to stimulus onset and subjective perception of the illusion. 
For instance, Keil et al. (2014) have found that beta band power is increased in the 
left temporal gyrus prior to perceiving the auditory induced DFI. Similarly, Lange et al. 
(2013) and Cecere et al. (2015) found that higher alpha power is associated with lower 
perception of the auditory induced illusion. Moreover, Cecere et al. (2015) found that 
the individual alpha peak frequency correlates with the temporal window of illusion, 
such that the slower the alpha frequency, the larger the temporal window of illusion. 
Interestingly, Cecere et al. (2015) found that alpha power did not account for the 
temporal dynamics of the illusion (i.e. the interindividual difference in the length of the 
temporal window of illusion), which were instead explained by the alpha frequency 
peak, a finding that was replicated in further research (Cooke et al., 2019).  
This suggests that pre-stimulus power accounts for the general proneness to the 
illusion, and not for the temporal dynamics of this process, which are best accounted 
for by individual peak frequency (Cooke et al., 2019; Cecere et al., 2015).  For this 
reason, here we refrained from performing power data analysis as it was not within the 
scope of our study, as research observed that the oscillatory power in visual cortex 
predicts whether participants will perceive the illusion or not rather than describing the 




Thus, our findings provide novel, compelling evidence on the functional role played by 
oscillatory activity in neural code efficiency. They add to the body of evidence (Cecere 
et al., 2015; Cooke et al., 2019; Keil and Senkowki, 2017) supporting the notion that 
oscillatory activity in different frequency bands may play a crucial role in orchestrating 
sensory binding within critical windows of integration. A general view here is that a 
tendency towards slower oscillatory activity within a given frequency band is 
symptomatic of a general loss of neural code efficiency (see Ferri et al., 2018; Cecere 
et al., 2015; Cooke et al., 2019).  Specifically, we found that individual beta frequency, 
previously associated with somatosensory-to-visual functional connectivity (Cooke et 
al., 2019) accounts for the individual TWI, which in turn predicts the individual SPQ 
score. Thus, oscillatory indices, as the IBF, measured during a multisensory task, as 
in the present study, may represent an important biomarker in the development of 
schizophrenic symptoms and represents a prodromal early biomarker of high 
schizotypy.  
Investigating the pattern of neural alterations in high schizotypy is fundamental to 
elucidate the possible existence and nature of a continuum between schizotypy and 
schizophrenia. Research has now emerged suggesting that the abnormalities in 
oscillatory activities and functional connectivity found in schizophrenia, may also 
extend to schizotypy. A study by Koychev et al. (2011) found abnormalities in a 
measure of network synchronisation, the “phase-locking factor”, and a deficient 
modulation of the sensory processing by higher-order structures in schizotypy. A study 
from Ferri et al., (2017) found that people with high schizotypy display abnormal long-
range temporal correlation patterns that are similar to those observed in patients with 
schizophrenia (Nikulin et al., 2012). In our study, individuals with high schizotypy 
showed a general reduction in the speed of beta frequency (i.e. lengthening of the 
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beta wave time) in the visual cortex, which effectively lengthened their temporal 
window of integration for the tDFI. This pattern could contribute to the multisensory 
impairments often observed in schizotypy and schizophrenia. Moreover, it could be 
associated with abnormalities in the neural dynamics that coordinate brain activity in 
large-scale networks. Indeed, as observed in Cooke et al. (2019), the tDFI 
phenomenon, rather than being dependent on local network rules (i.e. local occipital 
oscillatory resonance activity), is likely to be determined by long-range communication 
networks (i.e. functional connections between somatosensory and visual cortices) 
which influence visual cortical processing. As such, the tDFI’s TWI would be mediated 
by beta oscillations as somatosensory processing (pre-synaptic), which is typically 
linked with beta activity, phase-align beta oscillations in the visual cortex (post-
synaptic), defining the temporal resolution of interregional synchronization within 
which the TWI phenomenon arises. This pattern has previously been observed in the 
auditory-to visual network by Romei et al. (2012) who demonstrated that a simple 
auditory stimulus could phase align oscillatory alpha activity within the visual cortex. 
These observations have been interpreted (Cooke et al., 2019) within the 
“Communication Through Coherence” framework (Fries, 2005; 2015) as a means of 
communication between the senses for optimal multisensory binding. Such an 
interpretation would be in line both with reports of abnormal oscillatory activity and 
abnormalities in network synchronisation as measured by the “phase-locking factor” 
from Koychev et al. (2011), in turn leading to a deficient modulation of the sensory 
processing in schizotypy as observed in the present study. 
Finally, the current data provide support to the hypothesis that the disruption of neural 
dynamics that coordinate brain activity in large-scale networks could be one of the 
possible causes for the emergence of schizophrenia. In particular, abnormal brain 
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dynamics could impact the multisensory experiences in schizotypy and in 
schizophrenia. Brain stimulation could represent an emerging approach to target and 
intervene in abnormal neural dynamics and abnormal multisensory integration. 
Evidence has now emerged that different brain areas can be entrained at specific 
frequencies (Romei et al., 2016). Furthermore, transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tACS) or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) could be implemented 
to modulate the TWI of both schizophrenic and schizotypal individuals. At the network 
level, further research could adopt a novel cortico-cortical paired associative 
stimulation (ccPAS) TMS paradigm based on the Hebbian principle of cortical plasticity 
(Hebb, 1949; Romei et al., 2016; Veniero et al., 2013 Chiappini et al., 2018). This 
protocol adopts a repeated stimulation of pre- and post-synaptic relevant neural 
population over specific brain networks aimed at enhancing functional connectivity 















Body representations and basic symptoms in schizophrenia 
 
5.1. Abstract 
Recent research on the early detection of schizophrenia spectrum disorders has 
placed much attention on the subtle and subclinical abnormalities present in body 
experiences that go beyond positive and negative symptoms. According to the Basic 
Symptom model of schizophrenia, abnormalities in bodily self-awareness constitute 
an important predictor of the changes in self-experience that are observed in 
schizophrenia. The present investigation first assessed the body structural 
representation (BSR), a specific component of bodily self-awareness, and its 
association with basic symptoms in patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. By 
adopting a Finger Localization Task, we found that patients are significantly less 
accurate than healthy controls when asked to identify pairs of fingers touched by the 
experimenter (with the hand hidden from view). Most notably, patients' performance 
at the Finger Localization Task was negatively associated with basic symptoms: the 
worse the individual accuracy, the higher the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument for 
adults (SPI-A) total score. Furthermore, performance at the Finger Localization Task 
was linked to the malleability of the sense of body ownership: the less the individual 
ability to localize fingers, the stronger the Rubber Hand Illusion. These results support 
the hypothesis that self-disorders in schizophrenia reveal a more profound 
disattunement with the lived body - i.e. disembodiment of the self - that can be traced 





A disturbed sense of self has been identified as a core characteristic of schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders. An important aspect of selfhood pertains the domain of the bodily 
self, which refers to the sense of inhabiting one own’s body and possessing a coherent 
representation of it. Disturbances in bodily self-awareness are observable from the 
pre-onset phase and deteriorate during the acute phases of the illness (Nelson et al., 
2012). For instance, patients can feel as if their body has undergone some 
morphological changes (Chapman et al., 1978), or can experience their body parts as 
alien and devoid of life (Mancini et al., 2014). Often times, a weakening of self-other 
boundaries are commonly observed across different stages of the disorder (Di Cosmo 
et al., 2018; Holt et al., 2015; Park et al., 2009).  For instance, some patients report 
feeling physically invaded or penetrated by other’s people gestures or actions (Mancini 
et al., 2014). Moreover, individuals in both the pre-onset or acute phases might feel 
as if once automatic motor actions require conscious attention and effort to be 
accomplished (Nelson et al., 2008). Thus, the body is not anymore inhabited as a 
subject of experience, but rather becomes experienced as an object of observation. 
Such focus on typically automatic aspects of body awareness implies a loss of a pre-
reflective form of self-awareness (i.e. the minimal self), something that appears to be 
deeply disturbed in schizophrenia (Sass, 2003; Sass & Parnas, 2005).  
 
Body perception abnormalities arise months or even years before the first formal 
diagnosis. Importantly, body perception abnormalities are included among the basic 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Basic symptoms are subtle, subjectively experienced 
disturbances which mostly reflect anomalies in self-experience, and which are present 
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in schizophrenic patients prior to, or very early in, the illness (Parnas, 2012). These 
symptoms include disturbances of the self, of affection, thought, perception, 
proprioception and motor action. Basic symptoms can be regarded as the earliest form 
of self‐experienced symptoms –  hence the name “basic” – and they are different from 
attenuated and overt symptoms, which develop later during the course of the illness 
(Schultze-Lutter, 2009; Magini & Raballo, 2004). Despite the fact that they are 
generally applied to the assessment of people who may be at risk to develop 
schizophrenia, it is acknowledged that they persist after its onset and for the whole 
duration of the illness (Klosterkotter, 1992). Basic symptoms can be evaluated using 
the Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS). The BSABS is a 
comprehensive, semi-structured interview that assesses various anomalies of 
experience (affective, volitional, cognitive, perceptual and bodily) and which is 
routinely used for the assessment of schizophrenia proneness (Gross, 1987). The 
basic symptoms identified by the BSABS scale have more recently been included in a 
semi-structured interview: the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument for adults (SPI-
A, Schultze-Lutter, 2009). Despite the fact that the former allows a more detailed 
examination of the basic symptoms, it is also less manageable, and patients often 
experience a progressive affliction, with consequent reduction in their capability to 
describe their own mental state. For these reasons, the SPI-A is currently more often 
used to assess basic symptoms. 
 
In accordance with the clinical reports, a recent empirical study has found that 
schizophrenic patients show impairments in tasks designed to detect a specific 
component of body representation: the body structural representation (BSR) (Graham-
Schmidt, 2016). The body structural representation is considered to be a topological 
120 
 
map of the body which functions as a stored representation of the relationship between 
body parts in relation to each other within a whole-body structure (Rusconi et al., 2009; 
Longo, 2016). Evidence for the existence of BSR comes from the study of 
autopagnosia (Sirigu et al., 1991) and finger agnosia (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 
1962). In both conditions, patients are unable to point to parts of their body on verbal 
command or to judge the spatial relations between body parts but remain able to 
describe the function of their different body parts and to perform self-initiated goal-
directed tasks. Also, their somatosensation remains relatively good (Anema et al., 
2008; Sirigu et al., 1991; Buxbaum & Coslett, 2011). These conditions have been 
interpreted as evidence that the structural body representation differs from 
sensorimotor representations, such as the body schema (Gallagher 2005; Longo 
2016). The BSR remains a vastly neglected component of body representation 
research. To date, the extent to which patients with schizophrenia exhibit altered BSR 
and how these deficits are related to abnormalities of the sense of body ownership 
has only been marginally investigated. 
 
The present study aimed to investigate BSR in patients with schizophrenia. First, we 
asked patients to perform a Finger Localization Task and tested the association 
between their performance and the SPI-A total scores. Second, we assessed the 
possible relation between patients' BSR and their sense of body ownership (BO). 
Thus, we utilised the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), a task in which the synchronous 
touch of a rubber hand and the real hand – vs their asynchronous touch - leads to the 
experience of owning the rubber hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In order to avoid 
potential inaccuracy of patients’ self-report, due to their poor insight (Nair et al., 2014), 
we utilised the proprioceptive drift (see section 2.3) to quantify the induced illusion of 
121 
 
ownership over the fake hand. Furthermore, we manipulated the posture of the rubber 
hand, based on previous findings showing that an incongruent position of the rubber 
hand with respect to the participant's hand prevents the induction of the illusion (see 
section 2.3.) (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
 
5.3. Materials and method 
5.3.1. Participants 
Twenty-two schizophrenic patients (SCZ) diagnosed according to the structured 
clinical interview for DSM-V, and twenty-two healthy controls (HV) were included in 
the present study (Table 1). Schizophrenic patients were rated for symptom severity 
using the scale for assessment of positive symptom (SAPS) and the scale for 
assessment of negative symptom (SANS; Andreasen,1989 (Table 1). The study was 
approved by the University of Chieti-Pescara Ethics Committee. All participants (SCZ 
and HC) reported normal or corrected to normal vision and were right-handed. 
Exclusion criteria for all participants comprised significant medical or neurological 
illness, substance abuse or dependence in the previous six months, and an IQ < 85. 
Moreover, an additional exclusion criterion was included for the HC group, i.e. a 
personal history of Axis I/II disorders, or a history of schizophrenia in first-degree 
relatives. SCZ patients were recruited from outpatient services at Chieti mental health 
department and from inpatients at the psychiatric clinic “Villa Jolanda”. 
Chlorpromazine equivalents (Woods, 2003) were calculated for antipsychotics (Table 
1). Most of the patients took atypical antipsychotic drugs, which are not burdened with 
side effects that affect the motor system (extrapyramidal side effects, EPS). Also, for 
patients taking haloperidol in addition to atypical antipsychotics, the neurological 
clinical examination revealed no signs of motor stiffness, tremors, or other EPS. Also, 
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the movements made by the patients were observed and controlled during the task 
execution and no involuntary movements were detected. Finally, an accurate clinical 
examination was performed for all patients to exclude severe attention deficits. 
 
Both SCZ and HC took part in the Finger Localization Task, while only SCZ took part 
also to the rubber hand illusion task. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee 
of Chieti University. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants after 

















Table 2. Demographic information about schizophrenia group (SCZ) and healthy control 
group (HC). Mean and SD of total score on SPI-A (basic symptoms), SAPS (positive 




(N = 22) 
Control 
participants 
(N = 22) 
DSM-V schizophrenia type: 
  
Paranoid, no (%) 11 (50%) n.a. 
Disorganized, no (%)   6 (29%) n.a. 
Catatonic, no (%)  0 (0%) n.a. 
Undifferentiated, no (%)         4 (19.05%) n.a. 
Residual, no (%)     1 (4.7%) n.a. 
Age (mean ± SD) 42 ± 10 39 ± 13 
Male sex (N) 22 22 
Handedness 
  
Right, no (%) 22 (100%) 22 (100%) 
Left, no (%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Education, in years (mean ± SD) 11.6 ± 3.6 14.6 ± 4.1 
Illness duration, in years (mean ± SD) 11.9 ± 9.2 n.a. 
SCID-II n.a. Negative 
SAPS (mean ± SD) 
  
Hallucinations 4.3 ± 5.4 n.a. 
Delusions 8.1 ± 7.0 n.a. 
Bizarre behaviour 2.7 ± 3.3 n.a. 
Formal thought disorders 6.7 ± 6.7 n.a. 
SANS (mean ± SD) 
  
Affective flattening 10.4 ± 8.1 n.a. 






(N = 22) 
Control 
participants 
(N = 22) 
Avolition – Apathy 6.3 ± 3.2 n.a. 
Anhedonia- Asociality 10.6 ± 4.2 n.a. 
Attention 3.2 ± 2.6 n.a. 
SPI-A (mean ± SD) 
  
A. Affective-dynamic disturbances 14.6 ± 4.2 n.a. 
B. Cognitive-attentional 
impediments 
12.1 ± 4.8 n.a. 
C. Cognitive disturbances 10.5 ± 5.8 n.a. 
D. Disturbances in experiencing 
self and surroundings 
8.2 ± 4.0 n.a. 
E. Body perception disturbances 3.3 ± 4.3 n.a. 
F. Perception disturbances 3.8 ± 3.5 n.a. 
O. Optional symptoms 15.9 ± 10.4 n.a. 
TOT 68.4 ± 24.8 n.a. 
Chlorpromazine Equivalent (mg/die) 404.0 ± 268.2 n.a. 
Typical Antipsychotic, N (%) 2 (9.5%) n.a. 
Haloperidol 1 (4.8%) 
 
Levopromazine 1 (4.8%) 
 
Atypical Antipsychotic, N (%) 13 (61.9%) n.a. 
Clozapine 2 (9.5%) 
 
Risperidone   8 (38.1%) 
 
Quetiapine   3 (14.3%) 
 
Atypical + Typical Antipsychotic, N (%)   6 (28.6%) n.a. 
Quetiapine + Haloperidol   3 (14.3%) 
 
Risperidone + Haloperidol 2 (9,5%) 
 










5.3.2. Assessment of basic symptoms 
Basic symptoms were assessed using the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument (SPI-
A; Klosterkotter et al., 2001) in nineteen patients. Basic symptoms refer to a set of mild 
self-experienced subclinical disturbances that involve different areas of psychic 
functioning (see Table 1). Such symptoms are assumed to play a crucial role in self-
disorders and disabilities of patients with schizophrenia. Being part of the earliest 
manifestation of schizophrenia, they represent a “novum” which indicates the 
emergence of the illness. Most notably, basic symptoms are thought as arising from 
the self, rather than happening to the self without its participation (Mishara et al., 2016). 
Thus, the basic symptoms approach is close to models of self-disorders (Sass & 




5.4.1. Finger Localization Task 
Participants sat in front of a table with a box, which served to hide the participant’s 
hands, and a drawing (outline) of a human hand. In the outline drawing, the fingers of 
each hand were given a number (see Fig. 5.1) that participants could use to identify 
the corresponding finger on their own hand. Participants were asked to put their hands 
on the table, with their palms facing downwards and their fingers stretched and slightly 
separated. Participants provided their responses by naming the fingers that were 
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stroked referring to the outline drawing of a hand with numbered fingers. Correct 
responses were recorded with pen and paper. The test consisted of three tasks (ten 
trials on each hand per task). The first task required participants to identify the finger 
of the left or the right hand touched by the experimenter (Fig. 5.1a). The second task 
required participants to identify the finger of the left or the right hand touched by the 
experimenter, with the hands hidden from view (Fig. 5.1b). Finally, the third task 
required participants to identify pairs of fingers of the left or the right hand touched by 
the experimenter with the hand hidden from view (Fig. 5.1c). In the third task, 
responses were counted as correct when both fingers were accurately identified. The 





   
Fig. 5.1. (a, b, c) Experimental conditions of 
the Finger localization task. Participants had 
to identify the finger touched by the 
experimenter, with the hands visible (a) or 
hidden (b) from view. In a third condition, they 
had to identify pairs of fingers touched by the 
experimenter, with the hand hidden from view 
(c). (d, e, f) Experimental conditions of the 
Rubber Hand Illusion. Participants saw a 
rubber hand in a congruent posture with 
synchronous (d) or asynchronous (e) 
stroking. In a third condition, the 
synchronously stimulated rubber hand was in 
an incongruent posture (f). 
1 
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5.4.2. Rubber Hand Illusion 
 
Each participant performed three experimental blocks, each representing a distinct 
experimental condition (Fig. 5.1d–f). In two blocks, the rubber hand was aligned with 
the participants' hand, and the stimulation could be either synchronous (con-syn; Fig. 
5.1d) or asynchronous (con-asy; Fig. 5.1e). In the third block, the rubber hand was 
rotated by 90 degrees (Fig. 5.1) hence inducing a mismatch between the 
representation of the subject's hand and the representation of the rubber hand (inc-
syn; Fig. 5.1f). The block order was counterbalanced across participants. The index 
fingers of the rubber hand and the participant's hand were brushed by the 
experimenter with two paintbrushes with a frequency of approximately 1 Hz. In the 
synchronous condition, the hands were brushed at the same time, while in the 
asynchronous condition, they were brushed out of phase. For each condition, after 
2 min of stimulation (either synchronous, asynchronous or incongruent), the post-
induction proprioceptive location was taken. Each condition was followed by a brief 
rest period. A brief rest period followed each condition. During rest periods, 
participants were encouraged to move their hand and body so to prevent transfer of 
the illusion across conditions.   
Participants were seated in front of a specially constructed multi-chambered wooden 
box. The box measured 100 cm in width, 20 cm in height and 40 cm in depth and was 
placed in a darkened room. To prevent participants from seeing their hands during the 
experiment, a semi-silvered mirror was placed on the top of the box. Two lights were 
installed in the apparatus, one light was used to illuminate the rubber hand during the 
stimulation phase, and the other was used to illuminate a sliding ruler used to measure 
the proprioceptive drift. Participants sat in front of a table and placed their right hand 
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at a fixed point inside the box, while their left hand was left in their lap. A lifelike right 
rubber hand was placed in front of the subject's body midline. The participant's right 
hand and the rubber hand were positioned 20 cm from each other, with a wall between 
them to avoid any light over spilling into the actual hand chamber.  
For each experimental condition, the experimenter turned the light on in the rubber 
hand chamber during the 2 min stimulation phase, so that the participant could see 
the rubber hand. A ruler with the numbers printed in reverse was maintained between 
two poles 20 cm above the box. When illuminated from above, the mirrored surface of 
the box allowed the numbers to be reflected in their proper orientation; thus, the 
numbers could appear at the same gaze depth as the rubber hand. Participants were 
asked: “Using this ruler, where is your index finger”? They were instructed to judge the 
position of their finger by projecting a parasagittal line from the center of their index 
finger to the ruler. Participants were required to respond by verbally reporting a 
number on the ruler. During the judgments, there was no tactile stimulation, and 
participants were prevented from seeing the rubber and the real hands or any other 
landmarks on the work surface, by switching off the light under the semi-silvered 
mirror. The participants were also cautioned not to move their hand during the 
stimulation phase, nor during the judgment phase. The experimenter monitored this 
closely. The ruler was always placed with a different random offset for each judgment 
to prevent participants from memorizing and repeating responses given in previous 
conditions.  
The experimenter recorded the offset position and deducted that from the reported 
position, yielding the perceived finger position both before (baseline) and after (drift) 
the induction period of each experimental condition. The difference between the 
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baseline and the drift estimations represents the change in the perceived position of 
the hand due to the stimulation, i.e. the proprioceptive drift. When positive, it indicates 
a mislocalization toward the rubber hand. We decided to use the proprioceptive drift 
to index the RHI in SCZ, rather than the questionnaire (Longo et al., 2008), as an 
implicit measure is more reliable than subjective reports when testing patients with 
schizophrenia. 
 
5.5. Data Analysis 
5.5.1. Finger localization and basic symptoms 
Correct responses from the Finger Localization Task were analysed using a 2 by 2 by 
3 ANOVA with laterality (left hand vs right hand), and task (first vs second vs third) as 
within-subject factors, group (healthy controls, HC vs schizophrenic patients, SCZ) as 
between-subject factor. Post-hoc analyses (Newman-Keuls) tested for between-group 
differences. 
For the SCZ group, Pearson's correlation analysis was performed between the 
individual accuracy at the Finger Localization Task, computed across the three tasks, 
and the SPI-A total score.  
5.5.2. Rubber Hand Illusion Task 
Proprioceptive drifts from the RHI task- i.e., the changes in the perceived position of 
the hand, computed as the difference between the perceived position before (baseline) 
and after (drift) the induction period for each block – were analysed using a repeated 
measure one-way ANOVA. The within-subject factor “mode of RHI induction” had 
three levels (congruent-synchronous (CS) vs congruent-asynchronous (CA) vs 
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incongruent-synchronous (IS)). Post-hoc analyses (Newman-Keuls) tested for within-
group differences. 
5.5.3. Rubber Hand Illusion and Finger Localization Task 
To test for the effect of the structural representation of the hand on the sense of body 
ownership in patients, we ran a linear correlation (Pearson's) between the individual 
accuracy at the Finger Localization Task, computed across the three tasks, and the 
RHI index (computed as the difference between the proprioceptive drift induced by the 
CS condition and the average proprioceptive drift induced by the control conditions 
(CA and IS). 
5.5.4. Rubber Hand illusion and basic symptoms (SPI-A) 
To test for the relationship between basic symptoms and the effect of body ownership 
over the rubber hand, we computed a linear correlation (Pearson’s) between the RHI 
index (computed as the difference between the proprioceptive drift induced by the CS 
condition and the average proprioceptive drift induced by the control conditions (CA 
and IS), and the SPI-A total score. 
 
5.6. Results 
5.6.1. Finger Localization and basic symptoms 
An analysis of variance showed that the factor group was significant (F 
(1,42) = 8.69, p = .005, η2= 0.171), as the HC group (M= 57.18, S.E = 0.64) showed 
higher accuracy than the SCZ group (M= 53.63, S.E = 1.02). Also, the factor task was 
significant (F (2,84) = 57.04, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.576), with higher accuracy on the first 
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(M= 19.8, S.E = 0.93) and second (M = 19.27, SE = 0.17) tasks than on the third task 
(M = 16.3, SE = 0.49), where two fingers were touched simultaneously while hands 
were hidden from view. The main effect of task was further qualified by the group by 
task interaction (F (2,84) = 8.08, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.161), accounted for by significantly 
higher accuracy of HC group's performance (M = 17.7, SE = 0.51), as compared to 
SCZ group's performance (M = 14.91, SE = 0.76), only in the third task (p = .004). 
Notably, the fact that patients and controls differed only on the third task rules out the 
hypothesis that these effects are due to reduced tactile acuity in patients. Indeed, if 
such difference was due to a reduce tactile sensitivity per se, then we would have 
seen an effect on all the three tasks. Instead, the fact that patients and healthy control 
only differed in the third task (i.e. the most complex one) suggests that such difference 
is mainly driven by the higher complexity of the body structural representation being 
tested. Finally, the factor laterality was not statistically significant, nor were its second 












Fig. 5.2. Panel a) Mean accuracy in the Finger Localization Tasks in both healthy controls 
and SCZ patients. The maximum score for accuracy (i.e. summation of scores 
between right and left hand) is 20.  Panel b) Correlation between SPI-A and accuracy 
in the Finger Localization Task in SCZ patients. 
 
Importantly, for the SCZ group, we found a statistically significant negative association 
between the performance at the Finger Localization Task and the basic symptoms: 
the higher the SPI-A total score, the worse the individual accuracy when localizing the 
touched fingers (r = − 0.51, p = .026; Fig. 5.2b).  
 
5.6.2. Rubber Hand Illusion Task 
An analysis of variance showed that factor “mode of RHI induction” was significant (F 
(2,42) = 4.41, p = .02, ηp2 = 0.173). Post-hoc analyses (Newman-Keuls) revealed that 
the proprioceptive drift was significantly larger for the CS condition (M = 1.93, 
SE = 0.71) than both the control conditions, IS (M = 0.18, SE = 0.03; p = .03) and CA 








Fig. 5.3. Panel a) Mean proprioceptive drifts toward the rubber hand. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. Asterisk indicates significant differences between conditions. 
136 
 
Zero represents the felt position of the participant's hand in the pre-induction judgment. 
Panel b) Linear correlation between the RHI index and the accuracy in the Finger 
Localization Task. 
 
5.6.3. Correlation between Rubber Hand Illusion and Finger Localization 
As they did not differ significantly, we averaged the proprioceptive drift induced by the 
control conditions (IS and CA) for each participant and computed the individual RHI 
index as the difference between the proprioceptive drift induced by the CS condition 
and M(IS, CA). The test for the effect of hand representation on the sense of body 
ownership in patients showed a negative relationship (r = − 0.51, p = .02). Thus, the 
lower the accuracy in the Finger Localization Task, the larger the RHI index. (Fig. 
5.3b). 
 
5.6.4 Correlation between Rubber Hand Illusion and basic symptoms 
We found a non-significant correlation between the RHI index and the basic symptoms 




Disturbances in bodily self-awareness are considered to be hallmark signs for 
schizophrenia proneness (Magini & Raballo). This is supported by the basic symptom 
model of schizophrenia. Basic symptoms are considered as the most immediate 
expression of the neurobiological correlates of the illness (Klosterkotter et al., 1992; 
Nelson et al., 2019). The present study investigated the body structural representation 
(BSR), a specific type of body representation, and its association to basic symptoms 
in patients with schizophrenia. To this purpose, schizophrenic patients performed a 
Finger Localization Task. Results show that patients are significantly less precise than 
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healthy controls when asked to identify pairs of fingers touched by the experimenter 
(when the hand is hidden from view). Furthermore, patients' performance at the Finger 
Localization Task was negatively correlated with basic symptoms: the worse the 
individual performance at the task, the higher the SPI-A total score. Also, performance 
at the Finger Localization Task was negatively correlated with the malleability of the 
sense of embodiment: the less the individual ability to localize fingers, the stronger the 
rubber hand illusion. These results suggest that a reduced body structural 
representation might stem from more malleable models of the body in schizophrenia, 
thus promoting an excessive incorporation of objects in the external space. Moreover, 
it provided evidence that body representation abnormalities are correlated with basic 
symptoms, which are considered the earliest subjectively experienced symptoms of 
schizophrenia.  
 
In contrast to the emergent literature on body image in schizophrenia (Peled et al., 
2003; Thakkar et al., 2011), the integrity of the BSR in schizophrenia has been 
investigated (so far) only in one study from Graham-Schmidt et al. (2016). The authors 
assessed the BSR by means of the In Between-Task, a task in which participants 
estimate the number of unstimulated fingers between two touched fingers. Moreover, 
the authors asked participants to perform a matching body parts by location task, a 
task in which participants determine which of three body parts presented on a screen 
is closest to the target body part. Both these tasks assess the integrity of BSR but 
using different stimuli, that is, tactile/proprioceptive stimuli the former task, while visual 
stimuli the latter. Interestingly, the authors reported that patients with schizophrenia 
made more errors than controls in the In Between task, while they performed no 
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different from controls in the matching task. Thus, our results are consistent with those 
from Graham-Schmidt and colleagues. 
 
It could be that the body structural representation is influenced by tactile acuity. This 
is also suggested by recent empirical evidence. Indeed, Peviani et al. (Sci Rep. 2019), 
using a Line Length Judgment task, showed that the estimation error relative to the 
length, but not the width, of most body parts, is predicted by the individual tactile acuity. 
Thus, it could be that the reduction in tactile acuity, already observed in schizophrenia, 
may at least contribute to some aspect of their body structural representation. 
Somatosensory disorders have been observed among individuals at higher risk for 
schizophrenia (Postmes et al., 2014). For instance, Chang and Lenzeweger (2001; 
2005), found abnormal somatosensory processing in first-degree biological relatives 
of schizophrenia patients, such as a poor performance in the two-point discrimination 
task. Moreover, Ferri et al. (2016) found that individuals with high schizotypy were 
characterized by poor touch remapping abilities. When asked to perform a temporal 
order judgment of tactile stimuli delivered on their hands, high schizotypy individuals 
performed worse than individuals with low schizotypy, in both uncrossed- and crossed- 
hand conditions. It could be then, that the worse performance in the Finger 
Localization Task in patients compared to healthy controls, is caused by a reduced 
tactile acuity in schizophrenia. However, we observed a significant difference between 
patients and controls only for the third task of the Finger Localization Task -i.e. 
identification of pairs of fingers hidden from view (task C), but not in the first two tasks, 
i.e., identification of a single touched finger, with the hand visible (task A), or hidden 
from view (task C). If the within difference were entirely due to the possibly reduced 
tactile acuity in patients with schizophrenia, then it should impact upon all the three 
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tasks constituting the Finger Localization Task. The fact that patients and controls 
differed only on the third task, the most difficult one, suggests that such difference was 
mainly due to the higher complexity of the body structural representation tested.  
 
Previous accounts on the sense of embodiment, often inspired by studies on the 
Rubber Hand Illusion, have suggested that feelings of ownership result from both 
bottom-up processes (i.e. involving the multisensory integration of visual, tactile and 
proprioceptive information) and top-down processes (i.e. involving an internal 
representation of the body) (Tsakiris, 2010). Indeed, the illusion is usually not 
experienced when the rubber hand is spatially incongruent with the participant’s real 
hand, or when non-corporeal objects are used, suggesting that a prior structural-
spatial representation of one’s body has a key role in constructing the experience of 
mineness. On this line of reasoning, it could be that the higher proneness to the 
Rubber Hand Illusion reported in schizophrenia (Peled et al., 2003; Peled et al., 2000; 
Thakkar et al., 2011), stems from more complex disturbances in, and higher 
malleability of, body representation. Unsurprisingly, body representations issues have 
been well-documented among schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Klosterkötter et al., 
2001; Maggini & Raballo; Peled et al., 2003; Peled et al., 2000; Priebe & Rohricht, 
2001; Rohricht & Priebe, 2002; Thakkar et al., 2011; Tordjman et al., 2019; Graham-
Schmit, 2016). The results observed in the present study provides evidence in this 
direction. Indeed, reduced acuity in the BSR - as indicated by less accuracy at the 
Finger Localization Task - was negatively correlated with the Rubber Hand Illusion in 
patients with schizophrenia, indicating that individuals with less stable body 
representation are more susceptible to incorporate external objects.  
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Research has suggested that disturbances in the minimal self are a trait marker of 
schizophrenic vulnerability. Possessing a pre-reflective and implicit sense of self 
entails that there is a sense of embodiment; thus, the constitution of the minimal self 
has a bodily basis (de Haan & Fuchs, 2010). Disturbances in the sense of the 
embodiment occur many years before first frank symptoms appear (Parnas, 2000, 
2003; Stanghellini, 2012). Pre-onset and onset phases are characterized by the 
presence of body abnormalities such as subtle transitivistic phenomena and disruption 
of bodily boundaries. The former refers to the inability to distinguish the self from the 
not-self; the latter refers to the externalization of parts of the body that are normally 
within the bodily boundaries, as well as the internalization of objects that normally 
occupy the external space (Mancini et al., 2015). Thus, the disruption of the ego 
boundaries assumes a particular relevance as a psychopathological phenomenon 
insofar as it is useful for describing and understanding the schizophrenic prodrome.  
 
This inability to inhabit one’s body implies that the body has lost its ‘taken for granted’, 
implicit quality of a medium for relating to the world (Sass, 2000). For instance, parts 
of the body that are normally tacitly and implicitly present in the background of 
experience must be recovered from time to time, controlled and reasserted. This 
excessive form of reflectivity (see hyperreflexivity, section 1.2.1) leads the subject to 
assume a third-person perspective towards their body (Nelson et al., 2009; Parnas 
2003; Mancini et al., 2014). Typically, this sensation is accompanied with an 
experience of devitalization and diminished self-presence. Interestingly, this persistent 
feeling that one is observing oneself from an outside perspective is typically observed 
in depersonalization-derealization disorder and in dissociative identity disorder (Grauz 




To conclude, the results suggest that abnormalities in the body structural 
representation in schizophrenia i) are linked to core symptoms that are commonly 
taken as phenomenological markers of schizophrenia risk; ii) may contribute to a more 
malleable body representation, reduced sense of body ownership and more 
“permeable and blurred boundaries of the body” (Postmes et al., 2014). In this context, 
the subject may progressively experience a dissociation between their lived body (i.e. 
the body that ‘I’ am) and the objective body (i.e. the body that ‘I’ have), with the third-
person perspective becoming more salient than the first-person perspective. This 
hypothesis needs to be tested in future investigations in order to shed new light on the 
interaction between different body abnormalities in schizophrenia spectrum disorders 














Body Structural Representation in schizotypy 
 
6.1. Abstract  
A deficient sense of self, typically observed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, is 
often accompanied by abnormalities in bodily perception and awareness. These 
abnormalities are seemingly among the most powerful predictive factors for the onset 
of schizophrenic illnesses. According to the hypothesis of the schizophrenia 
continuum, high schizotypal traits in the general population may be characterised by 
a progressive sense of detachment from one’s lived body. Building upon previous 
research that found an abnormal Body Structural Representation (BSR) in individuals 
with schizophrenia, this study aims to extend these findings to schizotypy. To do so, 
we utilised the Finger Localization Task (FLT), in which participants must identify the 
finger touched by the experimenter, and the In Between Task (IBT), in which two 
fingers are touched, and participants must specify the number of fingers in between 
the two stimulated fingers. We found that individuals with high schizotypy were 
significantly less accurate than individuals with low schizotypy in determining the 
spatial configuration of their own fingers relative to each other. Most significantly, 
performances on both tasks were negatively correlated with the score on the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES). These findings support the hypothesis that the 
progressive loss of one’s sense of self is associated with abnormal bodily experiences 
and dissociative symptomatology which may represent a potential marker for 





Schizophrenia spectrum disorders are characterised by a complex profile of 
symptomatology. The core feature of the spectrum appears to be characterised by 
abnormalities of fundamental selfhood, sometimes termed ‘ipseity’ or the ‘minimal self’ 
(Nordgaard & Parnas, 2014; Gallagher 2004). The minimal self could be described as 
a pre-reflective sense of awareness that one is an autonomous agent who ‘owns’ their 
experiences. The minimal self can be contrasted with the narrative or descriptive self, 
which involves autobiographical information or an explicit concept about one’s 
individual identity. Thus, even if the narrative or descriptive self is impaired (as may 
occur in amnesia), the minimal self will remain intact provided that the individual 
retains a pre-reflective sense of agency and body ownership. Phenomenologically 
oriented neuroscientists have posited that one’s body provides a tacit, “background” 
sense of one’s first-person presence and relationship to the environment. Thus, pre-
reflective forms of selfhood are likely rooted in a bodily context as the body represents 
a “minimal threshold” component of selfhood, which does not need to be explicitly 
conceptualised to profoundly influence the agent’s cognition (de Haan & Fuchs 2010). 
Research has afforded significant attention to clinical manifestations of embodiment 
and selfhood, particularly insofar as such body perception related measures improve 
the early detection of, and provide preventive measures for, schizophrenia. Indeed, 
several studies have found that an anomalous sense of body ownership (Peled, 2000, 
2003, Thakkar et al., 2011, Ferri et al., 2014; Ferri et al., 2020), aberration in body 
image (Priebe & Rohricht, 2001; Ferri et al., 2012), disintegration of bodily boundaries 
(Parnas et al., 2003; Noel., 2016; Di Cosmo, 2018), abnormal sensorimotor 
representation (Ardizzi, 2020) and perceived changes in the shape and location of 
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body parts (Priebe & Röhricht, 2001) are common features to schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders. In particular, it has been observed that abnormalities in the sense of 
embodiment, such as loss of contact with one’s own body and disintegration of bodily 
boundaries, actually manifest prior to the first symptoms typically used to establish a 
diagnosis (Szczotka & Majchrowicz, 2018; Maggini & Raballo, 2004; de Haan & Fuchs, 
2010) and persist during the course of the disorder (Nelson et al., 2012). Thus, these 
abnormalities in embodiment and corporeality are observable in those who merely 
carry liability for schizophrenia (e.g., schizotypes), significantly before the onset of the 
first schizophrenia symptoms occur (Handest & Parnas, 2005). Correspondingly, the 
symptomatology observed in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may be a 
consequence of more malleable models of body representation (Graham-Schmidt et 
al., 2016) and of an earlier loss of contact with one’s own body (Huber, 1957; 
Stanghellini et al., 2012)  
The development of a coherent sense of self can be considered as a process that 
requires the retention of various body representations. Most prominent of these 
include ‘body schema’ and ‘body image’. However, there has been confusion 
surrounding the distinction between these two concepts (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012). 
To clarify, body image is an explicit attitude or perception directed towards one’s own 
body, whereas the body schema constitutes a set of largely automatic task-related, 
bodily-motor orientations. While my body itself is the intentional-object in the body 
image (how my body looks or feels to me), the environment is the intentional-object in 
the body schema (how I use my body to engage in various actions) (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945; Gallagher & Zahavi 2012). This distinction echoes the phenomenological 
division between the body-as-object or “Körper” (i.e., the physical body “I” that is 
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observable both by myself and by others), and the body-as-subject or “Leib” (i.e. the 
body “I” pre-reflectively experience as a subject) (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). 
 
One emerging yet understudied example of a body representation is the Bodily 
Structural Representation (BSR). BSR denotes the agent’s topological model of how 
their various body parts relate to one another in a spatial configuration (Longo, 2016). 
A functional bodily structural representation likely allows the individual to properly 
explore their own body (body image) and to use their body as an interface for engaging 
with the world (body schema) in a properly co-ordinated fashion. Impairments in the 
BSR are often localised to the fingers, such as in finger agnosia (patients who are 
unable to identify their digits) (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962). Those with severe 
BSR impairments cannot point to their body parts on command nor judge the spatial 
relationships between body parts, such as in the condition of autotopagnosia (Longo, 
2016). 
In Chapter Five, we found that schizophrenic patients show impairments in the Finger 
Localization Task, a task designed to detect abnormalities in the BSR (Costantini et 
al., 2020). Our findings show that BSR abnormalities were correlated with deficits in 
body ownership, as indicated by higher susceptibility to the Rubber Hand Illusion, and 
to basic symptoms (i.e. a set of mild self-experienced subclinical disturbances that are 
present since the prodromal phase; Schultze-Lutter, 2009). These findings support 
previous evidence which found that the somatotopic map of the hand and fingers in 
the primary somatosensory cortex (SI) is altered in patients with schizophrenia (Geyer 
et al., 1999). Moreover, evidence supporting a deficient BSR in schizophrenia has 
recently been observed by Graham-Smith et al. (2016). The authors found that 
patients with schizophrenia performed poorly in the In Between Task, a task in which 
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a correct performance relies on an intact BSR of the hand and more particularly the 
fingers. This deficit in body structural representation could be conceptualised in terms 
of a weakened internal modelling of the self or an excessive plasticity of its boundaries 
and spatial configuration. This is consistent with observations that the sense of self 
generally is either deteriorated or more malleable in people with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders (Thakkar et al., 2011) and that this deterioration or malleability 
includes pre-reflective experiences of embodiment (Parnas, 2013; Fuchs, 2005; Ferri 
et al., 2012).  
The aim of the present study was to broaden previous findings by investigating the 
Body Structural Representation in individuals with high and low schizotypy. For this 
purpose, we utilised the Finger Localization Task (FLT) (Benton et al., 1994), in which 
participants have to identify which of their fingers is being touched by the 
experimenter, and the In Between Task (IBT) (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962), in 
which two fingers of the same hand are touched, and the participants must count the 
number of fingers in between the two stimulated ones. Both tasks assess fine-grained 
acuity in body mapping (Kinsbourn & Warrington, 1962; Benton et al., 1994; Graham-
Smith et al., 2016) and have been utilised to investigate Body Structural 
Representation in schizophrenic individuals (Graham-Smith et al., 2016; Costantini et 
al., 2020).  
Our hypothesis was that individuals with high schizotypy, as assessed by the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), would display less accuracy in BSR-
related tasks than people with low schizotypy. This hypothesis is in keeping with the 
continuum hypothesis which posits that characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia are 
present in less severe forms in individuals with high schizotypy (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 
2015; Kwapil & Barrantes-Vidal, 2015; Nelson et al., 2013). Moreover, grounding on 
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prior research that observed an overlap between dissociation and schizophrenia 
(Ross, 1997; 2009), we asked participants to complete a questionnaire designed to 
measure dissociative experiences: the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES). We 
predicted that reduced performance accuracy in the tasks would be associated with 
higher scores in the SPQ and the DES.  
 
6.3. Materials and Methods 
6.3.1. Participants 
Two hundred sixty-eight students, recruited via mailing lists at the University of Essex, 
were screened with respect to schizotypal personality traits using the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991). The distribution of scores was divided 
into quintiles, with the first quintile representing the participants rated as low 
schizotypes and the fifth quintile representing the participants rated as high 
schiotypes. Based on their scores, 55 participants in total were called to complete the 
full study. The study was approved by the University of Essex Ethics Committee. All 
participants read and signed a consent form prior to their participation. None of the 




6.3.2.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) 
Schizotypal personality traits were assessed using the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (SPQ) (Raine, 1991). The SPQ is a 74-item questionnaire that has been 
modelled after the DSM-III-R schizotypal personality disorder diagnostic criteria 
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(Venables and Raine, 2015). The questionnaire assesses three well-replicated factors 
of schizotypy: cognitive-perceptual deficits, interpersonal deficits, and disorganisation. 
This factor structure of the SPQ corresponds to the three cluster symptoms observed 
in people with schizophrenia (DSM-V, 2014): positive symptoms (i.e., cognitive-
perceptual symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions), negative symptoms (i.e., 
interpersonal symptoms such as apathy and social avoidance) and disorganised 
symptoms (i.e., disorganisation symptoms such as abnormal speech and behaviour).  
6.3.2.2. Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) 
On the day of the experiment, participants were asked to complete the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES) (Bernstein and Putnam, 1986). The Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES) is a widely used instrument in both clinical and nonclinical 
samples. The scale consists of 28 items assessing the frequency and the severity of 
a series of dissociative experiences. Participants were asked to determine to what 
extent the experiences described would apply to them by using an eleven-point visual 
analog scale (0%–100%) (Mazzotti et al., 2016). The DES assesses different aspects 
of dissociation: absorption (e.g. experiences of detachment with the immediate 
surroundings and with the present moment); depersonalisation (e.g. feelings of 
disconnection from one’s identity and body, such as out-of-body experiences); 
derealisation (e.g. feelings of alienation from the outside world which is perceived as 
unreal and not recognizable – i.e. objects perceived as altered, individuals perceived 
as inanimate); dissociative amnesia (i.e. failure into retrieving personal information that 
would normally be accessible) (Waller et al., 1998). Factor analyses has showed that 
a three-factor model best account for clinical samples (Ross et al., 1995), whereas 
one-factor best account for nonclinical samples (Holtgraves & Stockdale, 1997), 
indicating that overall score is the most reliable measure for the purpose of the current 
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study where we investigated sub-clinical samples. Research has suggested that 
scores above 30 are highly indicative of severe dissociative pathology and scores 
above 40 are highly indicative of dissociative personality disorders (Carlson & Putnam, 
1993).  
 
6.4. Behavioural tasks/Procedure 
6.4.1. Finger Localization Task 
Participants sat in front of a table with a box, which served to hide the participant’s 
hands, and a drawing (outline) of a human hand. In the outline drawing, the fingers of 
each hand were given a number (see Fig. 6.1) that participants could use to identify 
the corresponding finger on their own hand. Participants were asked to put their hands 
on the table, with their palms facing upwards and their fingers stretched and slightly 
separated. Participants provided their responses by naming the fingers that were 
stroked referring to the outline drawing of a hand with numbered fingers. Correct 
responses were recorded with pen and paper. The test consisted of three tasks (ten 
trials on each hand per task). The first task required participants to identify the finger 
of the left or the right hand touched by the experimenter (Fig. 6.1a). The second task 
required participants to identify the finger of the left or the right hand touched by the 
experimenter, with the hands hidden from view (Fig. 6.1b). Finally, the third task 
required participants to identify pairs of fingers of the left or the right hand touched by 
the experimenter with the hand hidden from view (Fig. 6.1c). In the third task, 
responses were counted as correct when both fingers were accurately identified. The 
















Fig. 6.1. (a, b, c) Experimental conditions of the Finger Localization Task. Participants had to identify the finger touched by the experimenter, 
with the hands visible (a) or hidden (b) from view. In a third condition, they had to identify pairs of fingers touched by the experimenter, with 







6.4.2. In Between Task 
 
The In Between Task has been widely used in research to investigate body structural 
representation of the hand in neurological patients (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962). 
The task has had various adaptations in different research assessing body structural 
representation also in healthy participants, and the cortical areas involved (Rusconi et 
al., 2014). Here, we utilised a variation of the original task by Kinsbourne & Warrington 
(1962).  
Participants sat in front of a table with their hands resting on the table and their palms 
up, finger slightly spread, eyes closed. The experimenter simultaneously stroked two 
fingers on the participant’s hand, making sure to apply the same pressure for 
approximately one second (Graham-Smith et al., 2014). Participants were asked to 
make unspeeded verbal responses as to how many fingers they felt were between the 
fingers that were touched (See Fig. 6.2). Responses were manually documented by 
the experimenter. The procedure was repeated ten times for each hand. The order of 
the trials was established in a pseudo-random manner before the test began, following 
a pre-established combination. The combination in which no fingers was in between 
on either hand (“0” answer) was presented twice; one finger in between (“1” answer) 
was presented three times; two fingers in between (“2” answer) was presented twice 
and three fingers in between (“3” answer) was presented three times. This particular 
adaptation was adopted as a variation of the original task (Kinsbourn and Warrington, 
1962), which was considered too simplistic to assess performance in healthy 












Figure 6.2. In Between Task. Participants kept their eyes closed. Experimenter 
stroked two fingers of the same hand. Participants had to verbally report how many 
fingers they felt were between the fingers that were stroked. There was one block 
of 20 trials per hand (40 trials in total). The combination in which there were no 
fingers in between on either hand (answer “0”) was presented twice; one finger in 
between (answer “1”) was presented three times; two fingers in between (answer 





6.5.1.  Self-report measures 
6.5.1.1. Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
From 268 participants who initially completed the SPQ questionnaire, 55 participants 
in total were called to complete the full study. Based on their scores, a total of 28 
participants were selected from the uppermost 20% of the scores (score range: 35- 
60), representing participants rated as high schizotypes, and 27 from the lowermost 
20% of the scores (score range: 2 -16), representing participants rated as low 
schizotypes. This sample consisted of 14 male and 41 female participants.  
6.5.1.2. Dissociative Experiences Scale 
The 28 items of the questionnaire were assessed using an eleven-point scale (0%-
100%). The scores were calculated by totalling the percentage indicated by each 
participant for each question (from 0% to 100%) and then dividing it by 28. The scores 
ranged from 0 to 100 (score range: 6.4-74). Those who scored above 30 (24 
participants out of 55), were considered to have high dissociative traits. A t-test was 
performed to check whether the DES scores differed between participants who scored 
high and low in the SPQ. Mean score on the DES for participants with low SPQ scores 
(M = 17.4, SD = 10.8), significantly differed from mean score on the for participants 
with high SPQ scores (M = 39, SD = 17), demonstrating that individuals with higher 






6.6. Behavioural Tasks 
6.6.1. Finger Localisation Task and SPQ 
As in Chapter Five (Costantini et al., 2020), performance in tasks A and B was at 
ceiling, with 96.4% of participants obtaining the maximum score in task A and 80% 
obtaining the maximum score in task B. Correct responses from the Finger 
Localisation task C (i.e. hands hidden condition) were analysed using 2 by 2 ANOVA 
with laterality (left hand vs right hand) as within-subject factors, and group (high vs low 
schizotypy) as between-subject factor. Post-hoc analyses (Newman-Keuls) tested for 
between-group differences. An analysis of variance showed that the factor group was 
significant (F (1,53) = 9.301, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15) as the low schizotypy group (M = 
17.9, SE = .44) showed higher accuracy than the high schizotypty group (M = 15.64, 
SE = .59) in task performance (Fig. 6.3.). No effect was found for hand laterality (F 
(1,53) = .399, p = 0.53). 
6.6.2. Finger Localization Task and DES 
The effect of dissociative symptomatology on the structural representation of the hand 
was analysed using the Spearman correlation analysis. A statistically significant 
negative correlation was found (rs(53) =-.32, p = .01) indicating that the higher the 














Figure 6.3.  
Panel A. Mean accuracy in the Finger Localization Task in both high and low schizotypes. 
Values correspond to task condition “c” (“hands hidden”). Panel B. Correlation between DES 
total score and accuracy in the in the Finger Localization Task for all participants. Participants 




6.6.3. In Between Task and SPQ 
Correct responses from the In Between Task were analysed using 2 by 2 ANOVA with 
laterality (left hand vs right hand) as within-subject factors, and group (high vs low 
schizotypy) as between-subject factor. Post-hoc analyses (Newman-Keuls) tested for 
between-group differences. Analysis of variance showed that the factor group was 
significant (F (1,53) = 7.900, p < 0.001 η2= 0.13) as the low schizotypy group (M = 
19.33, SE = .25) showed higher accuracy than the high schizotypty group (M = 17.71 
SE =.51) in task performance (Fig.6.4.). No effect was found for hand laterality (F 
(1,53) = 1.276, p= 0.26). 
6.6.4. In Between Task and DES 
To test for the effect of dissociative symptomatology on the structural representation 
of the hand (in absence of multisensory stimulation), we ran a correlation (Spearman) 
between the individual accuracy at the In Between Task and the DES total score. A 
significant negative correlation was found (rs (53)= -.35, p <.001) indicating that 
individuals with high dissociative traits are less accurate when asked to identify how 














Figure 6.4. Panel A. Mean accuracy in the In Between Task in both high and low schizotypes. 
Panel B. Correlation between DES total score and accuracy in the In Between task for all 
participants. Participants are colour-coded according to whether they were from the low or 








This study aimed to investigate the body structural representation in individuals with 
high and low schizotypy. To this purpose, we used two tasks: the FLT and the IBT. 
Both tasks have recently been employed for assessing BSR in individuals with 
schizophrenia (Costantini et al., 2020; Graham-Smith, 2014). In accordance with the 
idea of schizophrenia as a continuum (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015; Kwapil & 
Barrantes-Vidal, 2015; Nelson et al., 2013), our findings suggest that individuals with 
high schizotypy, similar to schizophrenic patients, display a reduced accuracy in BSR-
related tasks. More specifically, our results show that individuals with high schizotypy 
are significantly less accurate than individuals with low schizotypy in identifying the 
stimulated fingers and situating them to an outline of the hand (FLT), or in determining 
the spatial relationship between the stimulated fingers when their eyes are closed 
(IBT).  Moreover, our findings show that performances in both tasks were negatively 
correlated with scores in the DES: the worse the individual accuracy, the higher the 
DES score.  
Taken together, these results contribute to the mounting evidence that suggests that 
abnormalities in various dimensions of corporeality and self-awareness are common, 
unifying features in schizophrenic-like condition, including the sub-clinical types. In line 
with this hypothesis, we propose that aetiological features of schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders might be better understood by further explicating their shared bodily roots. 
In the case of Bodily Structural Representation, a functional BSR implies an 
understanding of the objective spatial configuration of one’s body and of its place in 
the environment. Consequently, agents with an impaired understanding of the 
structure of their bodies and its specific spatial configuration may be more malleable 
to adopting faulty models of their body’s spatial mapping and location. The lack of a 
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coherent understanding of oneself as a structural entity in the world may be associated 
with deficits in the minimal self that are typically observed in the schizophrenic 
spectrum. As the minimal self is mediated through the body, disruptions in BSR may 
constitute one of several embodiment-related factors that contribute to well-
documented disturbances in minimal selfhood and the confusion between first and 
third-person perspectives present in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. 
Interestingly, research observed that schizophrenic patients display a tendency to 
disengage from normal forms of involvement with the external world, particularly with 
such acts that would normally be tacit (“in the background”) and transparent. For 
instance, some patients report becoming excessively aware of the act of breathing or 
the movements of their arms while walking (Nelson & Sass, 2016). These sensations 
often concern the domain of pre-reflective bodily experience, whereby the body is no 
longer experienced as tacitly given in the first-person perspective, but it rather loses 
its transparent quality and becomes an overt object of observation and concern 
(Irrazàval, 2015). This loss of the transparent, pre-reflective sense of one’s 
embodiment ultimately affects the capacity to switch between the body-as-subject 
(body schema) and the body-as-object (body image) dimensions of embodied 
experience, producing a fracture between the observing and the observed self (Sass, 
2003). Consequently, one could feel as if they are observing their own experiences in 
third-person, rather than from a first-person perspective. This tendency has also been 
referred to as “hyperreflexivity”, i.e. where bodily processes that are otherwise typically 
unnoticed instead become intensified in reflective consciousness. It has been 
hypothesised elsewhere that hyperreflective dimensions of self-consciousness might 
stem from disturbances in the minimal self (Sass 2013; Fuchs, 2005).     
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Interestingly, similar experiences of self-detachment (i.e., a fracture between the 
observing and the observed self) are predominant characteristics of dissociative 
disorders (Sass, 1992; Bob et al., 2013; Ciaunica, 2020). Research has found that 
dissociative symptoms often overlap with schizophrenic symptoms (Haugen and 
Castillo, 1999; Putnam et al., 1986) and with schizotypal personality traits (Pope & 
Kwapil, 2000; Merckelbach et al., 2000; Watson, 2001). In particular, a study by 
Watson (2001), found that the features that contribute most strongly to this relationship 
pertain to symptomatology concerning detachment and depersonalisation constructs 
that are deeply related with changes in the quality of embodied, pre-reflective 
experiences. These experiences include sensations of estrangements from one’s self, 
body, body parts, or one’s surroundings (Ciaunica et al., 2020). However, individuals 
with dissociative disorders are usually aware that these are subjective and temporary 
phenomena, rather than an ‘objective’ reality (Ciaunica et al., 2020). It could be 
hypothesised then, that their ‘minimal selfhood’ is preserved. On this basis, future 
research could investigate which processes could represent distinguishing clinical 
factors between dissociative disorders and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. We 
propose that greater focus on the early detection of minimal selfhood disruptions and 
body abnormalities in dissociative symptomatology and schizophrenic spectrum 
conditions could provide useful insights in regard to this facet. 
In conclusion, our results suggest that an abnormal BSR represents a potential early 
marker of schizophrenia. Indeed, abnormalities in BSR contribute toward observed 
anomalies in related body representations (e.g. body schema) which, collectively, may 
contribute to the development of a deficient sense of self. Evidence of a deficient BSR 
in both clinical and sub-clinical populations may further illuminate the nature of 
disordered self-experiences that are predictive of schizophrenia onset. Further 
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research could investigate to what extent deficits in the BSR extend to other parts of 
the body. Furthermore, it may also be productive to investigate the difference between 
deficits in body structural representation and other deficits in spatial processing and 
representation. In addition, the results from the present paper provide further insights 
regarding the relationship between schizophrenia spectrum conditions and 
dissociation. Interestingly, prior research found that both dissociation and 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders are often associated with a history of trauma (Allen 
& Coyne, 1995; Salami, Andreu-Perez & Gillmesteir, 2020). This relationship might be 
linked to the fact that post-traumatic intrusions foster abnormal perception, temporality 
deformation, dysfunctional reality testing abilities and bodily sensations, and may 
ultimately induce changes in the overall texture and quality of experience and 
contribute to the development of dissociative experiences (Morrison et al., 2003). 
Subsequent research might focus on the interrelationship between body abnormalities 
in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, the history of trauma and dissociation. This may 
further clarify the link between self-disturbances and schizophrenic spectrum 











7. Chapter Seven 
7.1. General Discussion 
The goal of this doctoral research project was to investigate the mechanisms 
underlying the development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although there have 
been many attempts to explain the processes involved in the emergence of the 
disorder, there is still the need to extract from these processes a cohesive theory. The 
necessity of understanding the subjective dimension of schizophrenia has led 
researchers to make use of the contribution of phenomenology, which provides an 
adequate conceptual framework for describing the experiential aspects of the disorder. 
For this reason, this project revolved around past and recent theories, both from 
phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience, which have attempted to create a 
comprehensive account of the disorder. Most prominent theories have conceptualised 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders as disorders of the most basic sense of self-
awareness: the minimal self. Minimal selfhood entails that a subject has an implicit, 
pre-reflective, non- objectifying and non-observational sense of existing as a subject 
of awareness. This basic form of self-awareness is rooted in the bodily experience, is 
based on the integration of multisensory information, and carries the potential for 
action (i.e. it is understood as a “predisposition” towards objects in the environment or 
an “immersion” in a world of affordances). The disruption of aspects such as 
multisensory integration, ego-boundaries and agency, have been well documented in 
schizophrenia. On this line of evidence, I aimed to investigate how abnormalities in 
multisensory temporal integration (Chapter Three), its underlying patterns of neuro-
oscillatory activity in the brain (Chapter Four) and body representation (Chapters Five 
164 
 
and Six) deficits may account for self-disorders and could be predictive of 
schizophrenia onset.  
Linking the evidence that has emerged from the studies presented in this thesis to 
disturbances in the minimal self can be problematic, as most of the concepts relating 
to the “self”, are largely descriptive concepts. In general, phenomenological oriented 
researchers argue that self-disturbances are strictly related to abnormal perceptual 
organization and multimodal integration, and to fundamental anomalies in the 
experienced sense of existing as a subject of awareness (e.g., body ownership) or 
agent of action (e.g., sense of agency) (Borda & Sass 2015). The studies presented 
in this thesis have attempted, at least indirectly, to address the aforementioned 
components (i.e., multisensory integration and bodily self-awareness). 
 
7.2. Summary of findings 
7.2.1. Multisensory Integration 
A background composition of multisensory information is always present in everyday 
experience and is responsible for shaping and maintaining the implicit awareness of 
ourselves, i.e., minimal self.  In this sense, the minimal self could be thought of as 
analogous to a “sensory self” (Postmes et al., 2014). Therefore, it has been assumed 
that a disruption in multisensory processing might reflect a general decline of the 
common clearness in the field of awareness, which indicates a more fundamental 
decline in normal self-experience. As already observed in research, specific degrees 
of temporal tolerance for multisensory stimuli asynchronies are fundamental to 
integrate different inputs into a singular holistic Gestalt, or a coherent percept. The 
version of Double Flash Illusion utilised in Chapters Three and Four has allowed us to 
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specifically manipulate the time window wherein multisensory stimuli were presented 
and to investigate the difference in multisensory temporal acuity of low-level 
information (e.g., a simple tactile and a simple visual stimulus) in individuals with high 
and low schizotypal traits. Both studies revealed an increased amount of illusions for 
temporally distant auditory (Chapter Three) and tactile (Chapter Four) stimuli (i.e. 
enlarged temporal window of integration), in line with research on schizophrenic 
patients. These results might suggest that a reduction in multisensory temporal acuity 
could indicate of a more general disruption of the ‘grip’ or ‘hold’ on the perceptual world 
and ultimately be responsible for a decline in normal self-experience. 
With this in mind, the work in Chapter Three (Ferri et al., 2018) was based on the 
initial observation that integration of simple audio-visual sensory stimuli in healthy 
individuals seems to happen within a temporal window of around 100ms (Shams et 
al., 2012; Cecere et al.,2015), and that such window of audio-visual integration is 
larger in individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Haß et al., 2017). For this 
purpose, we utilised the auditory-induced Double Flash Illusion to investigate whether 
individuals with high schizotypy exhibited reduced temporal sensitivity, indexed by an 
enlarged temporal window within which the illusion is maximally perceived (i.e. the 
Temporal Window of Illusion, TWI). Results showed that individuals with high 
schizotypy integrate audio-visual information over longer periods of time (i.e. they have 
reduced temporal sensitivity) compared to individuals with low schizotypy. Moreover, 
we observed a higher proneness to the illusion in individuals with high vs low 
schizotypal traits.  
In order to test whether such enhanced proneness to the illusion was a direct 
consequence of a larger TWI and not, instead, a consequence of a more general noise 
in sensory processing, we normalised the measure of proneness to the DFI to each 
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individual TWI by calculating the percentage of perceived illusion falling in the 3 SOAs 
preceding the inflection point (i.e. the point in which the illusion starts to decay). In this 
way, the absolute number of SOAs sensitive to the illusion was kept constant across 
participants and any differential effect of proneness was now controlled for by any 
individual difference in TWI.  Results show that the between-group differences in the 
proneness to perceive the illusion were abolished when correcting for the individual 
TWI. Therefore, we have discarded, at least indirectly, the alternative hypothesis that 
our results reflect a general problem in sensory processing per se that is independent 
of the individual TWI. Instead, our novel findings point to the idea that a reduced 
temporal sensitivity, as indexed by an enlarged TWI, fully mediates the proneness 
effects of the crossmodal induced illusion observed in the high- (vs low-) schizotypy 
group.  
Here, a possible limitation is that even if the TWI represents an implicit measure of 
multisensory binding, it is derived from the same data as the mean rate of double-flash 
illusions. Indeed, the TWI has been inferred from the rate of illusion itself. In future 
research, it will be convenient to utilise additional unimodal or multisensory control 
conditions to test for alternative interpretations of our data, notably response bias 
toward saying “2” (i.e., reporting seeing two flashes) against sensory temporal 
resolution. A similar approach has been utilised by Stevenson et al. (2014). The 
researchers measured the TWI by manipulating the stimulus onset asynchronies 
between visual and auditory information (i.e., simultaneity judgment task). Subjects 
had to evaluate whether auditory and visual information was simultaneous or 
asynchronous. Afterwards, the researchers examined whether the individual TWI, i.e., 
the audio-visual discrimination abilities, correlated with the McGurk or sound-induced 
flash illusion, which were evaluated in a separate experimental session.  
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With the purpose of understanding which processes underlie such difference in the 
width of the TWI between individuals with high and low schizotypy, in Chapter Four, 
we went a step forward and investigated the neural processes underlying multisensory 
integration. Successful multisensory processing requires the coordination of 
information across widespread brain areas (Stekelenburg et al., 2013). Research has 
recently started to focus on the neuro-oscillatory processes that facilitate the 
coordination and integration of sensory information across modalities. Unsurprisingly, 
evidence is now emerging linking abnormal oscillatory activity in different frequency 
bands and impaired multisensory integration in schizophrenia spectrum disorders (for 
a review, see Uhlhaas et al., 2011). Thus, our research grounded on previous 
evidence which found that the temporal window of integration for the auditory-induced 
DFI in healthy individuals (100 ms), corresponds to the duration of an alpha cycle 
(Cecere et al., 2015). Cecere et al. (2015) provided causal evidence for a link between 
oscillatory alpha activity and temporal resolution of the TWI by stimulating the occipital 
pole via transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS) at slower vs faster 
oscillatory alpha frequencies. Cecere et al. (2015) showed that stimulation set at 
slower alpha frequency induced larger TWI, while stimulation set at faster alpha 
frequency induced shorter TWI.  
More recently, Cooke et al. (2019), extended this observation to tactile-to-visual 
crossmodal interactions (i.e. the tactile-induced DFI). The authors found a dissociation 
between auditory and tactile induced flash illusion with respect to the oscillatory peak 
accounting for this effect. Indeed, while alpha peak could account for the auditory 
induced flash illusion (replicating previous findings, i.e. Cecere et al., 2015; Keil et al., 
2017), this same frequency does not account for the tactile-induced flash illusion. 
Interestingly, the authors looked into the beta frequency band (which is functionally 
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relevant in the sensory-motor domain) and found a correlation between individual beta 
peak and the TWI for the tactile induced DFI.  
With this in mind, in Chapter Four (Fotia et al., 2021), we utilised the tactile-induced 
Double-Flash-Illusion (tDFI) to investigate the tactile-to-visual temporal sensitivity in 
schizotypy, as indexed by the temporal window of illusion (TWI), and its neural 
underpinnings. First, we aimed to replicate the behavioural findings from Chapter 
Three (Ferri et al., 2018) to the tactile-induced Double Flash Illusion. Second, we 
aimed to replicate the findings from Cooke et al. (2019) who showed that the individual 
TWI for the tDFI positively correlates with the individual beta frequency (IBF) in the 
occipital cortex. Moreover, we wanted to investigate the potential association between 
schizoptypy and IBF. 
Results confirmed that there is a temporal sensitivity reduction in people with high 
schizotypy vs low schizotypy. Indeed, we found a positive correlation between the 
TWI, as measured with the tDFI, and the SPQ scores. Here, it has to be noted that we 
could not find any significant difference in the overall proneness to perceive the 
illusion. This could be dependent on many factors: in this study, our participants were 
not clustered into extreme scores (high vs low), but rather were distributed across a 
continuum of the SPQ score. Also, along with evidence which observed high inter-
individual variability in the susceptibility to the illusion (de Haas et al., 2012), previous 
research noted that susceptibility to the illusion is higher for the auditory induced 
illusion compared to the tactile-induced illusion (Cooke et al., 2019). A possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is that the tactile-induced DFI appears to be noisier 
than the auditory-induced DFI, possibly due to the fact that auditory information tends 
to be more precise in the temporal domain when compared to tactile information. 
Hence, auditory stimuli are more likely to influence other sensory modalities when 
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compared to tactile stimuli (Bresciani et al., 2008; Plaisier, Van Dam, Glowania & 
Ernst, 2014).  
Also, in Chapter Four, we expected to reproduce the relationship between beta – but 
not alpha – frequency and TWI. To this aim, individual oscillatory frequencies were 
converted from cycle units (Hz) into millisecond units (period=1000/frequency) so as 
to correlate TWI and oscillatory activity on the same measure scale (of time) and the 
same unit (ms). Our findings show a significant positive correlation between the TWI 
and the duration of an individual beta frequency, suggesting that participants with 
wider TWIs have also a slower beta cycle. In line with our expectations, we found no 
association between the TWI and the peak alpha frequency. supporting the notion that 
oscillatory activity in the visual cortex relate to the illusion in a frequency and network-
specific manner (i.e. depending on the neural network involved). As discussed in 
Cooke et al. (2019), a possible mechanism linking temporal integration across the 
senses with specific cross-sensory oscillatory patterns is that communication between 
sensory areas follows a cyclical gating allowing for efficient cross-sensory coordination 
at the specific temporal loop of the cross-sensory feedback network.  
Most notably, we found an association between the IBF and the SPQ scores. Again, 
as we expected, there was no relationship between the IAF and the SPQ scores. 
Specifically, individuals with higher schizotypal traits exhibit wider TWI and slower beta 
waves accounting for the temporal window within which they perceive the illusion. This 
observation is in line with extensive research reporting slower oscillatory activity 
(Fuggetta et al., 2014; Nagase et al., 1996; Omori et al., 1995) as well as larger period 
of integration of information across the senses in schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
(Stevenson et al., 2017; Haß et al., 2017).  
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Finally, we performed a mediation analysis to better understand the relationship 
between SPQ, TWI and IBF, and to examine a possible mediation role of the TWI for 
the effect of IBF on SPQ. We found no residual correlation between IBF and SPQ that 
is not mediated by TWI (i.e. the relationship between IBF and schizotypy disappear 
when TWI is introduced as a mediator). Indeed, the model suggests that the 
relationship between IBF and SPQ is fully mediated by the TWI.  
A possible limitation for both Chapters Three and Four is that the illusion differences 
observed between the groups, rather than being a consequence of reduced temporal 
sensitivity in multisensory integration, could be explained by other types of information 
processing abnormalities. For instance, a reduced ability to concentrate on relevant 
stimuli while simultaneously ignoring the irrelevant ones is a central feature of acute 
schizophrenia and has been observed in schizotypal conditions as well.  
Research has demonstrated that patients with schizophrenia (Perry et al., 1999; 
Parwani et al., 2000) and schizotypal personality traits (Wan et al.,2017) exhibit 
sensory gating deficits compared to the healthy population, meaning that they have 
more difficulties to “gate” or screen out irrelevant stimulus and to attend to salient 
features of the environment (McGhie & Chapman, 1961). Deficits in central gating or 
inhibitory functions have been investigated via the use of prepulse inhibition of the 
startle response (Braff et al. 1978). Prepulse inhibition is an operational measure of 
sensorimotor gating that is present when a weak pre-stimulus precedes a more 
intense one (typically by 30 to 500 milliseconds). Normally, when the intense stimulus 
is preceded by a similar one of weaker magnitude, the startle response is inhibited. 
Schizophrenic patients, however, exhibit a loss of inhibitory function as reflected by 
deficient prepulse inhibition, meaning that they exhibit strong startle responses despite 
the pre-stimulus. Most of the studies investigating prepulse inhibition in schizophrenia 
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and in healthy individuals have used acoustic stimuli, but tactile stimuli (Braff et al., 
1992; Kumari et al., 2008) have also been used. Thus, in the case of the DFI, it is 
possible that the second beep (in Chapter Three) and the second tap (in Chapter Four) 
could be louder in individuals with high schizotypal traits, and this could drive the 
illusion differences. With this in mind, it is crucial that future research implements 
control conditions, such as the simultaneity judgment task, as previously mentioned. 
 
7.2.2. Body representation 
As the background composition of multisensory stimuli shape our sense of self, our 
body is always present in the field of awareness. Indeed, in order to recognize and 
differentiate oneself from the others, a subject must coordinate inputs from various 
senses with the ongoing modification of the internal models of the body and of the 
bodily self in action (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Thus, self-awareness is strictly 
dependent on the proper integration of multisensory inputs that arise from the body, 
such as proprioceptive, spatial and temporal sensorimotor ones, and by stable internal 
body representations: both these aspects relate to the construction of the bodily self. 
An intact bodily self is a prerequisite for generating a normal sense of body ownership 
and agency, which in turn allow the individual to experience subjective involvement in 
practical tasks of everyday life (i.e., self-presence) (Tsakiris et al., 2007; Gallese & 
Sinigaglia 2010).  
By focusing more directly on the sense of embodiment, Chapter Five and Six have 
investigated fundamental aspects of coherent self-experience, namely the stability of 
body representations (top-down and bottom-up) in individuals with schizophrenia and 
with high schizotypal traits. More specifically, building on the hypothesis that 
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multisensory abnormalities in the schizophrenic spectrum are linked to deeper 
aberrancies in the structure of the self, Chapters Five and Six have utilised knowledge 
from neuropsychology, neuroscience and phenomenology to investigate the bodily 
roots of self-awareness and bodily-self abnormalities in schizophrenia. Coherently 
with the clinical reports that have observed abnormal body ownership in 
schizophrenia, research has shown that patients with schizophrenia are more 
susceptible to the Rubber Hand Illusion,and exhibit a more rapid onset of the illusion 
(Peled et al., 2000; Peled et al., 2003; Thakkar et al., 2011; for a review see Klaver & 
Dijkerman, 2016). Body ownership is believed to be dependent on the successful 
integration of multimodal information and on pre-existing body representations which 
possess their own frame of reference and are distinct from external spatial 
representation (Blanke et al., 2002; Ehrsson, 2007). Thus, the representation of one’s 
body, and the feeling of one’s body as “mine” is multidimensional as it involves both 
“bottom-up” (multisensory integration) and “top-down” (internal representations of the 
body) processes (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). These “a priori” structural-spatial body 
representation have a key role in elaborating multimodal stimuli and creating the 
experience of what is “mine”. Results emerging from Chapter Five and Chapter Six 
have suggested that more flexible bodily boundaries and bodily representation are 
likely to indicate a weaker sense of self. This in turn can represent an indirect measure 
of minimal self-disorders and can offer important insights into the disturbances of self-
awareness that may contribute to the development of schizophrenia. 
In Chapter Five (Costantini et al., 2020), we investigated body representation in 
relation to basic symptoms in patients with schizophrenia.  Basic symptoms define a 
set of mild self-experienced subclinical disturbances that are present since the 
prodromal phase and that involve different areas of psychic functioning. Most 
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importantly, basic symptoms are thought of as arising from the self, rather than 
happening to the self without its participation (see Mishara et al., 2016). Therefore, the 
basic symptoms approach is close to phenomenological models of self-disorders (e.g. 
the model proposed by Sass & Parnas, 2003, which emphasize that the symptoms 
are pre-psychotic 'as if' phenomena”). Thus, we utilised both the Rubber Hand Illusion 
and the Finger Localization Task to investigate body ownership and the body structural 
representation, respectively. Moreover, we investigated whether abnormalities in body 
representation would correlate with basic symptoms. 
Results show that patients were significantly less accurate than healthy controls when 
asked to identify pairs of fingers touched by the experimenter (when the hand was 
hidden from view). Interestingly, we observed a significant difference between patients 
and controls only for the third task of the Finger Localization Task, i.e., identification 
of pairs of fingers with hand hidden from view. The fact that patients and controls 
differed only on the third task, the most difficult one, suggests that such difference was 
mainly due to the higher complexity of the body structural representation tested, and 
not simply to a reduced tactile acuity. Most importantly, patients’ performance at the 
Finger Localization Task was negatively associated with basic symptoms, as 
measured by the SPI-A. Also, we found that performance at the task was negatively 
correlated with the malleability of the sense of body ownership: the less the individual 
ability to localize fingers, the stronger the rubber hand illusion. This evidence points 
towards misrepresentation of the self being core to schizophrenia and being present 
since the earlier stages of the disorder. 
Thus, in Chapter Five we have provided important insights on the relationship between 
body representation and self-disorders in patients with schizophrenia. Thus, we have 
showcased that patients with schizophrenia possess more malleable body 
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representations and can, therefore, more easily adopt faulty models of their own 
body’s spatial mapping and location. This, in result, can make them more susceptible 
to external, transitory influences (e.g. an external visual rubber hand).  Also, we have 
provided evidence that these abnormalities are linked to early markers of vulnerability 
to the disorder (i.e. basic symptoms). As basic symptoms represent real markers of 
vulnerability (Magini & Raballo, 2004), the study of these represents a valid point of 
reference for evaluating the subjective disorders present in the prodromal phases of 
the schizophrenic syndrome. 
In Chapter Five, we have adopted the Rubber Hand Illusion as this task has been 
widely utilised to investigate multisensory mechanisms of bodily self-identification and 
bodily self-localisation. However, especially considering novel findings, some task 
limitations must be addressed. A study from Lush et al. (2020) showed that the effects 
reported in the Rubber Hand Illusion could be attributed to imaginative suggestion (i.e. 
phenomenological control). The authors found substantial correlations between 
response to the illusion and phenomenological control. A possible way to bypass the 
dangers of “demand characteristics” of the task (i.e. the fact that the subjects say what 
they implicitly think they ought to say) is to utilise alternative tasks to test multisensory 
mechanisms of self-localisation (e.g. visual-proprioceptive), such as the prism 
adaptation task (Luautè et al., 2009). In the prism adaptation task, participants are 
asked to wear goggles designed to shift the visual scene laterally and to perform a 
series of pointing movements to a visual target. The first pointing movements are 
normally deviated toward the shifted location so that the subject misses the actual 
object. After some trials, the participants will adapt to the visual distortion and will be 
able to reach the target. Once the goggles are removed, the movements remain 
temporally biased toward the opposite side of the prism-induced displacement. What 
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this suggests is that the resolution of the sensorimotor discrepancy caused by the 
optical prisms requires a remapping of bodily and space coordinates into a new 
egocentric spatial frame of reference. 
In Chapter Six (Fotia et al., submitted), in accordance with the idea of schizophrenia 
as a continuum, we further investigated the body structural representation in 
individuals with high and low schizotypy. To this purpose, we utilised two body 
structural representation related tasks: the Finger Localization Task and the In 
Between Task. Results indicated that individuals with high schizotypy performed 
worse in both tasks. In line with what has been observed in Chapter Five, performance 
at the Finger Localization Task was impaired only in the third condition (two stimulated 
fingers with hands hidden from view). Moreover, building on research that observed 
an overlap between dissociation and schizophrenia (Ross, 1997), we screened 
participants in regard to dissociative symptomatology by means of the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale. Interestingly, our findings show that performance in both the 
Finger Localization and the In Between Tasks was negatively correlated with 
dissociative symptomatology (i.e. the higher the scores in the scale, the worse the 
performance). By showcasing that both individuals with high schizotypy and with 
elevated dissociative traits display a reduced acuity in body structural representation, 
we have raised interesting questions on whether this may account for the confusion 
between first and third-person perspectives present in schizophrenia spectrum 
disorders and in dissociative disorders. Indeed, possessing a faulty model of one 
own’s body might contribute to the tendency to disengage from normal forms of 
involvement with the external world, particularly with such acts that would normally be 
tacit and transparent (as in hyperreflexivity and diminished self-presence). 
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Most importantly, we have extended the results observed in Chapter Five - i.e. reduced 
accuracy to the Finger Localization Task in schizophrenia - to schizotypy. However, 
the task details have slightly changed between the two studies (namely, palms 
downward in Chapter Five and palms upward in Chapter Six). The Finger Localization 
Task was originally developed by Benton (1955) to measure the deficits exhibited in 
patients with finger agnosia; the test is described in “Contribution to 
Neuropsychological Assessment” (Benton et al., 1983) and in “A compendium of 
Neuropsychological Tests: Administration, Norms, and Commentary” (Strauss et al., 
2006). In the original version of the task, participants are required to put their hands 
with their palms facing upward. Also, the subject is given the option of responding by 
naming the stimulated finger (either by naming the number on the outline or naming 
the finger) or pointing at it on the outline. Later, this source of variability was eliminated, 
and the subjects were required to give a verbal response. Subsequent studies have 
utilized this task but with participants’ hands facing downward (Pipe, 1991, Geffen et 
al., 1985) and since then, the studies implementing the Finger Localization Task have 
utilized the palms downward and upward interchangeably. However, given the test-
retest reliability of the task (larger than .70), we are inclined to believe that these 
parameters do not have a significant impact on the overall performance. Thus, in 
Chapter Five, we have decided to utilise the “palms downward” version of the task so 
the stimulation could be similar to the one utilised in the Rubber Hand Illusion (i.e., 
with palms downward). In Chapter Six, we have decided to utilize the original version 
of the task (palms facing upward). 
 




In attempting to deliver an account of the body representation abnormalities observed 
in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, I have focused on concepts that derive from 
phenomenology and that have already been well integrated into current 
neuropsychological and neuroscientific research (Gallagher, 1986; 2005; Paillard, 
1999; de Vignemont, 2010; Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Di Vita et al., 2016). The 
concepts I am referring to are body image and body schema. As already mentioned 
during the course of the thesis, there has been much conflation of these two terms, 
presumably because of the dual meaning of the term ‘body’ (e.g., ‘lived’ or ‘objective’), 
despite the fact that different kinds of intentional and neural profiles underlie each one. 
The concept of body schema was originally introduced by Head and Holmes in 1911 
(Head & Holmes, 1911). Based on their work with neurological patients, Head and 
Holmes conceptualised the body schema as an “organised model of ourselves” which 
coordinates (multi)sensory information arising from the body in order to produce motor 
control and to localise sensations on the surface of the body (Head & Holmes, 1911). 
More specifically, they proposed the existence of different schemata. First, a body 
schema which registers and updates all of the sensory information coming from the 
postural changes of the body. Second, a “superficial schema” which is a “central 
mapping of somatotopic information derived from the tactile information” (Head & 
Holmes, 1911, p.187). Importantly, both the body schema and the superficial schema 
operate below the level of consciousness. This idea was later developed into the 
dyadic taxonomy (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Gallagher, 2005), by drawing a 
distinction between the body schema and the body image. The body image is 
generated from the contribution of all of the sensory channels and consists in the 
conscious representation (i.e. conceptual and perceptual) of our body in space as if it 
was intended by an external observer. Conversely, the body schema enables the 
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intentional directedness to the external environment that underlies perception and 
action and does so automatically. Thus, the body schema does not coincide with a 
specific perception, with an image or with a marginal form of awareness. Rather, it 
utilises the body to carry out actions in compliance with pragmatic interests. It has 
been proposed that the inferior posterior parietal cortex is mainly involved in the body-
image representation (Roux et al., 2003), whereas the body schema (i.e. sensorimotor 
guidance) relies on subcortical and superior parietal processing (Dijkerman & de 
Haan, 2007). As mentioned in section 2.4, these ideas of a body schema acting as a 
representation for environment-directed action, and a body image employed in the 
perceptual identification of body features, have been supported by a series of 
neuropsychological studies (Paillard, 1999; Halligan et al., 1995; Dijkerman & de 
Haan, 2007; Anema et al., 2008). Such studies have also hypothesised the existence 
of two additional subcomponents of the body image: the body structural representation 
and the body semantics (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Sirigu et al., 1991; de 
Vignemont., 2009). The body semantics corresponds to a conceptual and linguistic 
body representation, whereas the body structural representation consists of a 
structural description of the relationships between body parts, including the relative 
positions of different body parts relative to one another in a spatial configuration (for 
further specification, see section 2.4). 
Here, the nature of the body structural representation might sound confusing. At first 
glance, it could seem that the body structural representation and the body schema 
coincide (Sirigu et al., 1991). However, while the body schema is situational and 
environment-focused (i.e. the intention is directed to the environment), holistic (i.e. 
changes in posture involve global adjustment of body parts), and features operations 
carried out prior to, or outside of, conscious awareness, the body structural 
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representation involves an abstract or partial representation of the body, as conscious 
awareness can attend to one part or few areas of the body at a time (Gallagher, 2005). 
The important thing here is that the intentional content of the body structural 
representation features the body as an object, which is distinct from objects of the 
outer environment. On the other hand, the intentional content of the body schema is 
never one own’s body; rather, the body schema operates below the level of explicit, 
self-conscious awareness and is not directed at the self. 
At this point, some confusion might still exist regarding whether (and to what extent) 
there is a consciousness of the body schema and of the body image (which includes 
the body structural representation). To clarify, we possess a “tacitly given” awareness 
of our body as a sensorimotor subject in a perceptual background – the body schema 
- and we have an objectifiable representation of our own body – the body image - 
towards which we can intentionally draw our attention (i.e. as a focal object of 
awareness). As pointed out by Gallagher (2005), the processes of body image and 
body schema are dependent upon the intentional context of the agent. As such, they 
need to be understood under the domain of intentionality, rather than under the 
framework of a conscious vs unconscious dichotomy. Thus, if “my” intentionality is 
directed towards my body, we are referring to body image. Conversely, in the body 
schema, “my” body has an extra intentional direction towards the environment, and, 
though it involves my body, it is not directly and explicitly focused on the (objective) 
body itself. I will explain this more precisely. Take, for instance, the act of pouring 
water. The act of pouring the water defines the intentional act (body schema). Thus, 
the intentionality is directed towards accomplishing the task. The act is pre-reflectively 
accomplished without explicit moment-to-moment awareness of each body part and 
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body movement required for the task. Conversely, if I am asked to name a body part 
that has been just touched, that body part become the intentional object.  
The important conceptual distinction between body schema and body image should 
not imply a complete behavioural separation between these two aspects, as both can 
interact and influence each other. In normal conditions, the boundaries between body 
schema and body image are not rigid, and both of these components concur to 
structure our mind and our actions (Gallagher, 2005). For instance, tools such as 
prostheses can be incorporated both into the body image (at the level of a conscious 
perception of it as constituting part of one’s body) and in the body schema (at the level 
of an automatic involvement with the external world) (Gallagher & Cole, 1995). 
Nonetheless, there is a duplicity of the body. On the one hand, the body can be taken 
as an object just like any other intentional object (the objective body). Thus, the body 
can be represented as an image that is mediated by conscious awareness, anatomy, 
evaluations on the body. On the other hand, the body is first and foremost a lived body, 
a body as a subject that engages in tasks and with others. In this sense, the lived body 
represents the medium through which we live ‘from the inside’ and which constantly 
act behind the level of conscious awareness (the lived body).  
The main point of interest here is that body schema (i.e. the lived body) and body 
image (i.e. the objective body) reflect two aspects of two specific forms of bodily self-
awareness: the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective. The first-
person perspective entails that one’s living body (Leib) functions as an integrated sub-
conscious system of multisensory processes and this interaction between the sensory 
modalities and the environment manifests in the body schema. On the other hand, the 
third-person perspective entails that the multisensory processes (already functioning 
on-line), and the conceptual and affective representation of the body, contribute to the 
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constitution of the body image (Körper). While usually functioning together, these 
processes could potentially be dissociated. Interestingly, as we have already 
proposed, the minimal self-disorders observed in the schizophrenic spectrum might 
stem from a disassociation between the objective body and the lived body. 
7.4. Limitations  
The main limitation of the present thesis is that it has emphasised a conceptual notion 
of the self as a separate subject, while not considering the role of the body in action 
and social interaction. Indeed, an agent is not an isolated entity but rather it is deeply 
embedded in the world through an enactive embodied existence (i.e. its 
embeddedness is based upon its active engagement with the surrounding 
environment) (Varela, 1994; Gallese, 2003). It is noteworthy that the way we perceive 
things is largely in the service of how we can act upon them; thus, something that can 
be seen, it is seen in virtue of how it can be manipulated. For instance, when I see an 
apple, what I actually see is the opportunity afforded by that apple, for instance 
grasping it, eating it or throwing it. Thus, every perceptual capability we have is 
grounded in a fundamental way by the opportunities for action that that percept affords. 
Moreover, when we perceive the “graspability” of the apple placed in front of us, we 
do not simply experience it passively, but at the same time we also experience its 
implicit call to action via our body (i.e. as something that features motor-potentiality for 
our body), that is, a body that can reach and grasp the apple. Consequently, we 
acquire and sample our world and our bodily self through movement. Such a dynamic 
connection between the body and the environment modulates the patterns of our self-
development and gives rise to the experience of ‘minneness’ (Rochat, 1998; Gallese 
& Sinigaglia 2010; 2011). The same applies for our being in space, as bodily space 
182 
 
represents a horizon of motor possibilities. This type of bodily self-awareness is 
inherently non-conceptual and non-reflective (Gallagher, 2005).  
In this regard, a notable limitation of this thesis is that it has not properly experimentally 
assessed the body schema, which is the pre-reflective sensorimotor representation of 
the body morphology used for planning and executing body movements. The body 
schema is strictly linked to the functional representation of the space surrounding the 
body, the peripersonal space. The peripersonal space refers to a spatial interface 
immediately surrounding the body which enables the agent to interact with their 
immediate surroundings (Graziano, 1994), and has been conceptualised as a 
multisensory-motor interface which serve to determine the location of nearby sensory 
stimuli to generate appropriate motor act. The peripersonal space is highly malleable; 
using a tool to reach objects in the far space extends the boundaries of peripersonal 
space representation (Serino et al., 2007).  Unsurprisingly, research has suggested 
that modifications of peripersonal space usually co-occur with changes in the body 
schema. For instance, the active use of a tool to interact with objects placed in the 
peripersonal space, produces changes in the body schema, increasing length of the 
sensorimotor representation of the arm (Cardinali et al., 2009; Longo & Haggard, 
2010).  It could be hypothesised then, that the process of structuring space is also 
involved in building the intention to act, and that this, as a consequence, helps to 
structure the sense of self as a separate entity for the external environment. This is 
particularly important considering that the lack of boundaries between the self and 
other often reported in schizophrenia, are taken as marker of minimal self-disorders.  
With this in mind, in future research, I shall adopt a more enactive approach to the 
body, in order to emphasize the role of action and the role of space as core 
components of minimal selfhood. One way to do so would be to adopt tasks which 
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more finely assess the body schema. Being an implicit component of body 
representation, the body schema is resultingly less accessible to empirical 
investigation. However, goal-directed tasks which manipulate the sense of 
embodiment and self-localization can be useful in this regard. For instance, one could 
assess the effects of visual body manipulation (e.g. by magnifying and minifying the 
subject’s hand in virtual reality) on an open loop target locating task. The open loop 
task allows the participants to see their virtual hand only prior to locating the target, 
while being unable to view their hand when performing the movement; thus, this 
approach could specifically target the body schema, as during task performance the 
body itself is not the direct object of intentionality (see previous section). Possibly, 
individuals with schizophrenia spectrum condition, given their weaker body 
representation, would be more prone to the effects of manipulation of body perception 
in goal-oriented task compared to healthy individuals, thus reporting higher sense of 
body ownership and agency in the manipulation conditions.  
7.5. Conclusions 
Disturbances of the minimal self (located in pre-reflective self-awareness) have been 
proposed as core features of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Possessing minimal 
self-awareness entails that one possesses a first-person ownership of experience 
which is both automatic and transparent. In normal conditions, automatic inferential 
mechanisms allow the agent to discriminate between objects of the surrounding space 
that need to be taken into the foreground, and objects of the surrounding space that 
have to remain in the background, depending on their salience or relevance. 
Moreover, the body, being the medium through which we perceive and interact with 
the world, needs to be transparent. Indeed, it is normally assumed that a normal 
relationship between the body and the mind necessitates a state of ‘quiet cooperation’, 
184 
 
whereby the bodily functioning does not preoccupy the attention of an individual 
(Erikson, 1956; Stanghellini et al. 2012). Thus, minimal self-consciousness is 
characterised by “mediated immediacy” (Plessner, 1981). However, during the 
schizophrenic prodrome, the tacit knowledge of an agent’s body and of the 
surrounding reality (i.e. the “already familiar” way to experience reality) – becomes 
progressively lost. This loss is characterised by a breakdown of Gestalt perception, 
that is, a dissolution of the feelings of rootedness and at-homeness. These feelings 
are often accompanied with an extreme focus on objects/events of the lived space that 
would typically remain in the background of experience. Crucially, this tacit and “in the 
background” form of self-awareness (i.e. the ‘mineness’ of experience), appears 
compromised during the early stages of schizophrenia. When considering the 
evidence from clinical, neuropsychological and neuroscientific studies, it emerges that 
the disturbances in the minimal self, experienced during the schizophrenic prodrome, 
could be better understood as a complementary distortion of this tacit aspect of the 
act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection (or diminished 
presence) (Sass & Parnas, 2003).  
Diminished self-affection (or diminished presence) refers to a reduced first-person 
perspective on the world, with a diminished sense of inhabiting one's own actions, 
thoughts, perception and bodily sensations. Experientially, this can manifest with a 
sense of being dissociated (i.e. not related) from one’s own body (e.g. blurring of bodily 
boundaries), and from the environment, whereby the transparent and taken-for-
grandtness quality of experience is progressively lost. This means that there is a 
diminishment in the most basic sense of self presence: the sense of existing as a self-
possessed subject of awareness (Sass & Parnas, 2003). This alteration of pre-
reflective self-awareness is accompanied by compensatory hyper-reflectivity (Fuchs, 
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2005). Hyperreflexivity refers to the hyper-objectivization of aspects of the self, which 
are normally tacit and implicit. Thus, hyper-reflectivity can be considered as a 
paradoxical effect of reflexivity itself (Sass & Parnas, 2012; Fuchs, 2005). This 
tendency to objectivise one’s experience and one’s body is manifested through an 
externalisation or objectification of normally “automatic” processes.  
Both the concepts of hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection involve a disruption 
of the aforementioned tacit-focal structure of experience and are mutually implicative 
aspects of the intentional relationship between the embodied agent and the 
environment. This is particularly relevant when pertaining the domain of bodily self-
awareness. For instance, patients become excessively aware of bodily parts or 
functions that are typically in the tacit background of their experience (i.e. 
hyperreflexivity). As a result of this, the body becomes progressively experienced as 
devoid of life, or as mechanical and alien, often to the point of feeling that body parts 
are actually in possession or under the control of some alien being or force (i.e. 
diminished self-affection). As Sass and Parnas have noted: “...on our view, there is a 
sense in which the person with schizophrenia has both too little sense of self 
(diminished self-affection) and too much self-consciousness (hyperreflexivity)” (Sass 
& Parnas, 2003).  
In affording an excessive focus to one’s objective body, an agent is no longer relating 
to the body in a pre-reflective way (i.e. the “subjective body”). Specifically, pre-
reflectivity is lost in a condition characterised by the excessive reflection on automatic 
aspects of body awareness (see section 2.4.). This fracture in bodily-self experience 
is manifested through the agent’s inability to switch between the first-person 
perspective (i.e. the subjective body) and the third person perspective (i.e. the 
objective body) (Sass, 2003; Krueger, 2018). This aspect provides a useful resource 
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for understanding schizophrenia spectrum disorders, particularly if we assume that the 
fracture between the observing and the observed self represents a hallmark for the 
emergence of the disorder. Interestingly, a disruption in the regular ability to switch 
between first-person and third-person perspectives is something that has been 
observed in individuals with dissociative symptomatology (e.g. dissociative identity 
disorder, depersonalization and derealization) (Ciaunica et al., 2020; Sass, 1992; Bob 
et al., 2013), something which is often present in schizophrenic-like-conditions (e.g. in 
schizotypy) and in the earliest phases of schizophrenia (see section 1.3.1). 
Dissociation is characterised by a reduced sense of being in touch with the world in a 
“vital” and “first-person” perspective. Similarly, the schizophrenic individual 
experiences a disintegration of the minimal level of subjectivity, which is normally 
implicit in every act of awareness. In both conditions, the subject may feel detached 
from the medium that it would normally embody them in relation to the environment 
(the body), leading to feelings of alienation from the self and from the surrounding 
environment.  
This fundamentally embodied basis of the minimal self implies that the body 
represents the only interface with the world. Although our body is physically 
demarcated from the environment, the environment still influences us in profound 
ways. Therefore, the body needs to integrate multisensory information emanating from 
the environment in order to create a proper representation of both the external 
environment and of our body acting in it. As mentioned in Chapters Three and Four, 
an important aspect that enables the brain to integrate incoming stimuli depends on 
the temporal structure of this information. The temporal relationships of incoming 
stimuli, therefore, provide information on how these signals should be integrated in 
order to create a coherent perceptual representation of the world. 
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To sum up, the experiments described in the present thesis have provided evidence 
for disruption in two main components in schizophrenia spectrum disorders: 
multisensory integration and body representation. In particular, we have provided 
evidence that the bodily self is majorly affected in both schizophrenia and high 
schizotypy (Chapters Five and Six) and that this may be due to an impaired integration 
process of sensory information (Chapters Three and Four).  On this basis, I have 
attempted to integrate this evidence with a broader theoretical framework which 
conceptualises schizophrenia spectrum disorders as disorders of minimal self. The 
minimal self implies that self-experience is pre-reflective (i.e., it is a form of selfhood 
that is prior to any explicit thinking about oneself), meaning that it is “transparent” (Sass 
& Parnas, 2003).  
In light of this, it could be argued that self-disorders connotate a qualitative 
modification of this transparent dimension experience and that this modification starts 
to happen since the earliest stages of the disorder (e.g. pre-morbid and prodromic). 
Indeed, during these phases, nuanced manifestations of bodily-self disorder can 
indicate a latent vulnerability trait. The body, which normally provides a synthesis 
between subjectivity and objectivity, begins to acquire the characteristic of an “alien” 
entity, in which the two poles of subject and object are not anymore integrated, but 
rather becomes blurred. In particular, the body appears to progressively lose its 
transparency, whereby sensory information arising from both the outer (environment) 
and the inner (body) world, are not reliable and are not properly integrated. It can be 
argued then, that self-disorders underlie a profound fracture of the dynamic 
interrelationship between the self and the environment, and more specifically between 
the first and third-person perspective. 
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All in all, the aforementioned aspects have important implications for the early 
detection and the early treatment of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. First, creating 
a unifying model of self-disorders in schizophrenia would allow researchers to identify 
and describe the processes involved in the emergence of minimal selfhood 
abnormalities. Second, intervening in a situation in which the patient still maintains a 
certain level of self-presence implies that he will be more receptive to treatment.  
Indeed, during the prodromal phase (e.g. basic symptoms), individuals are aware of 
the peculiarity of their symptoms which are experienced as disturbing disruptions in 
self-experience and which negatively impacts on their self-assessed quality of life. As 
schizophrenia develops and the body loses its transparency, the subject becomes less 
able to immerse himself in the environment and to project himself toward the future. 
Thus, the symptomatology becomes part of the patient’ core sense of identity, 
meaning that the patient is no longer aware of the aberration of their experiences. As 
a consequence, schizophrenic individuals undergo a profound reorientation of self-
identity, while building a new “philosophical schema”. Often times, this schema 
consists of a solipsistic worldview and suspiciousness of the surrounding environment 
(Stangehllini & Fusar-Poli, 2012). Notably, these ideas are already present during the 
prodrome, although to a lesser degree. For instance, individuals often react to their 
feelings of disorientation by consciously choosing to oppose “common-sense rules” 
and taking an eccentric perspective on reality (e.g. as it is the case in individuals with 
high schizotypy). After the manifestation of first frank symptoms, these abnormalities 
consolidate to the point of giving rise to symptoms such as delusion, hallucinations, 
disorganised speech and behaviour (Sass & Parnas, 2003).  
More intensive research in the early detection of schizophrenia spectrum disorders is 
necessary to detect sub-threshold symptoms and to ensure the development of 
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appropriate multidimensional therapeutic approaches. Furthermore, more focus 
should be given to the subjective lived experience of the patients, their interpersonal 
relationships and the significant events in their environment, such as life stressors that 
could compromise the outcome of the treatment (e.g. trauma, substance abuse) and 
those that could represent protective factors to the emergence of the. In this context, 
the conceptualisation of schizophrenia spectrum disorders as disorders of the minimal 
self has provided a deeper understanding of the subjective dimension of the patient 
who is undergoing a profound alteration of their ‘being-in-the-world’ (i.e. the totality of 
their subjective experience). Current research on the early identification of 
schizophrenia should further investigate evidence-based practices in order to detect 
self-abnormalities in healthy individuals which exhibit sub-psychotic symptoms. For 
instance, semi-structured interviews could be implemented to detect sub-threshold 
changes in self-experience of healthy individuals with high schizotypy, thus elucidating 
why some people with schizotypy would eventually develop the disorder, whereas 
some others would not. 
Finally, further research could investigate whether and to what extent minimal self-
disorders in schizophrenia could be caused by failures in pre-reflective, probabilistic 
inference mechanisms. Indeed, in order to maintain its organization as an adaptive 
living system, an organism has to minimize information-theoretic free-energy (i.e. 
errors) in its interactions with the environment (Free Energy Principle, Friston, 2010). 
This minimization can be achieved by predicting upcoming events (e.g. the sensory 
inputs) and/or by changing the environment to match what is anticipated. In this 
account, the experience of the minimal self should be interpreted as the experience of 
having predicted or being “already familiar” with, what one perceives, something that 
appears deeply impaired in schizophrenia spectrum disorder. Thus, such a framework 
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